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ABSTRACT 
Marisa R. Morrison: Medicaid Expansion Programs: Effects on Medicaid Enrollment and 
Healthcare Employment 
(Under the direction of Jonathan Oberlander) 
 
 This dissertation examines the effects of Section 1115 coverage expansions on health 
insurance coverage and healthcare employment. Although Section 1115 expansions had 
smaller enrollments than the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) Medicaid 
expansion, they—like the ACA’s Medicaid expansion—extended publicly financed health 
insurance to low-income adults who were previously ineligible for such coverage. Therefore, 
studying the effects of Section 1115 expansions can provide insights into the longer-term 
effects of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.  
In the dissertation’s first analysis, I construct multinomial probit models in Current 
Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement data to evaluate Section 1115 
expansions’ effects on health insurance coverage for “pre-expansion eligible” parents and 
children. These pre-expansion eligible individuals were eligible for Medicaid or the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) under rules in place prior to or in the absence 
of Section 1115 expansions. I find that the probability of public coverage enrollment 
increased for pre-expansion eligible children and parents and that the probability of private 
coverage declined for pre-expansion eligible parents after Section 1115 expansions. Because 
Section 1115 expansions were associated with an increased probability of Medicaid or CHIP 
enrollment among pre-expansion eligible individuals, the ACA’s effect on pre-expansion 
eligible individuals’ enrollment in public coverage is likely to be larger.  
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 Second, I use ordinary least squares (OLS) models with county and year fixed effects 
to estimate Section 1115 expansions’ effects on county-level health care and social assistance 
employment. This study’s principal data set is County Business Patterns data. I find that 
Section 1115 expansions were associated with increases in county-level health care and 
social assistance employment across all states with changes in expansion status during the 
study period. This finding suggests that healthcare employment could grow in response to 
public coverage expansions.  
 Finally, I use OLS models with hospital and year fixed effects to examine Section 
1115 expansions’ effects on hospital employment. This study’s key data source is the 
American Hospital Association annual survey. I find that these expansions were not 
associated with hospital employment growth. Applying these findings to the ACA’s coverage 
expansion suggests that the ACA could have small effects on hospital employment.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) authorized the most 
significant expansion of Medicaid coverage since the program’s creation in 1965. As of April 
2015, 29 states and Washington, DC, have adopted the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, which 
has been in effect since January 2014 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2015). As a result of this 
policy change, Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) enrollment grew 
by 26% in “expansion” states and 8% in “non-expansion” states between summer 2013 and 
January 2015 (Artiga et al., 2015). Because additional states may adopt the ACA’s Medicaid 
expansion at a later date and because the Medicaid expansion has only been in effect for 
slightly more than a year, looking back at the effects of pre-2014 Medicaid expansions can 
provide insights into the longer-term effects of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. 
This dissertation specifically draws lessons from pre-ACA Medicaid expansions in 
two areas: the effects of Medicaid expansion on health insurance for individuals already 
eligible for coverage under pre-expansion rules and the effects of Medicaid expansion on 
health care employment. The pre-ACA public coverage expansions on which this dissertation 
focuses are Section 1115 waiver-based expansions.  
This dissertation concentrates on Section 1115 expansions because they share a target 
population of parents and non-elderly, low-income adults without dependent children with 
the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. That being said, pre-ACA Section 1115 expansions do not 
present a perfect comparison for the ACA’s Medicaid expansion because they had smaller 
enrollments and generally were not implemented at the same time as other major health 
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insurance market changes. Furthermore, federal spending on Section 1115 expansions was 
much more constrained than is federal spending on the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.  
Because the ACA’s Medicaid expansion is an unprecedented event no prior 
expansion is exactly comparable to the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. Massachusetts’s 2006-
2007 health care reforms, on which the ACA is modeled, provide the closest approximation 
to the ACA’s coverage expansions. However, Massachusetts already had relatively high rates 
of health insurance coverage and a large healthcare workforce supply compared to other U.S. 
states prior to 2006 (Long, Stockley, & Dahlen, 2012; Staiger, Auerbach, & Buerhaus, 2011). 
Focusing on expansions carried out through Section 1115 waivers allows this dissertation to 
take into consideration public coverage expansion experiences in multiple states.  
Overview of Medicaid 
The Medicaid program is integral to the Section 1115 expansions discussed here. 
Prior to the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, Medicaid provided publicly financed health 
insurance coverage to specific categories of individuals: low-income children, parents of 
dependent children, pregnant women, and elderly or disabled individuals. Each state’s 
Medicaid program receives both federal and state funding, but each state has flexibility in 
administering its Medicaid program. Although the federal government has set minimum 
income eligibility limits, defined the types of individuals that are eligible for Medicaid 
coverage, and mandated certain Medicaid benefits, states can modify healthcare provider 
reimbursement, change Medicaid enrollment and renewal processes, enroll Medicaid 
beneficiaries into managed care, introduce premiums and cost sharing for some enrollees, 
offer additional benefits, increase income eligibility thresholds for mandatory populations, 
and apply for federal permission to cover optional populations (Kaiser Commission on 
Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2013).  
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Prior to the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, more than three-fourths of children in 
poverty were enrolled in Medicaid coverage while 9.8% were uninsured (Majerol, Newkirk, 
& Garfield, 2015). In contrast, only 35.2% percent of non-elderly adults in poverty were 
enrolled in Medicaid coverage, and 37.2% of adults in poverty were uninsured (Majerol, 
Newkirk, & Garfield, 2015). One reason that so many low-income U.S. adults were 
uninsured is that many states had income eligibility limits for parents that were below the 
federal poverty level (limits that still exist in some states). In addition, non-elderly, non-
disabled adults without dependent children (“childless adults”) were ineligible for Medicaid 
in most states prior to the ACA’s enactment (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the 
Uninsured, 2013).  
 States that have accepted the ACA’s Medicaid expansion have extended Medicaid 
eligibility to all individuals with household incomes below 138% of the federal poverty level 
(FPL) (Heberlein et al., 2013). The ACA also includes provisions simplifying Medicaid 
enrollment and renewal processes and eliminating assets as a factor for determining Medicaid 
eligibility (Heberlein et al., 2013; Somashekhar & Tumulty, 2013).  
Overview of Medicaid Waivers 
Prior to the implementation of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion in 2014, states had 
limited options for providing coverage to parents whose incomes were otherwise too high to 
qualify for Medicaid or to childless adults who were otherwise excluded from Medicaid 
coverage.  
Some states used their own funds to extend health insurance to individuals otherwise 
ineligible for Medicaid. For example, Pennsylvania used National Tobacco Settlement 
Agreement money to provide health insurance coverage to low-income, uninsured adults who 
were ineligible for Medicaid (Dorn & Meyer, 2004). Washington state funded coverage for 
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individuals with incomes up to 200% FPL through a Basic Health Plan (Kaiser Commission 
on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2010; Dorn & Alteras, 2004).  
 Another option for expanding Medicaid eligibility for parents—but not for childless 
adults—was a Section 1931 expansion. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 removed the connection between welfare receipt and Medicaid 
eligibility, providing states with opportunities to expand coverage to parents not eligible for 
welfare (Guyer & Mann, 1998). Section 1931 of the Social Security Act allowed states to 
disregard a certain portion of a Medicaid applicant’s income or assets when determining that 
applicant’s Medicaid eligibility—a policy that effectively makes more parents eligible for 
Medicaid coverage (Birnbaum, 2000). Under Section 1931 rules, states could receive 
matching funds from the federal government to cover parents eligible for Medicaid under 
Section 1931 expansions (Guyer & Mann, 1998) 
The third option for expanding publicly financed health insurance to adults was a 
Section 1115 waiver. In addition to being a tool for expanding coverage, the waivers 
provided states with opportunities to try new methods for administering Medicaid and CHIP 
programs (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, n.d.). States submitted waiver 
applications outlining coverage expansion plans to the Centers for Medicaid and Medicaid 
Services (CMS). CMS and the states then negotiated waiver details (Artiga, 2009). CMS only 
approved waivers that were budget neutral—that is, CMS required each waiver to be 
projected to not increase federal spending above what the federal government would spend in 
the waiver’s absence (Artiga, 2009). To maintain budget neutrality while expanding 
coverage, states implemented cost-saving strategies such as moving Medicaid enrollees into 
Medicaid managed care plans, redirecting disproportionate share hospital payment to health 
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insurance coverage or capping expansion program enrollment (Government Accountability 
Office, 2013). CMS approves waivers for five-year periods, after which a state must renew a 
waiver (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, n.d.).  
Overview of Dissertation 
This dissertation examines the effects of Section 1115 expansions on health insurance 
coverage and on the healthcare workforce employment to provide lessons for the possible 
longer-term effects of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. It includes three separate studies. The 
first study evaluates how Section 1115 expansions affect health insurance coverage for “pre-
expansion eligible” parents and children. This study defines pre-expansion eligible 
individuals as parents or children who are eligible for Medicaid or CHIP either under pre-
expansion Medicaid and CHIP rules in expansion states or under public coverage rules in 
states without Section 1115 expansions.  
The second study examines the effects of Section 1115 expansions on health care and 
social assistance employment at the county level between 2000 and 2010. The third study 
assesses the effect of Section 1115 expansions on full-time equivalent (FTE) hospital 
employment between 2000 and 2010. 
Contribution to the Literature  
These studies contribute to the literature on the effects of coverage expansions on 
health insurance coverage and the healthcare workforce. The first study adds to the literature 
because it examines the effects of expansions in several states not only on coverage for pre-
expansion eligible children but also on coverage for pre-expansion eligible parents. In 
addition, it considers CHIP-eligible children—not just Medicaid-eligible children—as pre-
expansion eligible children and it assesses whether public coverage expansions affect private 
health insurance coverage for pre-expansion eligible adults.  
6 
The second and third studies contribute to the limited research on the link between 
coverage expansion and healthcare employment (Buchmueller et al., 2014; Cozad, 2012; 
Shin & Rosenbaum 2012; Missouri Economic Research and Information Center, 2014; 
Staiger, Auerbach, & Buerhaus, 2011; Turner, 2014). Only two prior studies on this topic 
have used multivariate techniques to assess how coverage expansion affects specific types of 
healthcare workers (Buchmueller et al., 2014; Cozad, 2012). This dissertation’s second study 
is the first to use multivariate techniques to assess coverage expansions’ effects on 
employment within the entire healthcare sector in multiple states. The third study in this 
dissertation focuses on the effects of coverage expansions on hospital employment in 
multiple states rather than just in Massachusetts (Cozad, 2012).  
Policy Implications 
The studies in this dissertation also have implications for the ACA. First, by 
examining the effects of Section 1115 expansions on uninsurance, private health insurance 
coverage, and Medicaid or CHIP coverage for pre-expansion eligible populations, the first 
study in this dissertation can identify changes in health coverage patterns that could be 
repeated on a broader scale as a result of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. Prior to the ACA 
Medicaid expansion’s implementation, there were approximately 9.1 million non-elderly 
individuals who were eligible for Medicaid but were uninsured (Sommers & Epstein, 2011). 
Due to the publicity surrounding the ACA, outreach efforts, changes to Medicaid enrollment 
procedures, and the ACA’s requirement that most individuals have health insurance 
coverage, states expected many of these individuals to come out of the woodwork to enroll in 
public coverage (Sommers & Epstein, 2011).  
Enrollment of this population into public coverage has potentially significant 
implications for state budgets because the federal government provides states with enhanced 
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funding only for covering individuals newly eligible for Medicaid under ACA rules 
(Sommers & Epstein, 2011; Sommers & Epstein, 2013). When individuals who are not 
newly eligible for Medicaid enroll in public coverage, the federal government provides states 
with pre-ACA levels of federal matching funds to cover these enrollees’ costs (Sommers & 
Epstein, 2011). In fact, anecdotal evidence from California and Rhode Island suggests that 
“woodwork” enrollment has contributed to increased state Medicaid spending (Millman, 
2014).  
At present, there is limited information on woodwork enrollment under the ACA 
because CMS and other organizations are not publicly releasing data on health insurance 
coverage trends for “new eligibles” and woodwork individuals (Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, 2015; Levy, 2015; Urban Institute, 2014). Thus, it is only possible to 
identify the woodwork effect in states that have so far rejected the ACA’s Medicaid 
expansion and not in states that have expanded Medicaid coverage (Artiga et al., 2015).  
At the same time, it is important to evaluate whether pre-ACA coverage expansions 
influenced healthcare employment because the potential job-creating effects of the ACA’s 
Medicaid expansion are cited as a benefit of expansion (Gruber, 2009; White House Council 
of Economic Advisors, 2014). Moreover, 10.6% of the employed U.S. population worked in 
health care in January 2015, and the healthcare sector represented 17.4% of the U.S. gross 
domestic product in 2013 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015; Hartman et al., 2015). It is 
especially useful to examine the effects of pre-ACA coverage expansions on hospital 
employment because hospitals—as providers of emergency care—represent an important site 
of care for low-income and uninsured individuals, the ACA’s target population for coverage.  
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Dissertation Organization 
Chapters 2 through 4 present the first, second, and third studies included in this 
dissertation. Chapter 5 synthesizes the conclusions from the studies presented and describes 
opportunities for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2. THE EFFECT OF MEDICAID EXPANSION ON HEALTH 
INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR PRE-EXPANSION ELIGIBLE PARENTS AND 
CHILDREN  
 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) enables states to expand 
Medicaid coverage to all adults with household incomes below 138% of the federal poverty 
level (FPL). In addition to expanding coverage to adults newly eligible for Medicaid, the 
ACA’s Medicaid expansion is likely to increase Medicaid participation—through publicity, 
outreach and administrative simplification—among the millions of individuals who were 
Medicaid-eligible under pre-ACA rules (Sommers & Epstein, 2010). This increase in 
Medicaid participation among pre-ACA Medicaid-eligible individuals is known as the 
“woodwork effect” (Sommers & Epstein, 2011). 
 States are concerned about the “woodwork” population because of its budgetary 
implications for Medicaid (Millman, 2014). Although the federal government will pay no 
less than 90% of the costs of Medicaid enrollees newly eligible through the ACA, it will not 
provide funds beyond the traditional match rate to cover spending on enrollees eligible for 
Medicaid under pre-ACA rules (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2013). The 
traditional match rate varies by state, covering between 50% and 74% of Medicaid enrollee 
costs, so any increase in woodwork enrollment entails additional costs to states (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, 2014).  
 At present, limited information is available on woodwork enrollment under the ACA. 
For example, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) does not publicly 
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separate total Medicaid and CHIP enrollment into “newly ACA eligible” enrollment and 
“eligible under pre-ACA rules” enrollment.  
 The ACA’s Medicaid expansion is unprecedented in its magnitude. Yet examining 
the effects of prior Medicaid expansions on health insurance coverage for individuals eligible 
for Medicaid or CHIP prior to these expansions could provide insight into the ACA’s 
potential woodwork effects. This study assesses the effects of Section 1115 waiver-based 
public coverage expansions on Medicaid coverage, uninsurance, and private coverage for 
parents and children eligible for Medicaid and CHIP coverage prior to these expansions or in 
states without coverage expansions. I refer to these individuals as the “pre-expansion 
eligible” population. In this study, individuals who are pre-expansion eligible can be enrolled 
in Medicaid or CHIP, covered by private coverage, or uninsured.
1
 
Background 
Overview of Section 1115 Waiver-Based Health Insurance Coverage Expansions 
Before the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, states had three options for expanding 
publicly financed health insurance to adults. First, states could create public insurance 
options that were entirely state-funded, such as Washington state’s Basic Health Plan (Kaiser 
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2010; Dorn & Alteras, 2004). A second option 
was a Section 1931 expansion, created by Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). Section 1931 of the Social Security Act allowed 
states to expand Medicaid eligibility for parents and children by increasing the amount of a 
Medicaid applicant’s income or assets that could be disregarded when determining that 
applicant’s Medicaid eligibility (Birnbaum, 2000).  
                                                          
1
 As noted later in this chapter, I consider Medicaid or CHIP to be the primary coverage for individuals who 
have both Medicaid or CHIP and private coverage.  
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Finally, states could expand publicly financed health insurance through the Section 
1115 waiver process. These waivers allowed states to waive key federally mandated features 
of the Medicaid program and still obtain Medicaid matching funds from the federal 
government. To obtain a Section 1115 waiver, a state submitted an application to CMS. The 
state and CMS then negotiated the waiver’s terms (Artiga, 2009). CMS required waivers to 
be projected to not increase federal spending above what the federal government would 
spend in the waiver’s absence—a condition known as “budget neutrality” (Artiga, 2009).  
Prior Research on How Medicaid and CHIP Coverage Expansions Affect “Pre-
Expansion” Eligible Parents and Children 
Below, I summarize research on the effects of public insurance expansions on 
coverage for pre-expansion eligible children and parents. In particular, I review prior 
literature on how expansions affect parents’ and children’s substitution of public coverage for 
private coverage.  
Effects of Coverage Expansion on Pre-Expansion Eligible Children’s Coverage 
Researchers have examined how three types of coverage expansions—parental 
Medicaid expansions, CHIP implementation, and Massachusetts’s 2006–2007 healthcare 
reforms—have affected children’s health insurance coverage.  
I located three studies that examine how parental coverage expansions affected 
children’s health insurance coverage. All three studies conclude that these expansions 
increased children’s public coverage enrollment and decreased uninsurance. The earliest of 
these studies, by Ku and Broaddus (2001), finds that young children’s Medicaid participation 
rates increased 16 percentage points between 1990 and 1998 in three states with parental 
Medicaid expansions, even though Medicaid eligibility rules for these children had not 
changed. On the other hand, in states without parental Medicaid expansions, children’s 
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participation in Medicaid only increased 3 percentage points during the same period. 
However, this descriptive study, which uses Current Population Survey Annual Social and 
Economic Supplement (CPS ASEC), does not control for other factors that affect coverage. 
Using multivariate techniques, CPS ASEC data, and a larger sample of states, Aizer 
and Grogger (2003) find that parental Medicaid expansions increased the probability of 
children’s enrollment in Medicaid by 5.3 percentage points. Dubay and Kenney (2003) find 
that Massachusetts’s expansion of Medicaid coverage for parents in 1997 was associated 
with a 14.2 percentage point increase in the percent of Medicaid-eligible children enrolled in 
Medicaid and an 11 percentage point increase in insurance coverage compared to other U.S. 
states (Dubay & Kenney, 2003). 
Two studies indicate that CHIP was associated with increases in Medicaid coverage 
for low-income children. An uncontrolled analysis from Dubay and colleagues (2007) using 
the National Health Interview Survey finds that CHIP implementation corresponded with an 
11.2 percentage point increase in public coverage among Medicaid-eligible children. Because 
the authors do not control for other factors, it is impossible to rule out other explanations 
besides CHIP implementation for increases in children’s Medicaid participation. Using 
multivariate methods in Medical Expenditure Panel Survey data, Hudson, Selden, and 
Banthin (2005) find not only increases in Medicaid participation among Medicaid-eligible 
children but also decreases in uninsurance after CHIP implementation.  
I identified one study that examines how Massachusetts’s healthcare reforms in 
2006–2007 affected Medicaid coverage for low-income children (Kenney, Long, & Luque, 
2010). Using CPS ASEC data from 2005–2009, the authors find that children in 
Massachusetts in families with incomes below 200% FPL were 10.4 percentage points more 
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likely to be enrolled in Medicaid coverage and 5.1 percentage points less likely to be 
uninsured compared to children in other New England states (Kenney, Long, & Luque, 
2010). Like Dubay and Kenney’s study (2003), Kenney, Long, and Luque’s study (2010) 
focuses only on changes in one state and therefore its results may be less generalizable to the 
rest of the United States.  
Taken together, these studies suggest that Medicaid expansions increase public 
coverage and reduce uninsurance for pre-expansion eligible children.  
Enrollment of Pre-Expansion Eligible Parents into Coverage after Coverage 
Expansions to Adults  
Two studies use difference-in-difference models to estimate the enrollment of pre-
expansion eligible parents into Medicaid after coverage expansions. Sommers, Kenney, and 
Epstein (2014) use American Community Survey data to examine changes in health 
insurance coverage for previously Medicaid-eligible parents after ACA-related Medicaid 
expansions in Washington, DC, and Connecticut in 2010. The authors observe an increase in 
coverage rates for previously Medicaid-eligible parents after Medicaid expansion in 
Connecticut but not in Washington, DC (Sommers, Kenney, & Epstein, 2014). Sonier, 
Boudreaux, and Blewett (2013) find that Massachusetts’s 2006–2007 healthcare reforms 
increased Medicaid enrollment by 16.3 percentage points among previously Medicaid-
eligible parents in Massachusetts compared to their peers in surrounding states (Sonier, 
Boudreaux, & Blewett, 2013).  
Both Sommers and colleagues’ (2014) and Sonier and colleagues’ (2013) studies are 
limited by their focus on states with relatively high Medicaid income eligibility limits for 
parents and relatively high Medicaid participation rates among Medicaid-eligible 
individuals—even prior to the coverage expansions described in these two studies. In 
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particular, Sommers and colleagues’ mixed findings may be due to the fact that both 
Connecticut and Washington, DC, had state-funded coverage expansions for adults prior to 
adopting the ACA’s early expansion option. However, the studies by Sommers and 
colleagues (2014) and Sonier and colleagues (2013) together suggest that Medicaid 
expansions increase parental Medicaid coverage. 
Substitution of Private Coverage for Public Coverage after Medicaid and CHIP 
Expansions 
 The substitution of private coverage for Medicaid or CHIP—usually described as 
“crowd-out”—has been studied extensively. Public coverage can crowd out private coverage 
in two ways. First, individuals can drop private insurance coverage—either employer-
sponsored coverage or non-group coverage—in favor of Medicaid or CHIP after an 
expansion of public coverage (Gruber & Simon, 2008). Second, firms can respond to public 
insurance expansions by making changes to employer-sponsored insurance that result in 
employees’ moving from employer-sponsored coverage to public coverage (Gruber & 
Simon, 2008).  
I identified several studies that examined crowd-out for pre-expansion eligible 
children. Both Aizer and Grogger (2003) and Dubay and Kenney (2003) estimate that 
parental Medicaid expansions increased pre-expansion eligible children’s Medicaid 
enrollment without a statistically significant effect on these children’s private coverage. 
Hudson, Selden, and Banthin (2005) similarly find that CHIP implementation did not 
produce statistically significant estimates of crowd-out among already Medicaid-eligible 
children. Kenney, Long, and Luque (2010) extend prior research on crowd-out among 
children by separately examining substitution of public coverage for employer-sponsored 
insurance and non-group insurance. They conclude that although there is no evidence that 
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Massachusetts’s state-level healthcare reforms caused substitution of employer-sponsored 
insurance for public coverage, the reforms did appear to decrease non-group coverage among 
children already eligible for public coverage in Massachusetts (Kenney, Long, & Luque, 
2010).  
 Besides these studies, there is a substantial body of literature on the effect of 
expansions on crowd-out rates among low-income children and parents. The initial study of 
crowd-out, conducted by Cutler and Gruber (1996), finds that nearly half of the individuals 
newly insured as a result of Medicaid expansions in the late 1980s and early 1990s were 
previously privately insured.  
Studies that followed Cutler and Gruber (1996) re-examine these 1980s–1990s 
Medicaid expansions, consider CHIP’s effects on crowd-out, or assess how expansions 
affected private insurance coverage for non-elderly adults. The range of crowd-out estimates 
varies substantially across studies and estimates are sensitive to the expansion studied, the 
data set used, and the methods the authors employ (Gruber & Simon, 2008; Card & Shore-
Sheppard, 2004; Hudson, Selden, & Banthin, 2005). One set of studies finds negligible rates 
of crowd-out (Aizer & Grogger, 2003; Card a&nd Shore-Sheppard, 2004; Ham & Shore-
Sheppard, 2005; Shore-Sheppard, 2008; Hamersma & Kim, 2013). A second set of studies 
finds some evidence of crowd-out after expansions, but usually at rates lower than the 50% 
from Cutler and Gruber’s 1996 study (Dubay & Kenney, 1996; Dubay & Kenney, 1997; 
Thorpe & Florence, 1998; Blumberg, Dubay, & Norton, 2000; Shore-Sheppard, 2000; Yazici 
& Kaestner, 2000; Shone et al., 2008; Kronick & Gilmer, 2002; Busch & Duchovny, 2005; 
Atherly, 2012; Lo, 2013; Sommers, Kenney, & Epstein, 2013). 
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Although the literature on crowd-out is extensive, there are no studies that focus on 
crowd-out among pre-expansion eligible parents. Furthermore, most crowd-out studies use 
linear probability models, which can result in nonsensical negative predicted probabilities 
(Hudson, Selden, & Banthin, 2005). This study avoids the problem of out-of-range 
predictions by using multinomial probit models. Finally, the lack of consensus on public 
coverage expansions’ effects on crowd-out suggests that there are still opportunities to study 
this topic.  
The Current Study’s Contribution to the Literature 
This study contributes to the literature on the effects of public insurance expansions 
on coverage for pre-expansion eligible individuals because it includes a broad group of 
states. In contrast, Dubay and Kenney (2003); Long, Kenney, and Luque (2010); Sommers 
and colleagues (2014); and Sonier and colleagues (2013) focus on a narrow set of states with 
higher family income eligibility limits for public coverage and higher-than-average Medicaid 
participation rates (Sonier, Boudreaux, & Blewett, 2013). Furthermore, this study is the first 
to examine the effects of Medicaid expansion on pre-expansion eligible parents’ enrollment 
in private health insurance coverage.  
Conceptual Framework 
 In this study, I assume that parents face two key decisions regarding health insurance: 
whether to obtain any insurance and whether to substitute public coverage for private 
coverage. All parents and children included in this study are assumed to be eligible for public 
coverage even if they are uninsured.  
I assume that parents who are considering whether or not to obtain coverage weigh its 
benefits against its costs. Parents’ perceptions of coverage’s benefits and costs likely differ 
according to demographic characteristics and health status of parents and their families, 
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parental knowledge, family incomes, characteristics of state Medicaid and CHIP programs, 
and stigma surrounding public coverage (Davidoff & Garrett, 2001; Wolfe & Scrivner, 2005; 
Currie, 2004). A parent’s or child’s demographic and health-status characteristics can affect 
how much value a parent places on obtaining coverage for herself and her children. For 
example, parents with children in poor health are more likely to place a higher value on 
coverage than would parents with children who are in good health (Davidoff et al., 2000). In 
turn, parents who place more value on coverage are more likely to enroll themselves and 
their children in coverage.  
Parents’ perceptions of the value of coverage may reflect their knowledge of public 
insurance programs. For example, some low-income parents do not know that they or their 
children are eligible for public coverage and thus remain uninsured (Baicker, Congdon, & 
Mullanaithan, 2012). Other parents may believe that enrolling their children in public 
coverage will expose unauthorized-immigrant family members to deportation (Ojeda & 
Brown, 2005). In this study, such knowledge cannot be measured.  
I propose that family income influences decisions about whether or not to obtain 
insurance. For the lower-income families considered in this study, private coverage—in 
particular, non-group coverage—could be too expensive (Davidoff et al., 2004). Public 
coverage entails relatively low out-of-pocket costs for families but premiums or cost-sharing 
can deter participation in public insurance programs (Kronebusch & Elbel, 2004; Wright et 
al., 2010).  
Medicaid and CHIP program characteristics shape parental decisions about insurance 
by affecting the non-financial costs of applying for public coverage. Hassles such as a 
burdensome application process could deter Medicaid and CHIP enrollment, causing some 
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parents and children to remain uninsured (Baicker, Congdon, & Mullainathan, 2012). 
Simpler enrollment processes could raise the value of public coverage relative to uninsurance 
and therefore increase an individual’s probability of public insurance enrollment (Baicker, 
Congdon, & Mullainathan, 2012). The stigma surrounding participation in public programs 
like Medicaid or CHIP could also influence the decision to enroll in coverage. Stigma can 
lower the value of enrolling in public insurance and thus reduce an individual’s probability of 
public coverage enrollment—though prior research suggests that the magnitude of this effect 
could be small (Currie, 2004).  
Pre-expansion eligible individuals with access to private health insurance coverage 
have the ability to decide whether or not to substitute their private health insurance coverage 
with public coverage. For low-income individuals, a primary factor in this choice is 
affordability. For many low-income individuals, Medicaid—with its low out-of-pocket 
costs—represents a more affordable choice than private health insurance coverage does 
(Gruber & Simon, 2008). Furthermore, parents, based on their and their children’s 
demographic characteristics and health status, may favor the more comprehensive benefits of 
Medicaid to private coverage’s less generous benefits (Gruber & Simon, 2008). Public 
coverage–eligible individuals could retain private coverage for a number of reasons. First, 
they may perceive that they have better access to care through private coverage than through 
Medicaid or CHIP (Gruber & Simon, 2008). Parents also could be unaware that they or their 
children qualify for public insurance or could be concerned about the potential stigma 
associated with such coverage (Currie, 2004).  
 I propose that public insurance expansions affect the relative values of uninsurance, 
private insurance, and public insurance. Outreach conducted as part of an expansion makes 
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individuals aware that they are eligible for Medicaid or CHIP and can include assistance with 
enrollment in insurance (Aizer, 2003). Such outreach activities, by increasing knowledge and 
reducing hassle, increase the perceived value of such coverage—which should lead to 
increased public insurance enrollment (Aizer, 2003). Furthermore, by increasing the pool of 
people eligible for public coverage, expansions could increase the value of Medicaid or CHIP 
by reducing the stigma associated with these programs. Finally, expansions could motivate 
employers to change the terms of the insurance they offer to employees, prompting 
employees to switch to public coverage (Gruber & Simon, 2008).  
Hypotheses  
Based on this conceptual framework, this study tests two hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1a. Pre-expansion eligible children are i) more likely to be enrolled in 
Medicaid, ii) less likely to be covered under private health insurance, and iii) less likely to be 
uninsured in states with active Section 1115 expansions than in states without such 
expansions.  
Hypothesis 1b. Pre-expansion eligible parents are i) more likely to be enrolled in 
Medicaid, ii) less likely to be covered under private health insurance, and iii) less likely to be 
uninsured in states with active Section 1115 expansions than in states without such 
expansions.  
Data and Samples 
Data Sources 
I use data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata (IPUMS) version of the Current 
Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement, the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services Web site, and the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 50-
state surveys.  
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Integrated Public Use Microdata Current Population Survey Annual Social and 
Economic Supplement (IPUMS CPS ASEC). This study’s main data source is the IPUMS 
Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS ASEC) data from 
the years 2001 to 2011 (King et al., 2010). This study uses IPUMS CPS ASEC data to 
describe coverage status, individual demographic characteristics, individual health status, and 
characteristics of the households in which each individual lives.  
The Current Population Survey is a monthly survey of U.S. households. The U.S. 
Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics field the Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement to the CPS every March. The CPS ASEC provides detailed employment, 
demographic, and socioeconomic information about members of approximately 100,000 
surveyed households (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012; U.S. Census Bureau, 2013).  
The IPUMS CPS data set, available from the University of Minnesota, is an edited 
version of the U.S. Census Bureau’s CPS data (King et al., 2010). This study uses the 
IPUMS version of the CPS ASEC for several reasons. First, the IPUMS CPS ASEC corrects 
for biases resulting from the imputation of survey answers for approximately 10% of CPS 
ASEC survey respondents (Ziegenfuss & Davern, 2011). Second, the IPUMS CPS ASEC 
fixes coding errors in the original CPS ASEC related to health coverage status (Ziegenfuss & 
Davern, 2011). Third, the IPUMS CPS ASEC groups related individuals into health 
insurance coverage units. These health insurance units define the family relationships on 
which an individual’s eligibility for either private or public health insurance coverage is 
based (State Health Access Data Assistance Center, 2012).  
Using CPS ASEC data to evaluate patterns of health insurance coverage poses two 
challenges. First, the CPS ASEC under-represents the number of individuals enrolled in 
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Medicaid, due in large part to Medicaid enrollees mistakenly reporting that they did not have 
Medicaid coverage in the prior year (Davern et al., 2009). The CPS’s Medicaid undercount 
therefore will depress this analysis’s estimates of individuals’ probability of Medicaid 
enrollment, but there is no evidence that this underreporting varies across states and years 
(Gilmer, Kronick, & Rice, 2005).  
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Web site. The primary source 
of information on the years in which states implemented Section 1115 expansions is the CMS 
Section 1115 waivers Web site (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, n.d. (a)). I use 
information from the CMS Web site to create this study’s key independent variable.  
Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 50-state surveys. Since 2000, 
the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured (KCMU) has commissioned surveys 
that provide information on Medicaid and CHIP income eligibility limits for children by age, 
parents by employment status, and pregnant women. These surveys also provide information 
on Medicaid and CHIP program features by state, such as whether states consider household 
assets when making determinations about a parent’s or child’s eligibility for Medicaid or 
CHIP (“asset tests”). In addition, these surveys provide information about non-Section 1115 
expansions by state and year. Because the KCMU 50-state Medicaid and CHIP survey from 
2000 only includes information about Medicaid and CHIP coverage for children and 
pregnant women, this study supplements the KCMU surveys with a 2000 survey of state 
Medicaid and CHIP eligibility and program characteristics from the Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities (Broaddus et al., 2002).  
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Table 2.1. States Included in This Study that Implemented Section 1115 Expansions to 
Parents or Low-Income Adults Without Dependent Children between 2000 and 2010 
Expansion 
state 
Year expansion 
implemented 
Expansion program 
enrollment as of June 2011 
Expansion program 
enrollment as of June 
2011 
Arizona 2001  224,500 childless adults 16% 
California 
10 counties in 2007, 35 
primarily rural counties 
in 2011
1
 
184,200 childless adults 
and parents 
2% 
 
Delaware 1996  37,100 childless adults 19% 
Hawaii  1994  Not reported  N/A 
Illinois  
2002. Expansion 
discontinued in 2007 
129,994 parents on 
December 31, 2006
2
 
7% of June 2006 
enrollment 
Indiana  2008 16,100 childless adults 2% 
Iowa 2005 
46,000 childless adults and 
parents 
11% 
Maine 2002 16,500 childless adults 6% 
Maryland 2007
3
 56,800 childless adults
 
7% 
Massachusetts  2007
4 
114,700 childless adults
 
10% (but accompanied 
by other coverage 
changes) 
Michigan 2004  77,900 childless adults 4%  
Minnesota 
1995; amendment to 
expand parental 
coverage in 1999 
90,455 parents and 
childless adults in 
MinnesotaCare
5
  
11% of total Medicaid 
enrollment for 
December 2012 
New Jersey 2001 
156,598 adults ever 
enrolled in 2011 fiscal 
year
6 
(monthly enrollment 
count not available) 
N/A 
New York 2001 949,300 childless adults 19% 
Utah 2002 
16,800 parents and 
childless adults 
6% 
Vermont 1996 
34,400 childless adults in 
June 2012 (June 2011 data 
not available) 
24% of total Medicaid 
enrollment in June 
2012 
Wisconsin 1999 34,200 childless adults 4% 
Notes: Unless indicated otherwise, data on expansion enrollments and monthly Medicaid enrollments come 
from Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Medicaid enrollment: June 2013 data snapshot. 
Washington, DC: Kaiser Family Foundation; January 2014. 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/8050-07-medicaid-enrollment-june-2013-data-
snapshot1.pdf. 
 
1. California’s Section 1115 expansions were not implemented on a statewide basis.  
2. Illinois expansion program enrollment count from Artiga S, Mann C. Family coverage under SCHIP 
waivers. Washington, DC: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured; May 2007. 
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7644.pdf. Accessed May 14, 2015.  
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3. Maryland’s limited-benefit coverage expansion to low-income adults without dependent children was 
an addition to a Section 1115 waiver that implemented Medicaid managed care in Maryland in 1997. 
4. Massachusetts’ major expansion of coverage in 2006-2007 was carried out through Massachusetts’ 
pre-existing Section 1115 waiver.  
5. Minnesota expansion program enrollment count from Minnesota Department of Human Services. 
Managed care enrollment figures, July 2011. 
http://www.dhs.state.mn.us/main/idcplg?IdcService=GET_DYNAMIC_CONVERSION&RevisionSel
ectionMethod=LatestReleased&dDocName=dhs16_141529. Accessed June 25, 2015.  
6. New Jersey expansion program enrollment count from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services. New Jersey Family Coverage under SCHIP. Baltimore, MD: Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services; April 2012.  
 
Sample Creation 
This study includes two distinct samples: one sample contains pre-expansion eligible 
parents and the other contains pre-expansion eligible children.  
Imputing pre-expansion eligibility status for children. I use CPS ASEC data on 
income, age, employment, and state of residence to impute whether or not a U.S.-citizen 
parent or child could be eligible for Medicaid or CHIP prior to or in the absence of a Section 
1115 expansion (Davidoff & Garrett, 2001; Sommers, 2007). 
I impute a child’s pre-expansion eligibility for Medicaid and CHIP by state and year 
based on the child’s age, the annual income of the health insurance unit to which the child 
belongs, and income eligibility rules for the child’s state of residence. The first step in this 
process is converting the total income of the health insurance unit to which the child belongs 
to a percentage of the federal poverty level. Calculations of income as a percent of poverty 
take into account family size, changes in federal poverty levels by year, and higher federal 
poverty levels in Alaska and Hawaii.  
Then, I compare income as a percent of poverty in the child’s health insurance unit to 
the appropriate state-specific income eligibility limits for public coverage. A child is 
considered pre-expansion eligible for Medicaid or CHIP if his or her family’s income is at or 
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below Medicaid and CHIP upper income limits. Pre-expansion eligible income limits by state 
are available in Table 2.6 in this paper’s Appendix.  
Imputing pre-expansion eligibility status for parents. Imputing a parent’s pre-
expansion eligibility for Medicaid requires additional considerations. First, the pre-expansion 
eligible income limits for parents in this study differ by employment status in some states. 
Second, pre-expansion eligible income limits for parents attempt to account for the fact that 
some states do not adjust income eligibility limits for parents in Medicaid for inflation. For 
these states, I use the 2010 Medicaid income limit as a percent of poverty to determine pre-
expansion eligibility.  
Limitations of the imputation process. This imputation process has several 
limitations. First, the CPS ASEC does not provide information on family assets. Having 
assets above a certain dollar amount disqualified children and adults from public coverage in 
certain states included in this study. The lack of information on assets means that some 
individuals who are imputed to be eligible for Medicaid or CHIP were in fact not eligible for 
coverage under these programs. Second, the CPS ASEC does not provide detailed 
information on how many months individuals were uninsured during a given year. Because 
many state CHIP programs require children to be uninsured for a set number of months prior 
to obtaining CHIP coverage, this study’s imputation process likely overestimates the number 
of children eligible for CHIP coverage under pre-existing non–Section 1115 rules. Third, this 
imputation process does not account for the closures of CHIP programs to new enrollment in 
certain states and years, also contributing to an overestimate of numbers of pre-expansion 
eligible children. Fourth, states can have different parental income eligibility limits based on 
family size. Because the KCMU 50-state surveys only provide information on income 
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eligibility limits for families of three people, the imputation process does not account for 
these differences in income limits by family size.  
Years included in the study. The samples for parents and for children use IPUMS 
CPS ASEC for the survey years 2001 through 2011. The CPS ASEC reports health insurance 
coverage status from respondents for the prior year, so the CPS surveys years 2001–2011 
provide information on survey respondent health insurance coverage status during 2000–
2010.  
The year 2000, corresponding to the 2001 CPS ASEC, is the start of the study period 
because by 2000 all but two states had implemented CHIP programs. Furthermore, by the 
2001 CPS, the U.S. Census Bureau had changed how it determined whether or not CPS 
respondents were uninsured, resulting in reduced estimates of uninsurance rates (State Health 
Access Data Assistance Center, 2002). Therefore, I do not use CPS ASEC data from 2000 
and before. The 2011 CPS ASEC, which provides health insurance coverage information 
from 2010, is the last year included in the study because of the ACA’s passage in 2010.  
Sample creation for pre-expansion eligible children. Developing the final study 
sample of children required subjecting the initial sample of individuals 18 years old or 
younger to several exclusion criteria. There were 733,226 total children (unweighted) in the 
2001–2011 CPS ASEC files. First, I removed 31,327 children who were less than one year 
old from the sample, because a child can receive Medicaid coverage if his or her mother was 
enrolled in Medicaid on the child’s birth date (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
n.d. (b)).  
The study sample also excludes 23,494 children who were not U.S. citizens. Non-
citizen children are excluded from the study sample because the CPS ASEC does not provide 
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information on whether or not these children are authorized immigrants. Unauthorized 
immigrants are only eligible for emergency Medicaid services (Wasem, 2014). Next, I 
excluded 4,588 children on Medicare and 21,825 children with military coverage from the 
sample because neither Medicare coverage nor military coverage is a coverage option for 
most children (Hamersma & Kim, 2013).  
In addition, I excluded 174,482 children because of public coverage changes 
unrelated to the Section 1115 expansions included in this study. Most of these exclusions are 
due to changes to Medicaid and CHIP program income eligibility limits that are not the result 
of Section 1115 expansions (in 24 states). For example, Hawaii increased CHIP income 
eligibility limits in 2006, so all children from Hawaii in the CPS ASEC from 2007 onward 
are excluded from the study sample. This exclusion ensures that I compare coverage for pre-
expansion eligible individuals in Section 1115 expansion states only to coverage for pre-
expansion eligible individuals in states with no Medicaid or CHIP income eligibility changes. 
Other policy-based exclusions relate to changes to state-funded coverage programs 
for adults (in 4 states). For instance, Washington, DC, implemented a locally funded health 
insurance program in 2001, so all children from Washington, DC, from 2002 onwards are 
excluded from the sample. Children from 4 states are excluded from the study sample after 
those states implemented Section 1115–based premium assistance programs. Individuals 
from premium-assistance states are excluded from the sample because eligibility for 
premium assistance is related to an employer’s offer of health insurance coverage or 
employment at a small firm—information not available in the IPUMS CPS ASEC.  
I excluded all children from Tennessee because Tennessee’s waiver program included 
repeated changes to income eligibility limits over the period of its operation and was 
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generally closed to adult enrollment soon after the expansion’s implementation (Broaddus et 
al., 2002). All children from Oregon were excluded from the final sample because changes to 
the state’s waiver program resulted in large declines in program enrollment (Oberlander, 
2007). These policy-based exclusions make it easier to isolate the effects of Section 1115 
expansions on the health insurance coverage status of pre-expansion eligible children. (Table 
2.6 in the Appendix explains exclusions by state and year in greater detail.)
2
  
 Only children who are imputed to be pre-expansion eligible are included in the final 
study sample, resulting in the exclusion of 272,480 children. Finally, 24,969 children are 
excluded from the sample due to missing variable values. The variables with missing values 
describe the citizenship status of a child’s parents (17,192 missing values), the number of 
siblings in a child’s family (6,520 missing values), whether or not a child lives in a 
metropolitan area (1,214 missing values), and the educational attainment of the household 
head (43 missing values). Figure 2.1 shows the process for creating the study sample of pre-
expansion eligible children. 
 
                                                          
2
 It is worth noting here that the policy-based exclusions differ between this paper and the two other dissertation 
papers, which focus on the effects of Section 1115 expansion on health care employment. These exclusions 
differ because individual enrollment in Medicaid or CHIP is assumed to be more responsive than health care 
employment to changes in Medicaid and CHIP income eligibility limits at the state level. 
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Figure 2.1. Creating a sample of pre-expansion eligible children.  
 
Sample creation for pre-expansion eligible parents. The 2001–2011 IPUMS CPS 
ASEC data includes 629,441 non-elderly adult parents living with their minor children. This 
initial group of parents was subject to a number of exclusion criteria. First, I excluded 27,163 
women whose youngest child was less than a year old were because these women were 
assumed to be pregnant in the prior year, and income eligibility limits for parents are 
different from those for pregnant women (Kenney et al., 2012).  
 Because the CPS ASEC does not distinguish between authorized immigrants and 
unauthorized immigrants, I dropped 63,225 parents who are not citizens from the parental 
sample. In addition, I excluded 7,011 parents with Medicare coverage and 18,935 parents 
with military coverage. (I also excluded four parents who reported being in the military but 
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lacked military coverage.) I removed 4,985 parents who reported receiving Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) from the sample because, in most states, people who qualify for SSI 
automatically receive Medicaid (Social Security Administration, n.d.; Sonier, Boudreaux, & 
Blewett, 2013).  
 Public coverage policy changes, such as increases or decreases in CHIP income 
eligibility limits, resulted in the exclusion of 137,105 parents from the sample. These policy-
based exclusions are identical to those discussed in the previous section. Next, I excluded 
349,396 parents who were not pre-expansion eligible from the sample. Finally, I dropped 123 
parents from the sample because their data included missing variable values. Figure 2.2 
shows the process for creating this sample of parents.  
 
 
Figure 2.2. Creating a sample of pre-expansion eligible parents. 
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Sample sizes and characteristics. There are 180,061 children from 47 states and the 
District of Columbia in this study’s sample of pre-expansion eligible children. The total 
number of children in states with active Section 1115 expansions during the study period is 
90,156.  
There are 21,494 parents from 47 states and the District of Columbia in the sample of 
pre-expansion eligible parents. Among all parents in all study years, 12,305 are from states 
that had active Section 1115 expansions during the study period, and 9,189 are from states 
without such expansions.  
Variables 
The analysis that focuses on pre-expansion eligible children and the analysis that 
focuses on pre-expansion eligible parents share the same dependent variable and key 
independent variable. The control variables differ between these two analyses because 
parental characteristics are associated with health insurance coverage outcomes for children 
(Davidoff and Garrett, 2001).  
Dependent Variable 
This study’s dependent variable is a construct that describes whether or not an 
individual had Medicaid or CHIP coverage (or other non-military or non-Medicare public 
coverage),
3
 had private health insurance, or had no health insurance in the year prior to the 
CPS survey year. Private health insurance includes both employer-sponsored coverage and 
non-group coverage.  
I created this health insurance construct using summary health insurance indicators in 
the IPUMS CPS ASEC data. The summary health insurance variables for Medicaid and 
private health insurance in the IPUMS CPS ASEC are not mutually exclusive. In the study’s 
                                                          
3
 For brevity’s sake, I refer to this category as “Medicaid or CHIP coverage” throughout the rest of the paper.  
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final sample for children, 12,655 children (7.0% of the sample) had both public and private 
coverage. Similarly, 702 parents in the study’s sample of parents (3.3% of the sample) 
reported having both public and private coverage. Because low-income individuals who 
move from private to public coverage are likely to face lower out-of-pocket costs and lower 
premiums, I consider individuals reporting both Medicaid coverage and private coverage to 
be covered under Medicaid (Shaefer, Grogan, & Pollack, 2011). 
Expansion Indicator 
Because the CPS ASEC records respondents’ health coverage status for the prior 
year, this study’s key independent variable describes Section 1115 expansion status at the 
state level in the previous year. The variable is set to 1 in a given year if a state had an active 
Section 1115 expansion in the previous year and is set to 0 otherwise. For example, because 
Arizona’s Section 1115 expansion was first implemented in 2001, the expansion indicator for 
Arizona is set to 0 for “CPS year” 2001 and set to 1 for “CPS years” 2002 to 2011. 
Control Variables for Children 
The analysis for pre-expansion eligible children’s coverage includes variables that 
describe a child’s demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, the demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics of the child’s household, and state-level Medicaid and CHIP 
program characteristics. Individual child characteristics that affect a child’s probability of 
public insurance enrollment, private insurance enrollment, or having no health insurance 
include age, gender, race and Hispanic origin, whether or not a child lives in a metropolitan 
area, and whether or not a child is reported by a parent to be in fair or poor health (Davidoff 
& Garrett, 2001; Kincheloe, Brown, & Frates, 2007).  
A number of family-level factors affect health insurance coverage status. These 
include total family (health insurance unit) income as a percent of the federal poverty level, 
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the number of siblings in the child’s health insurance unit, whether or not the child has a 
parent or minor sibling in fair or poor health, the age of the head of the household in which 
the child lives, the citizenship status of the child’s parents, the household head’s employment 
status, the household head’s educational attainment, and the household head’s marital status 
(Davidoff & Garrett, 2001; Kronebusch & Elbel, 2004). 
Finally, state Medicaid and CHIP program characteristics can affect health insurance 
outcomes for children. State Medicaid and CHIP program characteristics that are controlled 
for in this analysis are whether or not a state has an asset test to determine Medicaid 
eligibility for children, whether or not a state has an asset test to determine CHIP eligibility 
for children, and whether or not a state’s CHIP program is administered separately from its 
Medicaid program (Kronebusch & Elbel, 2004; Wolfe & Scrivner, 2005).  
Control Variables for Parents 
 Individual characteristics that affect a parent’s health insurance coverage status 
include age, gender, race and Hispanic origin, residence in a non-metropolitan location, 
whether or not the parent is in fair or poor health, educational attainment, the parent’s 
employment status, and the parent’s marital status (Kenney et al., 2012). This analysis does 
not control for whether a parent is a naturalized citizen or a U.S.-born citizen because 
naturalized citizens and U.S.-born citizens have similar rates of uninsurance (Derose, 
Escarce, & Lurie, 2007). Furthermore, U.S.-born citizens and naturalized citizens have 
similar probabilities of being covered by employer-sponsored insurance after controlling for 
other factors (Buchmueller et al., 2007). The analysis for parents accounts for Medicaid 
program characteristics in the form of asset tests for determining parental Medicaid eligibility 
(Sommers et al., 2012). 
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State and Year Indicators 
The models for adults and children also include indicators to describe an individual’s 
state of residence and the year in which that individual was included in the CPS ASEC.  
Methods 
Selecting between Maximum Likelihood Estimation Models 
I considered several maximum likelihood estimation models for evaluating the effects 
of Section 1115 expansion on coverage for pre-expansion eligible parents and children. 
Multinomial logit models are useful for examining choices between multiple options, but 
these models require the restrictive Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) 
assumption. The IIA assumption requires that the ratio of the predicted probabilities for any 
two alternatives in a multinomial logit model remain the same even when other available 
alternatives change. Tests using seemingly unrelated estimation rejected the null hypothesis 
that the IIA assumption holds in multinomial logit models for pre-expansion eligible parents 
and children.  
Nested logit models are an alternative to multinomial logit models. In this case, 
nested logit models failed to converge and therefore could not be used. I therefore selected 
multinomial probit models, which also do not impose the IIA assumption on choice, to model 
health insurance coverage status in this study.  
Multinomial Probit Models  
 This study uses multinomial probit models to evaluate the effect of Section 1115 
expansions on health insurance status for pre-expansion eligible parents and children. As 
noted in the “Variables” section, health insurance status options are Medicaid or CHIP 
coverage, private coverage, or no insurance coverage. I also use survey weights from the 
IPUMS CPS to generate nationally representative estimates (Minnesota Population Center, 
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n.d.). It is worth noting that 15,991 children and 2,168 parents in the final samples of 
children and parents have survey weights of zero.  
 For both parents and children, I evaluate the association between Section 1115 
expansion and health insurance status by computing the average differential effects of 
Section 1115 expansion on the predicted probabilities of having private health insurance 
coverage, having public coverage, and having no health insurance coverage. I calculate the 
average differential effects using the method of recycled predictions. I produce standard 
errors for the average differential effect estimates using bootstrapping with 500 replications. I 
also calculate predicted probabilities associated with Medicaid coverage, no health insurance 
coverage, and private coverage for individuals in expansion states and non-expansion states 
using the method of recycled predictions and bootstrapping with 500 replications to produce 
standard errors. In addition, I use bivariate tests to compare unadjusted differences in 
coverage, individual characteristics, family characteristics, and state Medicaid and CHIP 
program characteristics between individuals in expansion states and individuals in non-
expansion states.  
Results 
Descriptive Statistics  
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 provide descriptive statistics for the samples of pre-expansion 
eligible children and pre-expansion eligible parents.  
 Children. As Table 2.2 shows, the most common coverage choice for pre-expansion 
eligible children in the sample was Medicaid or CHIP. Approximately 50.6% of study-
sample children in non-expansion states and 48.4% of children in expansion states were 
covered under Medicaid or CHIP. Nearly 39% of children from expansion states and one-
third of children in non-expansion states had private coverage. Approximately 12.7% of 
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children in the sample from expansion states and nearly 17% of children in non-expansion 
states were uninsured. All of these differences are statistically significant (p<0.001).  
 
Table 2.2. Summary Statistics for Pre-Expansion Eligible Children (Ages 1–18), Unweighted  
Variables 
All children 
(N=180,061) 
Children in 
Section 1115 
expansion states 
(N=90,156) 
Children in non-
Section 1115 
expansion states 
(N=89,905) 
Health insurance status    
Medicaid, CHIP, or state-funded public 
coverage 49.5% 48.4% 50.6%*** 
Private coverage 35.7% 38.9% 32.5%*** 
Uninsured 14.8% 12.7% 16.9%*** 
Individual child characteristics     
Age at last birthday (in years) 
8.8 
 (5.0) 
8.9 
(5.0) 
8.7*** 
(5.0) 
Female 48.8% 48.7% 48.9% 
Race/ethnicity 
(Referent category: non-Hispanic 
white)     
Black, non-Hispanic 16.9% 13.2% 20.5%*** 
Biracial, non-Hispanic 2.6% 2.5% 2.6%*** 
Asian/Pacific Islander, non-
Hispanic 2.4% 3.6% 1.1%*** 
American Indian, non-Hispanic 1.7% 0.8% 2.7%*** 
Hispanic 29.6% 33.8% 25.4%*** 
Lives in metropolitan area 75.8% 82.6% 68.9%*** 
In fair or poor health 3.2% 3.0% 3.5%*** 
Family characteristics     
Family (health insurance unit) income 
as a percentage of poverty (Referent 
category: 100%-199% of the federal 
poverty level)    
Less than 100% FPL 42.3% 38.8% 45.7% 
200% FPL and above 11.4% 17.3% 5.5% 
Number of siblings in family 
1.7 
(1.3) 
1.7 
(1.4) 
1.6*** 
(1.3) 
Has parent or minor sibling in fair or 
poor health 17.1% 15.6% 18.6%*** 
Age of household head (Referent 
category: age 20 to 64)    
Age 19 or less 1.2% 1.1% 1.2% 
Age 65 and above 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 
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Citizenship status of child's parents 
(Referent category: all parents are 
citizens)    
Mixed parental citizenship status 6.2% 7.5% 4.9%*** 
No citizen parents 13.7% 17.4% 10.0%*** 
Employment status of household head 
(Referent category: Has full-time 
employment)    
Has part-time employment 13.4% 13.8% 13.0%***  
Unemployed 7.4% 7.4% 7.4%*** 
Not in labor force or not 
applicable  27.1% 26.7% 27.5%*** 
Military 0.000056% 0.0011% 0.0%*** 
Educational attainment of household 
head (Referent category: High school 
graduate)    
Less than high school 9.8% 11.1% 8.5%*** 
Some high school 17.3% 16.6% 17.9%*** 
Some college 19.3% 18.6% 20.0%*** 
Associate's degree 8.2% 8.3% 8.0%*** 
Bachelor's degree 7.4% 8.3% 6.5%*** 
Advanced degree 2.2% 2.5% 1.8%* 
Marital status (Referent category: 
Married)     
Separated, widowed, or divorced 26.7% 24.6% 28.7%*** 
Single 21.0% 20.8% 21.1%*** 
State Medicaid and CHIP program 
characteristics     
CHIP implemented as an expansion of 
Medicaid coverage (vs. as a separate 
state program)  24.7% 25.7% 23.8%*** 
State counts assets for determining 
Medicaid eligibility for children 14.2% 3.6% 24.8%*** 
State counts assets for determining 
CHIP eligibility for children 6.3% 0.0% 12.5%*** 
Note: *** indicates that means or proportions are statistically significant different at p<0.001.  
 
 
 Parents. Table 2.3 shows that approximately one-third of all pre-expansion eligible 
parents in this study’s sample were Medicaid enrollees, another one-third were uninsured, 
and the remaining one-third had private coverage. Medicaid coverage rates were significantly 
higher for parents from expansion states. Approximately 38.4% of parents in expansion states 
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had Medicaid coverage, while 32.2% of parents in non-expansion states were enrolled in 
Medicaid (p<0.001). Approximately 38.3% of pre-expansion eligible parents in expansion 
states but only 23.8% of parents from non-expansion states had private coverage (p<0.001). 
Uninsurance also differed significantly between parents in expansion states and parents in 
non-expansion states: 44% of parents in non-expansion states were uninsured, compared to 
23.2% of parents in expansion states (p<0.001).  
Multinomial Probit Model Estimates  
 Coefficient estimates from the multinomial probit models for pre-expansion eligible 
children and parents are presented in Appendix Tables 2.7 and 2.8, respectively. Coefficient 
estimates for no health insurance are normalized to zero because having no health insurance 
is the base category in these models.  
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Table 2.3. Summary Statistics for Pre-Expansion Eligible Parents, Unweighted 
Variables 
All parents  
(N=21,494) 
Parents in Section 
1115 expansion 
states (N= 12,305) 
Parents in non-
Section 1115 
expansion states 
(N=9,189) 
Health insurance coverage status     
Medicaid 35.8% 38.4% 32.2%*** 
Private coverage 32.1% 38.3% 23.8%*** 
Uninsured 32.1% 23.2% 44.0%*** 
Individual parent characteristics      
Age at last birthday (in years) 35.4 
(9.2) 
36.1 
(9.0) 
34.4*** 
(9.4) 
Female 69.8% 66.9% 73.7%*** 
Race/ethnicity (Referent category: non-Hispanic 
white)     
Black, non-Hispanic 17.9% 13.4% 23.8%*** 
Biracial, non-Hispanic 1.6% 1.7% 1.5%*** 
Asian/Pacific Islander, non-Hispanic 2.8% 3.7% 1.6%*** 
American Indian, non-Hispanic 2.8% 1.4% 4.7%*** 
Hispanic 12.2% 11.0% 13.9%*** 
Lives in metropolitan area 65.7% 64.2% 67.8%*** 
In fair or poor health 15.3% 13.1% 18.3%*** 
Educational attainment: (Referent category: 
High school graduate)     
Less than high school 3.7% 3.1% 4.4%*** 
Some high school 18.1% 14.5% 22.9%*** 
Some college 19.7% 20.3% 18.9%*** 
Associate's degree 8.6% 10.0% 6.7%*** 
Bachelor's degree 7.5% 9.2% 5.2%*** 
Advanced degree 2.1% 2.6% 1.6%*** 
Employment status (Referent category: Has full-
time employment)     
Has part-time employment 18.6% 19.0% 18.1%*** 
Unemployed 10.7% 9.7% 11.9%*** 
Not in labor force or not applicable  33.5% 29.6% 38.6%*** 
Marital status of household head (Referent 
category: Married)      
Separated, widowed, or divorced 26.1% 23.6% 29.4%*** 
   Single 31.2% 27.5% 36.1%*** 
Family characteristics      
Family (health insurance unit) income as a 
percentage of poverty (Referent category: less 
than 50% of the federal poverty level)     
50-100% FPL 20.8% 22.8% 18.1%*** 
100% FPL and above 26.5% 40.1% 8.2%*** 
State Medicaid and CHIP program 
characteristics     
State counts assets for determining Medicaid 
eligibility for parents 23.0% 25.9% 19.1%*** 
Note: *** indicates that means or proportions are statistically significant different at p<0.001.  
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Table 2.4 presents predicted probabilities of having private coverage, being 
uninsured, or having Medicaid or CHIP coverage for pre-expansion eligible parents and 
children in expansion and non-expansion states. Table 2.5 shows the average differential 
effects of Section 1115 expansions on the probabilities of private coverage, having no health 
insurance coverage, and Medicaid or CHIP coverage. The table indicates that Section 1115 
expansions were associated with a 1.4 percentage point increase in the probability that a pre-
expansion eligible child will have Medicaid or CHIP (95% bootstrapped confidence interval: 
0.37 percentage points, 2.4 percentage points). Section 1115 expansions were associated with 
a corresponding 1.4 percentage point decline in the probability of a pre-expansion eligible 
child’s having no health insurance coverage (95% bootstrapped confidence interval: -2.1 
percentage points, -0.60 percentage points). The average differential effect of Section 1115 
expansions on private coverage for pre-expansion eligible children is not statistically 
significant.  
For pre-expansion eligible parents, Section 1115 expansions were associated with a 
6.5 percentage point increase in the probability of Medicaid coverage (95% bootstrapped 
confidence interval: 2.8 percentage points, 10.3 percentage points) and 4.3 percentage point 
decline in the probability of private coverage (bootstrapped 95% confidence interval: -7.7 
percentage points, -0.88 percentage points). The average differential effect of Section 1115 
expansions on the probability of being uninsured is statistically insignificant for parents.  
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Table 2.4. Predicted Probabilities for Public, Private, or No Health Insurance Coverage for 
Pre-Expansion Eligible Children and Parents in Expansion States and Non-Expansion States  
 Coverage type  
Section 1115 expansion 
states Non-expansion states 
Pre-expansion eligible children  
Medicaid or CHIP coverage 
0.52 
(0.0037) 
0.51 
(0.020) 
Private coverage 
0.35 
(0.0035) 
0.35 
(0.019) 
No health insurance coverage  
0.13 
(0.0029) 
0.15 
(0.0014) 
Pre-expansion eligible parents 
Medicaid coverage 
0.41 
(0.011) 
0.34 
(0.0099) 
Private coverage 
0.29 
(0.0082) 
0.33 
(0.010) 
No health insurance coverage  
0.30 
(0.011) 
0.32 
(0.0090) 
Note: Predicted probabilities are rounded.  
 
Table 2.5. Average Differential Effects of Section 1115 Expansions on the Probabilities of 
Having Public, Private, or No Health Insurance Coverage for Pre-Expansion Eligible 
Children and Parents 
Coverage type  Children Parents 
Medicaid or CHIP coverage 
0.014** 
(0.0051) 
0.065** 
(0.019) 
Private coverage 
-0.00012 
(0.0049 ) 
-0.043* 
(0 .018) 
No health insurance coverage  
-0.014*** 
(0.0039 ) 
-0.022 
(0.019) 
Notes: * indicates p-value<0.05. ** indicates that p-value<0.01. ** indicates that p-value<0.001. Differential 
effects are rounded. 
 
 
Discussion 
This study finds mixed evidence in support of the hypotheses that Section 1115 
expansions increased the probability of Medicaid or CHIP coverage, decreased the 
probability of private coverage among pre-expansion eligible parents and children, and 
decreased the probability of having no insurance. I find that Section 1115 expansions were 
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associated with increases in the probability of Medicaid or CHIP coverage for both pre-
expansion eligible children and parents, which supports this study’s hypotheses. However, I 
also find that Section 1115 expansions were associated with decreases in the probability of 
having private coverage for pre-expansion eligible parents but not for pre-expansion eligible 
children. Finally, there is evidence that Section 1115 expansions were associated with 
decreases in the probability of having no insurance coverage for pre-expansion eligible 
children but not for pre-expansion eligible parents.,  
That Section 1115 expansions increased the probability of public coverage for pre-
expansion eligible children and parents is consistent with prior literature on the effects of 
parental coverage expansions on children’s coverage (Aizer & Grogger, 2003; Dubay & 
Kenney, 2003). The positive association between Section 1115 expansions and parental 
Medicaid coverage corresponds with Sonier and colleagues’ (2013) finding that 
Massachusetts’s healthcare reform increased Medicaid enrollment among pre-expansion-
eligible parents in Massachusetts.  
The finding that Section 1115 expansions had no effect on the probability that a pre-
expansion eligible parent is uninsured contrasts with finding from Sommers and colleagues 
(2014) and Sonier and colleagues (2013). The difference between my findings and those 
from other studies could be explained by differences in the expansions that each of these 
studies considers. Sonier and colleagues (2013) and Sommers and colleagues (2014) focus on 
coverage expansions in Massachusetts and Connecticut and Washington, DC, respectively. 
Although this study includes the Massachusetts expansion, it does not include the expansions 
from Washington, DC, or Connecticut. Furthermore, this study also includes Medicaid 
expansions with modest enrollments and presumably less publicity. As a result, it is 
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reasonable to expect that the overall effect of the expansions in this study on parental 
uninsurance is smaller than the effects presented in the Sonier and colleagues (2013) and 
Sommers and colleagues (2014).  
That Section 1115 expansions had no effect on the probability of private coverage for 
pre-expansion eligible children but a negative effect on the probability of private coverage 
for pre-expansion eligible parents is an unexpected finding. Previous research on the 
substitution of public coverage for private coverage suggests that such substitution is more 
likely for individuals in families with higher incomes because such individuals are more 
likely to have access to private insurance in the first place (Lo, 2013; Gilmer & Kronick, 
200). In this study, pre-expansion income eligibility limits for children are generally higher 
than those for adults. However, the extent to which expansions cause substitution of private 
coverage for public coverage among children and parents has been a matter of long-running 
debate (Shore-Sheppard, 2008). The average differential effects of expansions on coverage in 
this study are comparable in magnitude to results from other studies (Aizer and Grogger, 
2003; Atherly, 2012; Kenney, Long, and Luque, 2010).  
Limitations  
 This analysis has several limitations. First, as in most studies of state-level policy 
change, Section 1115 expansions are not randomly assigned to states; states had to choose to 
pursue these expansions. This represents a potential source of bias for model estimates, 
particularly if the decision to pursue expansions is related to pre-expansion state-level health 
insurance coverage rates. However—as state decisions on implementing the ACA’s 
Medicaid expansions illustrate—whether state policymakers perceive uninsurance as a 
pressing policy problem to resolve likely depends more on issues like state financial 
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resources and state administrative capacity rather than on health insurance coverage rates 
(Jacobs & Callaghan, 2013).  
 As previously noted, the process for imputing Medicaid and CHIP eligibility is 
imperfect. For example, the IPUMS CPS ASEC does not have data on assets, which also can 
determine whether or not an individual is eligible for Medicaid or CHIP. Nor does it contain 
information on monthly family income; individuals in families with volatile household 
incomes may be Medicaid- or CHIP-eligible in some months but not in others (Wolfe & 
Scrivner, 2005). Finally, the CPS ASEC data tend to understate Medicaid enrollment, though 
there is no evidence to suggest that this underreporting of Medicaid coverage varies 
systematically across states or years (Sonier, Boudreaux, & Blewett, 2013).  
Implications for the ACA  
 The expansions presented here were much smaller in scope than the ACA’s coverage 
expansion and—with the exception of Massachusetts’s reforms—did not include a mandate 
to have health insurance coverage. Despite this, this study found statistically significant 
increases in the probabilities of Medicaid and CHIP enrollment among pre-expansion eligible 
parents and children after Section 1115 expansions. Therefore, the ACA could have an even 
larger effect on public insurance enrollment for individuals eligible for such coverage under 
pre-ACA rules. That the Section 1115 expansions were associated with an increased 
probability of Medicaid enrollment and a reduced probability of uninsurance for pre-
expansion eligible children suggests that the ACA’s coverage expansion—even though 
targeted toward adults—could improve coverage rates for children. Finally, this study’s 
finding that Section 1115 expansions are associated with declines in the probability of pre-
expansion eligible parents’ enrollment in private coverage implies that at least some new 
parental enrollment in the ACA’s Medicaid coverage will come from adults who are 
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substituting private coverage with public coverage. In sum, this study reinforces the notion 
that expansions are likely to motivate enrollment in public insurance programs among 
individuals already eligible for such coverage.  
 
 Table 2.6. Rules for Pre-Expansion Eligibility for Children and Parents, By State and Year  
State name 
Pre-
expansion 
eligible 
income 
limits for 
children 
(as a 
percent of 
FPL) 
Pre-
expansion 
eligible 
income for 
unemployed 
parents (as 
a percent of 
FPL) 
Pre-
expansion 
eligible 
income 
limits for 
employed 
parents (as 
a percent 
of FPL) 
CPS 
ASEC 
years 
excluded 
from the 
sample 
Brief description of non-
Section 1115 Medicaid or 
CHIP changes corresponding 
to data exclusions by year Other notes 
Alabama 200% 11% 19% 
2010–
2011 
Non-Section 1115 increase in 
CHIP income eligibility limit 
in 2009 
  
Alaska 200% 75% 81% 
2001–
2005 
Non-Section 1115 decrease in 
children's Medicaid income 
eligibility limits in 2004 
  
Arizona 200% 36% 36% None   
Pre-expansion eligible 
limits for unemployed 
and employed parents 
are the same because 
Broaddus and 
colleagues (2002) only 
provides information 
about parental income 
eligibility limits for 
working parents.  
Arkansas 200% 15% 18% 
2008–
2011 
Implementation of a Section 
1115 premium assistance 
program in 2007 
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 California  250% 100% 106% None   
Only 10 counties were 
included in California's 
2010 coverage 
expansion through a 
Section 1115 waiver. 
However, the IPUMS 
CPS ASEC does not 
provide information on 
county of residence for 
survey respondents.  
Colorado 185% 31% 38% 
2007–
2011 
Non-Section 1115 increase in 
parents' Medicaid income 
eligibility limits in 2006 
  
Connecticut 300% 100% 107% 
2001–
2002, 
2006–
2011 
Non-Section 1115 changes to 
parents' Medicaid income 
eligibility limits in 2000, 
2001, and 2005 
  
Delaware 200% 100% 106% None   
Individuals insured 
under coverage 
expansions from the 
1990s—prior to the 
study period—are 
considered pre-
expansion eligible. 
District of 
Columbia 
200% 200% 200% 
2002–
2011 
Implementation of state-
funded health coverage 
program for adults in 2001 
  
Florida 200% 20% 53% None     
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 Georgia 235% 28% 50%       
Hawaii 200% 100% 100% 
2007–
2011 
Non-Section 1115 increase in 
CHIP income eligibility limit 
in 2006 
Individuals insured 
under coverage 
expansions from the 
1990s—prior to the 
study period—are 
considered pre-
expansion eligible. 
Idaho 150% 25% 32% 
2005–
2011 
Non-Section 1115 increase in 
CHIP income eligibility limit 
in 2004 
  
Illinois  185% 31% 56% 
2007–
2011 
Non-Section 1115 increase in 
CHIP income eligibility limit 
in 2006 
  
Indiana 
200% 
through 
2008; 
250% 
afterward 
19% 25% None   
Increase in CHIP 
income eligibility limit 
in same year as 
implementation of 
Section 1115 waiver-
based coverage 
expansion  
Iowa 200% 31% 77% 
2008–
2011 
Non-Section 1115 increase in 
parents' Medicaid income 
eligibility limits in 2007 
  
Kansas 200% 27% 34% 
2010–
2011 
Non-Section 1115 increase in 
CHIP income eligibility limit 
in 2009 
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 Kentucky 200% 36% 62% None      
Louisiana 200% 13% 20% 
2001–
2002, 
2009–
2011 
Non-Section 1115 increase in 
children's Medicaid income 
eligibility limit in 2002, and 
increase CHIP income limit 
(including addition of separate 
CHIP program) in 2008 
  
Maine 200% 107% 107% 
2007–
2011 
Non-Section 1115 increase in 
parents' Medicaid income 
eligibility limits in 2006 
  
Maryland 300% 30% 37% 
2001–
2002, 
2009–
2011 
Non-Section 1115 increase in 
CHIP coverage limit in 2001; 
non-Section 1115 increase in 
parents’ Medicaid income 
eligibility limits in 2008 
  
Massachusetts 400% 133% 133% None  
 Massachusetts 
covered children with 
incomes between 
300% FPL and 400% 
FPL with state funds.  
Michigan 200% 34% 58% None     
Minnesota 275% 275% 275% None  
Individuals insured 
under coverage 
expansions from the 
1990s—prior to the 
study period—are 
considered pre-
expansion eligible. 
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 Mississippi 200% 24% 44% None     
Missouri 300% 19% 25% 
2001–
2006 
Non-Section 1115 reductions 
in parents’ Medicaid income 
eligibility limits from 2000 to 
2005 
  
Montana  150% 35% 62% 
2008–
2011 
Non-Section 1115 increases in 
CHIP income eligibility limit 
in 2007 
  
Nebraska 185% 46% 56% 
2010–
2011 
Non-Section 1115 increase in 
CHIP income eligibility limit 
in 2009 
  
Nevada 200% 26% 84% 
2007–
2011 
Section 1115 premium 
assistance program 
implemented in 2006 
  
New 
Hampshire 
300% 39% 49% None     
New Jersey  350% 44% 44%   
Pre-expansion eligible limits 
for unemployed and employed 
parents are the same because 
Broaddus and colleagues 
(2002) only provides 
information about parental 
income eligibility limits for 
working parents.  
  
New Mexico 235% 30% 69% 
2006–
2011 
Section 1115 premium 
assistance program 
implemented in 2005 
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 New York 250% 80% 80% 
2009–
2011 
Non-Section 1115 increase in 
CHIP income eligibility limit 
in 2008 
Pre-expansion eligible 
limits for unemployed 
and employed parents 
are the same because 
Broaddus and 
colleagues (2002) only 
provides information 
about parental income 
eligibility limits for 
working parents.  
North 
Carolina 
200% 36% 49% None     
North Dakota 140% 38% 65% 
2001–
2002; 
2009–
2011 
Non-Section 1115 increases in 
parents’ Medicaid income 
eligibility limits in 2001; non-
Section 1115 increases in 
CHIP income eligibility limits 
between 2008 and 2010 
  
Ohio 200% 90% 90% 
2001–
2004 
Non-Section 1115 decrease in 
parents’ Medicaid income 
eligibility limits in 2004 
  
Oklahoma  185% 35% 44% 
2007–
2011 
Section 1115 premium 
assistance program 
implemented in 2006 
  
Oregon  Dropped from sample because of expansion enrollment volatility during the study period  
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 Pennsylvania  250% 46% 46% 
2002–
2011 
Non-Section 1115 decrease in 
children’s income eligibility 
limits for Pennsylvania's 
state-based health insurance 
coverage in 2001; 
implementation of state-based 
health insurance coverage for 
adults in 2002 
 Pre-expansion eligible 
limits for unemployed 
and employed parents 
are the same because 
Broaddus and 
colleagues (2002) only 
provides information 
about parental income 
eligibility limits for 
working parents.  
Rhode Island 250% 185% 192% 
2010-
2011 
Non-Section 1115 decrease in 
parents’ Medicaid income 
eligibility limits in fall 2008 
  
South 
Carolina 
150% 48% 89% None     
South Dakota 200% 52% 52% 
2001-
2003 
Non-Section 1115-related 
increase in CHIP income 
eligibility limits in 2003 
  
Tennessee  
Dropped from sample due to repeated changes to income eligibility limits. Also, 
most adult enrollment through the state's waiver-based coverage was closed before 
the beginning of the study period. The waiver program was closed altogether in 
2005.  
  
Texas 200% 12% 26% None     
Utah 200% 38% 44% None     
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 Vermont 300% 185% 191% None   
Individuals insured 
under expansions from 
the 1990s—prior to the 
study period—are 
considered pre-
expansion eligible. 
Virginia 200% 23% 29% 
2001-
2002 
Non-Section 1115-related 
increase in CHIP income 
eligibility limits in 2001 
  
Washington  
Dropped from sample because of active state-funded health insurance coverage expansion for adults 
throughout the study period  
West Virginia 200% 19% 37% 
2001-
2002, 
2007-
2011 
Non-Section 1115-related 
increases in CHIP income 
eligibility limits 
  
Wisconsin  185% 185% 185% 
2009-
2011 
Non-Section 1115-related 
increase in CHIP income 
eligibility limit in 2008 
Individuals insured 
under expansions from 
the 1990s—prior to the 
study period—are 
considered pre-
expansion eligible. 
Wyoming 200% 46% 60% 
2001-
2006 
Non-Section 1115-related 
increase in CHIP income 
eligibility limit in 2005 
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Table 2.7. Multinomial Probit Estimation of Coverage Outcomes for Pre-Expansion Eligible 
Children (N=180,061 children)
†
 
Variables 
Medicaid or CHIP 
coverage Private coverage 
Key independent variable     
Section 1115 expansion 0.097*** 
(0.027) 
0.069* 
(0.029) 
Individual child characteristics     
Age at last birthday (in years) 
-0.045*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.010*** 
(0.0017) 
Female 
0.0092 
(0.013) 
0.022 
(0.014) 
Race/ethnicity (Referent category: non-
Hispanic white)     
Black, non-Hispanic 
0.15*** 
(0.021) 
-0.13*** 
(0.022) 
American Indian, non-Hispanic 
-0.26*** 
(0.055) 
-0.59*** 
(0.062) 
Asian/Pacific Islander, non-Hispanic 
-0.12** 
(0.047) 
-0.28*** 
(0.049) 
Biracial, non-Hispanic 
0.36*** 
(0.050) 
-0.051 
(0.053) 
Hispanic 
0.098** 
(0.021) 
-0.25*** 
(0.022) 
Lives in metropolitan area 
-0.11*** 
(0.018) 
0.075*** 
(0.019) 
In fair or poor health 
0.44*** 
(0.040) 
-0.026 
(0.047) 
Family characteristics    
Family (health insurance unit) income as a 
percentage of poverty (Referent category: 
100%-199% of the federal poverty level)    
Less than 100% FPL 
0.19*** 
(0.015) 
-0.75*** 
(0.016) 
200% FPL and above 
-0.27*** 
(0.028) 
0.56*** 
(0.027) 
Number of siblings in family 
0.10*** 
(0.0055) 
0.053*** 
(0.0057) 
Has parent or sibling in fair or poor health 
0.36*** 
(0.018) 
-0.20*** 
(0.021å) 
Age of household head (Referent category: 
age 20 to 64)    
Age 19 or less 
-0.58*** 
(0.057) 
0.17** 
(0.061) 
Age 65 and above 
-0.64 
(0.041) 
-0.23*** 
(0.044) 
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Citizenship status of child's parents (Referent 
category: all parents are citizens) 
Mixed parental citizenship status 
-0.096** 
(0.028) 
-0.30*** 
(0.030) 
No citizen parents 
-0.12*** 
(0.022) 
-0.70*** 
(0.025) 
Employment status of household head 
(Referent category: Has full-time 
employment)    
Has part-time employment 
0.24*** 
(0.020) 
-0.19*** 
(0.021) 
Unemployed 
0.37*** 
(0.025) 
-0.30*** 
(0.030) 
Not in labor force or no response 
0.27*** 
(0.017) 
-0.19*** 
(0.018) 
Military 
10.68*** 
(0.21) 
-0.15 
(0.11) 
Educational attainment of household head 
(Referent category: High school graduate)    
Less than high school 
-0.17*** 
(0.023) 
-0.46*** 
(0.027) 
Some high school 
-0.0093 
(0.019) 
-0.36*** 
(0.021) 
Some college 
0.053** 
(0.019) 
0.14*** 
(0.020) 
Associate's degree 
0.037  
(0.028) 
0.26*** 
(0.028) 
Bachelor's degree 
-0.19*** 
(0.030) 
0.49*** 
(0.029) 
Advanced degree 
-0.21*** 
(0.055) 
0.69*** 
(0.051) 
Marital status of household head (Referent 
category: Married)     
Separated, widowed, or divorced 
0.22*** 
(0.017) 
-0.086*** 
(0.018) 
Single 
0.35*** 
(0.020) 
-0.22*** 
(0.021) 
State Medicaid and CHIP program 
characteristics     
CHIP implemented as an expansion of 
Medicaid coverage (vs. as a separate state 
program)  
-0.21* 
(0.080) 
-0.069 
(0.085) 
State counts assets for determining Medicaid 
eligibility for children 
-0.41*** 
(0.074) 
-0.27** 
(0.080) 
State counts assets for determining CHIP 
eligibility for children 
0.18*** 
(0.040) 
0.046 
(0.044) 
Notes: 
† 
Of the 180,061 children in the sample, 15,991 have a survey weight of zero. Coefficient estimates for 
state and year indicators as well as the constant term are omitted in the table above. * indicates p-value<0.05 for 
a particular coefficient; ** indicates p-value<0.01; and *** indicates p-value<0.001.  
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Table 2.8. Multinomial Probit Estimation of Coverage Outcomes for Pre-Expansion Eligible 
Parents (N=21,494 parents)
†
 
Variables Medicaid coverage Private coverage 
Key independent variable    
Section 1115 expansion 
0.23* 
(0.089) 
-0.090 
(0.097) 
Individual parent characteristics     
Age at last birthday (in years) 
-0.020*** 
(0.0023) 
0.0076** 
(0.0023) 
Female 
0.55*** 
(0.046) 
0.32*** 
(0.048) 
Race/ethnicity (Referent category: non-Hispanic 
white)     
Black, non-Hispanic 
0.21*** 
(0.052) 
-0.20** 
(0.058) 
American Indian, non-Hispanic 
-0.27* 
(0.12) 
-0.59*** 
(0.15) 
Asian/Pacific Islander, non-Hispanic 
-0.28* 
(0.13) 
-0.13 
(0.13) 
Biracial, non-Hispanic 
0.13 
(0.16) 
0.034 
(0.18) 
Hispanic 
-0.0017 
(0.063) 
-0.39*** 
(0.066) 
Lives in metropolitan area 
-0.14** 
(0.045) 
0.15** 
(0.051) 
In fair or poor health 
0.46*** 
(0.049) 
-0.35*** 
(0.046) 
Educational attainment (Referent category: High 
school graduate)    
Less than high school 
-0.058 
(0.094) 
-0.55*** 
(0.11) 
Some high school 
0.25*** 
(0.049) 
-0.24*** 
(0.057) 
Some college 
0.11* 
(0.051) 
0.37*** 
(0.052) 
Associate's degree 
0.020 
(0.071) 
0.37*** 
(0.068) 
Bachelor's degree 
0.044 
(0.071) 
0.93*** 
(0.077) 
Advanced degree 
-0.16 
(0.19) 
1.17*** 
(0.14) 
Employment status (Referent category: Has full-
time employment)    
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Has part-time employment 
0.15** 
(0.055) 
-0.42*** 
(0.054) 
Unemployed 
0.35*** 
(0.062) 
-0.58*** 
(0.071) 
Not in labor force or no response 
0.20*** 
(0.050) 
-0.40*** 
(0.051) 
Marital status (Referent category: Married)     
Separated, widowed, or divorced 
-0.18*** 
(0.049) 
-0.40*** 
(0.051) 
Single 
-0.11* 
(0.052) 
-0.44*** 
(0.055) 
Family (health insurance unit) income as a 
percentage of poverty (Referent category: <50% 
FPL of the federal poverty level)    
50-100% FPL  
0.098 
(0.057) 
0.24*** 
(0.062) 
 > 100% FPL 
-0.11 
(0.077) 
0.78*** 
(0.079) 
State Medicaid program characteristics     
State counts assets for determining Medicaid 
eligibility for parents 
-0.033 
(0.075) 
0.033 
(0.079) 
Notes: 
† 
Of the 21,494 parents in the sample, 2,168 have a survey weight of zero. Coefficient estimates for state 
and year indicators as well as the constant term are omitted in the table above. * indicates p-value<0.05 for a 
particular coefficient; ** indicates p-value<0.01; and *** indicates p-value<0.001.  
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CHAPTER 3. THE EFFECT OF EXPANDING MEDICAID ON HEALTHCARE 
EMPLOYMENT  
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) initiated the largest expansion 
of Medicaid since the program’s creation in 1965. As of October 2014, enrollment in 
Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program had grown by nearly 9.7 million 
people compared to enrollment in those programs between July and September 2013 (Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, December 2014).  
The ACA’s Medicaid expansion has implications not only for uninsured rates but also 
for state economies. Available evidence suggests that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion has 
increased revenues and lowered uncompensated care costs for hospitals and health systems in 
states that have expanded Medicaid (PwC Health Research Institute, 2014). Economic 
simulations indicate that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion could help state economies by 
increasing state revenues and employment in both health care and in other industries (Kaiser 
Family Foundation, 2013; White House Council of Economic Advisors, 2014). In general, 
conventional wisdom suggests that the ACA’s health insurance expansion will increase 
healthcare employment (Gruber, 2009).  
 It is important to explore the link between health insurance coverage expansion and 
healthcare employment because health care is integral to the U.S. economy. Nearly 15 
million people, approximately 10.6% of the employed U.S. population, worked in health care 
in January 2015 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015). Furthermore, the healthcare sector 
represented 17.4% of U.S. gross domestic product in 2013 (Hartman et al., 2015).  
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Because it will be years before the long-term effects of the ACA’s Medicaid 
expansion are apparent—especially because some states may implement the expansion at a 
later date—focusing on pre-2014 state-level public coverage expansions can provide insight 
into how the ACA’s Medicaid expansion could affect healthcare workforce employment. 
This study examines whether Section 1115 coverage expansions affected county-level health 
care employment in states that implemented these expansions. This study concentrates on 
Section 1115 expansions because these waivers share a target population of parents and non-
elderly low-income adults without dependent children with the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.  
Background 
Description of Section 1115 Medicaid Expansions  
 Prior to the ACA’s health insurance coverage expansion, states had few options for 
providing coverage to individuals who were otherwise ineligible for Medicaid or the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). One way for states to expand coverage to this 
group—which often included parents and low-income non-elderly, non-disabled adults 
without dependent children—was to seek a Section 1115 waiver. These waivers allow states 
to test different methods of financing and delivering Medicaid and CHIP to “promote the 
objectives” of these programs (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, n.d. (a)). 
Although Section 1115 waivers have been in existence since the Medicaid program’s 
founding, they were first used as a tool for expanding health coverage in the 1990s (Artiga, 
2009).  
To obtain a Section 1115 waiver, a state submits an application to the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) within the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services. The state and CMS negotiate the waiver’s terms, possibly leading to CMS approval 
and waiver implementation (Artiga, 2009). As a condition for waiver approval, the federal 
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government requires waivers to be budget-neutral. In other words, a state that applies for a 
Section 1115 waiver must show that federal Medicaid spending in that state under the waiver 
is projected to the be the same as federal Medicaid spending in that state in the absence of the 
waiver (Artiga, 2009). Because states must initiate the waiver-approval process, Section 1115 
waiver-based coverage expansions from the pre-ACA era differed significantly across states 
in terms of expansion details and implementation. (Table A.1 in this dissertation’s Appendix 
describes the characteristics of each Section 1115 waiver-based coverage expansion included 
in this study.)  
In the pre-ACA era, the two other key policy options for expanding health insurance 
coverage to adults not otherwise eligible for publicly financed coverage were state-funded 
coverage expansions and Section 1931 expansions. First, states could expand coverage 
through fully state-financed public coverage. For example, Pennsylvania used National 
Tobacco Settlement Agreement money to provide health insurance coverage to low-income, 
uninsured adults who were ineligible for Medicaid (Dorn & Meyer, 2004). A second 
coverage-expansion option was a Section 1931 expansion, which allowed states to expand 
eligibility by increasing the amount of a Medicaid applicant’s income or assets that can be 
ignored when determining that applicant’s Medicaid eligibility (Birnbaum, 2000).  
This study focuses only on Section 1115 expansions because, like the ACA, they 
extend coverage to higher-income parents and non-elderly, non-disabled low-income adults 
without dependent children who would otherwise be ineligible for Medicaid. (The Section 
1115 waiver–based expansions in this study—implemented either via new Section 1115 
waivers or through waiver amendments—are listed in this paper’s “Sample” section.) 
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Prior Research On the Healthcare Workforce and Health 
Insurance Coverage Expansion 
Prior research has focused on the effects of healthcare reforms in Massachusetts in 
2007, variations in the generosity of Medicaid benefits and income eligibility limits, or the 
ACA’s Medicaid expansion on healthcare employment. Staiger, Auerbach, and Buerhaus 
(2011) compare unadjusted trends in healthcare employment growth in Massachusetts to 
unadjusted trends in healthcare employment growth in all other states before and after 
Massachusetts’s implementation of state-led healthcare reforms in 2007. The authors find 
that healthcare workforce employment in Massachusetts grew at approximately 8%—the 
same rate as that in the rest of the United States—from 2001 to 2005 but accelerated to 9.5% 
between December 2005 and 2010. A significant increase in healthcare administrative 
employment, which includes occupations like medical records technicians or healthcare 
executives, was mostly responsible for the post-2007 employment growth in Massachusetts 
(Staiger, Auerbach, & Buerhaus, 2011). The authors find that per-capita employment in 
healthcare administrative occupations grew 18.4% in Massachusetts between 2005–2006 and 
2008–2009 but only grew 8% in the same time period in the rest of the United States.  
Cozad (2012) uses difference-in-difference models to evaluate the effect of 
Massachusetts’s healthcare reforms on hospital employment. Cozad’s analysis (2012) 
compares numbers of employees in Massachusetts to hospitals in surrounding states before 
and after the implementation of Massachusetts’s health insurance coverage mandate. She 
finds that the mandate for individuals to have health insurance coverage was not associated 
with changes in hospital employment (Cozad, 2012).  
 Shin and Rosenbaum (2012) and Buchmuller and colleagues (2014) examine the 
relationship between Medicaid program features and healthcare employment. In an 
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uncontrolled study, Shin and Rosenbaum (2012) use the Uniform Data System to examine 
changes in staffing levels between 2005 and 2009 at 519 community health centers (CHCs) 
in 25 states. Of these CHCs, 220 are located in states that provide Medicaid coverage to 
parents with incomes at or above the federal poverty level. The remaining 299 CHCs 
included in the study are located in states that provide Medicaid coverage only to parents 
with incomes well below the federal poverty level. Shin and Rosenbaum (2012) find that 
between 2005 and 2009 community health center (CHC) staff size grew 8 percentage points 
more at the 220 CHCs in states with higher parental Medicaid income eligibility limits than 
at the 299 CHCs in states with less generous income eligibility standards for parents.  
Buchmueller and colleagues (2014) use fixed effects models to estimate the effects of 
comprehensive adult dental benefits in Medicaid on dentists’ behavior. The authors find that 
comprehensive adult dental benefits in Medicaid increase dentists’ probability of employing 
one or more dental hygienists by 3 percentage points (Buchmueller et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, the authors’ analysis indicates that these dental benefits were associated with a 
0.1 increase in the average number of hygienists working in a dental practice (Buchmueller et 
al., 2014). Taken together, the studies from Shin and Rosenbaum (2012) and Buchmueller 
and colleagues (2014) suggest that higher Medicaid income eligibility limits and more 
generous benefits are associated with higher levels of staffing within certain medical settings.  
Two recent uncontrolled analyses assess the early effects of the Affordable Care 
Act’s Medicaid expansion on health care and social assistance employment at the state level. 
A June 2014 analysis from the Missouri Economic Research and Information Center 
(MERIC) compares health care and social assistance employment growth pre- and post-ACA 
Medicaid expansion implementation in five states that accepted the ACA’s Medicaid 
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expansion to healthcare employment growth in five states that have rejected the ACA’s 
Medicaid expansion. The ten states included in this study had similar numbers of total 
employed individuals. The MERIC analysis finds that healthcare and social assistance 
employment counts increased 2.1% from the first five months of 2013 to the first five months 
of 2014 in five states that had accepted the ACA’s Medicaid expansion but healthcare and 
social assistance employment only increased 0.7% between 2013 and 2014 in the study’s five 
non-Medicaid expansion states (Missouri Economic Research and Information Center, 2014).  
A December 2014 policy brief from the Altarum Institute finds that healthcare and 
social assistance job growth was higher in states that had not accepted the ACA’s Medicaid 
expansion than in states that had implemented the expansion (Turner, 2014). This analysis 
compares healthcare and social assistance employment growth from April to October 2013—
prior to the ACA Medicaid coverage expansion’s implementation—to healthcare 
employment growth between April and October 2014—after the ACA’s Medicaid expansion 
went into effect (Turner, 2014). The analysis finds that healthcare and social assistance job 
growth increased by 104% between 2013 and 2014 in non-Medicaid expansion states but 
only by 46% in Medicaid expansion states (Turner, 2014).  
The current study is the first to comprehensively explore how public health insurance 
coverage expansions—through Section 1115 waivers—affect healthcare employment across 
multiple states and over a longer time period. Analyses that focus on Massachusetts are 
limited by Massachusetts’s persistently large healthcare workforce supply relative to that of 
other states (Staiger, Auerbach, & Buerhaus, 2011; Cozad, 2012). This study also contributes 
to the literature by estimating health insurance coverage expansions’ effects on employment 
in the entire healthcare and social assistance industry rather than on employment within a 
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single healthcare setting such as hospitals or CHCs (Cozad, 2012; Shin & Rosenbaum, 2012). 
The analysis improves on that from the Missouri Economic Research and Information Center 
(2014) and from the Altarum Institute (2014) because this analysis uses multivariate 
techniques.  
Conceptual Framework 
This study’s conceptual framework proposes that health insurance coverage 
expansions—such as Section 1115 expansions—increase healthcare employment through 
increases in two related pathways. First, the framework proposes that healthcare 
organizations can hire workers in anticipation of increased demand for care due to a coverage 
expansion. In this situation, healthcare organizations make employment decisions in response 
to predicted changes in demand under a health insurance coverage expansion (Cozad, 2012). 
Because there is a time lag between the development and submission of a waiver and waiver 
implementation, healthcare organizations should, in theory, have time to prepare for policy 
changes under the waiver. This preparation could include hiring additional workers to meet 
possible increases in demand for care. 
Second, healthcare organizations can react to changes in demand after a coverage 
expansion has begun accepting enrollees. In this study’s conceptual framework, changes in 
demand for care are a consequence of post-expansion increases in community-level health 
insurance coverage rates. In fact, previous studies have indicated that Medicaid expansions to 
low-income, non-pregnant adults do increase health insurance coverage within this 
population (Atherly et al., 2012; Aizer & Grogger, 2003; Busch & Duchovny, 2005; Kronick 
& Gilmer, 2002). On gaining Medicaid coverage, newly insured adults tend to increase their 
use of inpatient, outpatient, and emergency department care (Finkelstein et al., 2012; 
Taubman, 2014). By increasing individual utilization rates, a coverage expansion could 
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increase community-level demand for healthcare services. Healthcare organizations could 
respond to increases in demand for health care by increasing the number of workers they 
employ (Gruber, 2009).  
Local demographic and economic characteristics also are likely to affect healthcare 
employment within a community. A local population’s demographic characteristics could 
affect local healthcare employment primarily by affecting rates of healthcare demand. For 
example, because women tend to use more medical care on average than men do and older 
people tend to use more care than younger people do, communities with relatively more 
women or a relatively older population could have higher rates of demand for health care 
(Bertakis et al., 2000; Meara, White, & Cutler, 2004). If healthcare employment responds to 
demand for healthcare services, communities with relatively more women or older 
populations will have relatively higher healthcare employment. Racial and ethnic minorities 
face barriers to accessing care unrelated to socioeconomic status (Fiscella et al., 2002; 
Padgett et al., 1994). Therefore, a community with a population that includes a relatively 
larger percent of racial and ethnic minorities may have lower healthcare use rates and, 
consequently, a correspondingly smaller healthcare workforce.  
The literature on physician supply suggests that a community’s economic wealth is 
positively associated with the size of a local healthcare workforce (Jiang & Begun, 2002; 
Freed, Nahra, & Wheeler, 2003; Ricketts & Randolph, 2008).  
Economic trends such as economic expansions and recessions also affect healthcare 
employment (Wood, 2011). Finally, state and national policies—from malpractice 
regulations to loan repayment programs—influence the number of employees in the 
healthcare sector (Kessler, Sage, & Becker, 2005; Pathman et al., 2004).  
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Figure 3.1 describes the proposed effect of Section 1115 expansion implementation 
on healthcare employment.  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Section 1115 expansions’ effect on healthcare and social assistance employment.  
 
Hypotheses 
Based on this conceptual framework, this study tests the hypothesis that Section 1115 
coverage expansions increased healthcare and social assistance employment at the county 
level. Healthcare and social assistance employment encompasses healthcare employment in 
ambulatory settings, hospital employment, nursing and residential care employment, and 
employment in social services provision (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014).  
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Data and Sample 
Data Sources  
This analysis uses multiple data sources to describe county-level healthcare and social 
assistance employment counts, Section 1115 expansions, and county characteristics. The 
analysis is carried out at the county level because Section 1115 expansions’ effects on health 
insurance coverage are likely to vary by county (Miller, 2012).  
County Business Patterns data. The CBP data provide healthcare employment 
counts in mid-March of each year at non-government firms and some governmental 
organizations, such as hospitals, by industry (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013). Since 1998, the 
CBP has used the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) to categorize 
employment by industry. Because CBP employment counts by industry from 1998 onward 
are not easily comparable to CBP employment data prior to 1998, this analysis does not use 
CBP data from before 1998. CBP employment counts are not available for all industries in all 
counties because the U.S. Census Bureau suppresses employment counts in the CBP when 
this information presents a disclosure risk for specific firms or individuals (Evans, Zayatz, & 
Slanta, 1998).  
Data on Section 1115 expansions. Information on active Section 1115 waiver-based 
expansions by state and year was abstracted from the U.S. Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services’ Web site and from other sources such as the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation State Coverage Initiatives Web site (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, n.d. (b); Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, n.d.) and the Kaiser Commission on 
Medicaid and the Uninsured’s state-level surveys of Medicaid and CHIP program 
characteristics (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2015). This study 
focuses on Section 1115 waivers and waiver amendments that include a coverage expansion 
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component for parents or low-income adults without dependent children. This study 
considers states with Section 1115 health insurance premium assistance programs to be “non-
expansion” states because there were often fewer than 1,000 individuals enrolled in these 
programs at the state level (Atherly et al., 2012).  
Data on county characteristics. Several federal, publicly available data sources were 
used to characterize counties. County Intercensal Estimates provide annual estimates of 
county population demographics and population size. Data on county-level per capita income 
and poverty rates come from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Local Area Personal 
Income data and the U.S. Census Bureau’s Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates 
(SAIPE), respectively.  
Sample Creation 
 Sample timeframe. This study’s analytic sample was created from a set of county-
year observations from all U.S. counties and county-equivalents for all years between 2000 
and 2010. The study sample’s first year is 2000 for two reasons. First, by 2000, all but two 
states had implemented CHIP programs (Rosenbach et al., 2001). This allows the analysis to 
separate the potential effects of CHIP implementation on healthcare employment from the 
potential effects of Section 1115 expansions on healthcare employment. Second, County 
Business Patterns employment counts by industry from prior to 1998 are not comparable to 
CBP employment from 1998 onward. Setting the sample’s initial year to 2000 avoids this 
issue. The year 2010 is the last year included in the study timeframe because the ACA was 
enacted in late March 2010, after 2010 CBP data were collected.  
 The Section 1115 expansions that were either implemented or discontinued during the 
2000–2010 study period are listed in Table 3.1.  
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Table 3.1. States That Implemented Section 1115 Expansions to Parents or Low-Income 
Adults without Dependent Children between 2000 and 2010 
Expansion 
state 
Year expansion 
implemented 
Expansion program enrollment as 
of June 2011 
Expansion enrollment 
as percent of total 
Medicaid enrollment 
in June 2011 
Arizona 2001 224,500 childless adults 16% 
California 10 counties in 
2007, 35 primarily 
rural counties in 
2011
1
 
184,200 childless adults and 
parents 
2% 
 
Illinois 2002. Expansion 
discontinued in 
2007.  
129,994 parents on December 31, 
2006
2 
7% of June 2006 
enrollment 
Indiana 2008 16,100 childless adults 2% 
Iowa 2005 46,000 childless adults and 
parents 
11% 
Maine 2002 16,500 childless adults 6% 
Maryland 2007
3
 56,800 childless adults 7% 
Massachusetts  2007
4 
114,700 childless adults 10% (but accompanied 
by other coverage 
changes) 
Michigan 2004 77,900 childless adults 4%  
New Jersey 2001 156,598 adults ever enrolled in 
2011 fiscal year
5 
(monthly 
enrollment count not available) 
N/A 
New York 2001 949,300 childless adults 19% 
Tennessee  1994. Expansion 
discontinued in 
2005.  
Reduced uninsurance in 
Tennessee from 15.7% in 1992-
1993 to 7.2% in 1994-1995. After 
the program’s first year, it was 
closed to most new enrollment.
6
  
N/A 
Utah 2002 16,800 parents and childless 
adults 
6% 
Notes: Unless indicated otherwise, data on expansion enrollments and monthly Medicaid enrollments come 
from Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Medicaid enrollment: June 2013 data snapshot. 
Washington, DC: Kaiser Family Foundation; January 2014. 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/8050-07-medicaid-enrollment-june-2013-data-
snapshot1.pdf. 
 
1. California’s Section 1115 expansions were not implemented on a statewide basis.  
2. Illinois expansion program enrollment count from Artiga S, Mann C. Family coverage under SCHIP 
waivers. Washington, DC: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured; May 2007. 
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7644.pdf. Accessed May 14, 2015.  
3. Maryland’s coverage expansion to low-income adults without dependent children was an addition to a 
Section 1115 waiver that implemented Medicaid managed care in Maryland in 1997. 
4. Massachusetts’ major expansion of coverage in 2006-2007 was carried out through Massachusetts’ 
pre-existing Section 1115 waiver. 
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5. New Jersey expansion program enrollment count from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services. New Jersey Family Coverage under SCHIP. Baltimore, MD: Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services; April 2012.  
7. Tennessee’s expansion program’s effects on state rates of health insurance coverage from Conover CJ, 
Davies HH. The role of TennCare in health policy for low-income people in Tennessee. Washington, 
DC: Urban Institute; February 2000. http://webarchive.urban.org/UploadedPDF/occa33.pdf. Accessed 
May 18, 2015.  
 
Exclusion of county-year observations. The first step in producing this study’s 
analytic sample was to exclude 638 county-year observations from counties and county-
equivalents that were created or eliminated during the 2000–2010 timeframe, such as 
Alaska’s boroughs. (Because the U.S. Census Bureau reorganized all of Alaska’s boroughs, 
the entire state of Alaska is excluded from this sample.) Next, I excluded seven county-year 
observations with missing values for county economic and demographic characteristics from 
the sample. Third, I excluded from the sample 8,078 county-year observations from counties 
with any suppression of healthcare and social assistance employment counts during the study 
period.  
Finally, I excluded 955 county-year observations collected from Connecticut, 
Pennsylvania, and Washington state after those states implemented state-funded health 
insurance coverage programs.
4
 Observations from these states are excluded because these 
state-funded health insurance coverage programs did not require federal approval and budget 
neutrality, unlike Section 1115 waiver–based coverage expansions. These three states also 
had full discretion to define program benefits, change eligibility, and open or close program 
enrollment. Thus, state-funded coverage expansions are assumed to be different enough from 
Section 1115 expansion to be excluded from this study’s sample.  
                                                          
4
 Washington, DC, also had a locally funded health insurance coverage program during the study period. 
However, healthcare and social assistance employment counts from Washington, DC, are suppressed from 2000 
to 2003 in the CBP data, resulting in the exclusion of all observations from Washington, DC, from the final 
analytic sample.  
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Figure 3.2 describes how the sample was created.  
 
 
Figure 3.2. Creating a sample of county-year observations.  
 
 Sample size and characteristics. The final healthcare and social assistance sample 
includes 25,203 county-year observations from 2,344 counties in 48 states. (The states for 
which there are no county-year observations in the sample are Alaska; Washington, DC; and 
Washington state.) The sample includes 8,657 county-year observations from 787 counties in 
states with active Section 1115 expansions during the study period and 16,546 county-year 
observations from 1,557 counties in non-expansion states. In this sample, 6,721 county-year 
observations were from the 13 states that either implemented or discontinued Section 1115 
81 
expansion program during the 2000–2010 study period. The other 1,936 county-year 
observations in the expansion group are from Delaware, Hawaii, Minnesota, Oregon, 
Vermont, and Wisconsin—states that had active Section 1115 expansions during the entire 
study period.  
 Observations included in the final study analytic sample differ from those 
observations excluded from the sample in that excluded observations come from counties 
with much smaller population sizes. The average population size of a county excluded from 
the final analytic sample is 12,000 people, while the average population among counties 
included in the final analytic sample is approximately ten times larger.  
Variables 
Healthcare employment. This analysis’s dependent variable is a county-level count 
of individuals employed in the healthcare and social assistance sector. This dependent 
variable comes from the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns data. Total 
healthcare and social assistance employment counts at the county level include not only 
employment in clinical occupations but also in non-clinical occupations (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2015).  
“Social assistance” employment is included in the healthcare and social assistance 
employment counts. Healthcare and social assistance are combined into a single industry 
category because, as the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics notes, “it is sometimes difficult to 
distinguish between the boundaries of these two activities” (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2014). At the national level, social assistance represents approximately 15% of total 
healthcare and social assistance employment, as Table 3.2 shows.  
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Table 3.2: Healthcare and Social Assistance Employment by Subsector  
Subsector within healthcare 
and social assistance 
Sample categories within that 
subsector 
Subsector employment as 
percent of total national 
healthcare and social 
assistance employment in 
2000, 2005, and 2010 
Ambulatory healthcare 
services  
Offices of physicians, Offices of 
dentists, Diagnostic imaging centers 
2000: 33.5% 
2005: 34.5% 
2010: 35.6% 
Hospitals  
General medical and surgical 
hospitals, Psychiatric and substance 
abuse hospitals, Specialty (except 
psychiatric and substance abuse) 
hospitals  
2000: 30.8% 
2005: 29.5% 
2010: 28.0% 
Nursing and residential care 
facilities  
Residential mental health and 
substance abuse facilities, Residential 
intellectual and developmental 
disability facilities, Assisted living 
facilities for the elderly  
2000: 20.1% 
2005: 19.4% 
2010: 18.7% 
Social assistance  
Child and youth services, Temporary 
shelters, Emergency and other relief 
services 
2000: 15.6% 
2005: 16.6% 
2010: 17.7% 
Source: Author’s analysis of Current Employment Statistics  
 
Section 1115 expansion indicator. This study’s key independent variable is an 
indicator for an active Section 1115 expansion within a state. If an expansion is implemented 
prior to mid-March of a particular year in a particular state, then the expansion indicator for 
that state-year observation is set equal to 1. If an expansion is implemented after mid-March 
of a given year within a particular state, the expansion indicator for that state-year 
observation is set equal to zero and the state-year indicator for the following year is set to 1. 
This March cut-off date corresponds to the time of year during which the Census Bureau 
collects CBP employment data. This expansion indicator equals 1 for subsequent 
observations as long as an expansion is active. If an expansion program is closed and all 
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expansion enrollees are disenrolled from Section 1115 expansion–based coverage, then the 
indicator is reset to zero.  
County demographic characteristics. This analysis uses control variables related to 
county demographic and economic characteristics. These control variables change over the 
study period and are correlated with both employment counts and the expansion indicator. 
Demographic variables include the percent of the county population that is female, the 
percent of the county population that is 19 years old or younger, the percent of the county 
population that is 65 years old or older, the percent of the county population that is a racial or 
ethnic minority, and the total county population (in tens of thousands of people). As 
described in this study’s conceptual framework, these variables are likely to be associated 
with the size of the healthcare workforce. Furthermore, each of these variables is correlated 
with one another as well as with the Section 1115 expansion indicator. County demographic 
characteristics that are negatively correlated with the Section 1115 expansion indicator are 
the percent of the county population that is female (r=-0.035), the percent of the county 
population that is aged 19 or younger (r=-0.072), and the percent of the population that is a 
racial or ethnic minority (r=-0.20). County demographic variables that are positively 
correlated with the Section 1115 expansion indicator are total county population (r=0.060) 
and the percent of the county population that is 65 years old or older (r=0.049). Because 
these variables are correlated with the expansion indicator, omitting them from this study’s 
regression model would bias model estimates.  
 County economic characteristics. County economic variables include the percent of 
the county population that is in poverty and county per capita income, which is inflation-
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adjusted based on the Consumer Price Index to 2012 dollars.
5
 These variables are included in 
the model because, as noted in this study’s conceptual framework, clinician supply tends to 
be greater in areas with greater economic wealth (Jiang & Begun, 2002). Percent of the 
county population in poverty is negatively correlated with the expansion indicator (r=-0.22), 
and county per capita income is positively correlated with the expansion indicator (r=0.14).  
Methods 
This analysis uses ordinary least squares models with county and year fixed effects to 
test the effect of Section 1115 expansions on healthcare and social assistance employment. I 
use two model specifications: One specification estimates the average effect of these 
expansions across the 13 states that experienced changes in expansion status during the study 
period. The other specification estimates state-specific effects of the expansions on 
healthcare workforce employment. Allowing expansion effects to differ by state is useful 
because the expansions differ according to key features like income eligibility limits for 
expansion enrollees or the comprehensiveness of benefits provided to these enrollees.  
Average Effect of Section 1115 Expansions on Healthcare Employment  
The model for estimating the average effect of Section 1115 expansions on county-
level healthcare and social assistance employment across the 13 states that experienced 
changes in Section 1115 expansion status between 2000 and 2010 is:  
EMPct = 1EXPst + 2Xct + t + c + ct 
In this equation, the subscripts c and t indicate that variables vary by county and by 
time in years, respectively. The subscript s denotes variation at the state level. The dependent 
                                                          
5
 SAIPE data contains a county-level variable for median income. However, a change in the SAIPE estimation 
methodology between 2004 and 2005 makes comparing median incomes challenging across time. I therefore 
use the Local Area Personal Income data to describe county-level incomes. However, I still use SAIPE to 
describe the percent of each county’s population in poverty.  
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variable EMP represents county-level counts of individuals employed in healthcare and 
social assistance. EXP is an indicator variable that describes whether or not a Section 1115 
expansion is in effect in a particular year in a particular state. The vector Xct describes each 
county’s economic and demographic characteristics. Time fixed effects, t, control for year-
specific shocks to healthcare employment and county fixed effects, c, control for 
unobservable, time-invariant county characteristics. The model’s error term is ct.  
The coefficient (1) on EXP describes the average effect of Section 1115 expansion 
implementation on county-level healthcare employment per capita across all Section 1115 
expansion states that experienced a change in Section 1115 expansion status between 2000 
and 2010. 
State-Specific Effects of Section 1115 Expansions on Healthcare 
Workforce Employment  
The state-specific effects model is:  
EMPct = 1EXPst + 2STATEs + 3STATEs  EXPst + 4Xct + t + c + ct 
The state-specific model resembles the average-effect model. However, the state-
specific model includes STATE, an indicator variable for each of the states in the model, and 
an interaction term that allows the effect of Section 1115 expansion implementation on 
county-level healthcare employment to vary by state. The coefficient on STATE, 2, cannot 
be estimated because the state indicator variable becomes redundant in the presence of 
county fixed effects. The state-specific effect of Section 1115 expansion implementation on 
healthcare employment is 1 + 3, the sum of the coefficients on EXP and the STATEEXP 
interaction term. The state-specific effect of Section 1115 expansions on county-level 
healthcare employment can only be identified for states with changes in expansion status 
during the 2000–2010 study period. Because Section 1115 waiver–based expansions were 
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continuously active in Delaware, Hawaii, Minnesota, Oregon, Vermont, and Wisconsin from 
prior to 2010 to the end of the study period in 2010, state-specific expansion effects cannot 
be estimated for these states.  
This study uses block bootstrapping with 1,000 replications to generate standard 
errors for coefficient estimates for both the average-effect models and state-specific models 
(Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004). Because this study uses a relatively long panel, 
focuses on the effects of state-level policy changes at the sub-state level, and features little 
change in the expansion implementation variable over time, conventional, non-bootstrapped 
standard errors likely would underestimate the standard errors from the average-effect and 
state-specific effect regression models (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004). The use of 
block bootstrapping avoids this problem.  
Specification Testing 
I examined the inclusion of a squared county population term in the regression 
models for this study’s main analysis. Including a population-squared term in the model 
decreases the model’s adjusted R2 and thus does not improve model fit. As a result, I use the 
linear version of state population in this analysis.  
Sensitivity Analysis 
I conducted a sensitivity analysis that repeats the main analysis but with annual 
county-level ambulatory healthcare employment counts as the dependent variable. 
Ambulatory healthcare services employment includes employment in healthcare practitioner 
offices, outpatient care centers, medical and diagnostic laboratories, and home healthcare 
services.  
Estimating the average-effect and state-specific effects of Section 1115 expansion 
implementation on county-level ambulatory healthcare services employment is useful 
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because, unlike healthcare and social assistance employment, ambulatory healthcare services 
employment does not include employment from the social assistance sector. Furthermore, 
ambulatory healthcare services employment is the largest subsector of healthcare and social 
assistance employment at the national level. Between 2000 and 2010—the years included in 
this study—ambulatory healthcare services employment represented approximately 35% of 
healthcare and social assistance employment nationally (see Table 3.2).  
Supplemental Analyses 
I also carried out two supplemental analyses. First, I assessed the association between 
Medicaid coverage expansion and total Medicaid enrollment at the state level. Second, I 
tested whether state-level healthcare and social assistance employment affected the 
probability of Medicaid expansion at the state level. 
The first supplemental analysis evaluated whether the Section 1115 expansions that 
were either implemented or discontinued during the study period were associated with 
changes in total Medicaid enrollment. This analysis’s hypothesis is that Section 1115 
expansions were associated with increases in Medicaid enrollment at the state level. This 
analysis uses ordinary least squares models with state and year fixed effects: 
ENROLLst = 1EXPst + sCHARst + t + s + ct 
The dependent variable in this model, ENROLL, measures total Medicaid enrollment 
in thousands at the state level in December of each year between 2000 and 2010. The 
model’s key independent variable, EXP, is the state-level Section 1115 expansion indicator 
used in this study’s main analysis.  
This model includes control variables for demographic and economic characteristics, 
CHARst, that are measured annually by state. These variables include total state population, 
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the percent of the state population that is 19 years old or younger, the percent of the state 
population that is 65 years old or older, the percent of the state population that is female, the 
percent of the state population that is a racial or ethnic minority, the percent of the state 
population in poverty, and state (s) and year fixed effects (t ). Standard errors in this model 
are clustered at the state level.  
State-level Medicaid enrollment counts come from Kaiser State Health Facts (Kaiser 
State Health Facts, n.d.). Information about the Section 1115 expansion indicators comes 
from the CMS Web site and other sources. State-level control variables come from the U.S. 
Census Bureau’s Population Intercensal Estimates and the Small Area Income Poverty 
Estimates. 
The second supplemental analysis assesses the potential for reverse causality in this 
study: whether healthcare employment counts affects the probability of Section 1115 
expansion. I hypothesized that state-level healthcare and social assistance employment 
counts in a given year were not associated with the probability of Section 1115 expansion in 
the following year. This state-level analysis uses a logit model with state and year fixed 
effects to predict the probability of Section 1115 expansion:  
Probability(EXPANSION = 1|x) = 1/(1 + e
-Xß
)  
where XB = ß1EMPLOYs, t-1 + ß2CHARst + tt + s  
The subscripts in this model indicate that variables in the model vary by state, s, and 
by year, t. The dependent variable in this model is the indicator for an active Section 1115 
expansion. The key independent variable, EMPLOY, in this model is an annual state-level 
count of healthcare and social assistance employees (in thousands). The subscript t-1 on 
EMPLOY indicates that the healthcare and social assistance employment count is from the 
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year prior to year t. This model includes the same state-level demographic and economic 
characteristics, CHARst, as the first supplementary analysis. Year fixed effects are 
represented above as tt and state fixed effects as s. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.3 summarizes the mean characteristics for all counties in the final sample, 
counties in states with active Section 1115 expansions during the study period, and counties 
in non-expansion states. During the study period, the average county had approximately 
6,355 people employed in the healthcare and social assistance sector. Counties in non-
expansion states had an average of 4,744 individuals employed in health care and social 
assistance while counties in expansion states had an average of approximately 9,433 
individuals employed in health care and social assistance. The difference in healthcare 
employment between counties in expansion states and counties in non-expansion states is 
statistically significant in unadjusted comparisons (p<0.001).  
Average economic and demographic characteristics differ significantly between 
counties in expansion states and counties in non-expansion states, as Table 3.3 indicates. 
Multivariate Analyses 
Table 3.4 shows coefficient estimates from the average-effect and state-specific 
effects models. Coefficients on state-specific interaction terms are omitted from Table 3.4. 
Instead, total estimated state-specific effects of Section 1115 expansion on county healthcare 
and social assistance employment are presented in Table 3.5. Figure 3.3 presents these same 
state-specific effects in a forest plot.   
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Table 3.3. Summary Statistics for County-Year Observations 
 Variables 
All county-year 
observations 
(N=25,203) 
County-year 
observations from 
non-expansion 
states (N=16,546) 
County-year 
observations 
from expansion 
states* 
(N=8,657) 
County health care employment     
Health care and social assistance 
employment 
6,354.55 
(18,846.26) 
4,743.84 
(12,128.24) 
9,433.07*** 
(27,175.75) 
      
County demographic characteristics 
    
Total population (in 10,000s) 11.75 
(34.54) 
8.98 
(20.98) 
17.04*** 
(50.90) 
% of pop. female 50.43 
(1.76) 
50.47 
(1.94) 
50.35*** 
(1.35) 
% of pop. 19 years old or younger 27.31 
(3.09) 
 27.41 
(3.15) 
27.11*** 
(2.96) 
% of pop. 65 years or older 14.74 
(3.92) 
14.64 
(4.07) 
14.94*** 
(3.61) 
% of pop. racial or ethnic minority 
20.05 
(18.47) 
23.47 
(19.17) 
13.50*** 
(15.03) 
County economic characteristics  
    
% of population in poverty 
14.44 
(5.82) 
15.80 
(6.04) 
11.85*** 
(4.30) 
Inflation-adjusted per capita income (in 
$100s) 
344.73 
(83.23) 
333.71 
(78.14) 
365.78*** 
(88.45) 
Note: T-tests were used to compare differences in averages between counties in expansion states and counties in 
non-expansion states. *** indicates that the p-value for a t-test was 0.001.  
 
Table 3.4 indicates that Section 1115 expansions were associated with a 372-person 
increase in the number of people employed in the healthcare and social assistance sector at 
the county level after controlling for other county and time effects. This effect is statistically 
significant at the 5% level of significance.  
Table 3.5 and Figure 3.3 indicate that nine of the 13 state-specific estimates of 
Section 1115 expansion implementation on healthcare workforce employment are not 
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statistically significant. Three of the statistically significant state-specific estimates are 
positive. In New York, Section 1115 expansion was associated with an increase of 
approximately 1,482 healthcare and social assistance employees at the county level after 
controlling for other county and time factors. In New Jersey, Section 1115 expansion was 
associated with a 2,048-person increase in county-level healthcare and social assistance 
employment. Massachusetts’s expansion of health insurance coverage in 2006–2007, 
supported by the state’s Section 1115 waiver, was associated with a 4,224-person increase in 
county-level healthcare employment after controlling for other factors. Although these 
estimates seem large, it should be noted that the average county population in each of these 
states during the study period was much larger than the study sample’s mean population size 
of 117,500. In New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts, the average populations of the 
counties included in this study were 323,900 people, 428,400 people, and 494,400 people, 
respectively.  
In Iowa, Section 1115 expansion was associated with a statistically significant 193-
person decrease in county-level healthcare and social assistance employment, all else held 
constant.  
An F-test on the state-specific coefficients in this model rejects the null hypothesis 
that these coefficients are jointly equal to zero. 
 
  
92 
Table 3.4. Regression Estimates of the Effect of Section 1115 Expansions on County-Level 
Counts of Healthcare and Social Assistance Employment (N=25,203 County-Year 
Observations) 
Variables  
Average-effect 
model 
State-specific effects 
model  
Section 1115 expansion indicator 371.99*  
  (153.73)  
State-specific expansion interactions  
Omitted: See table 3.5 
below for total state-
specific effects 
   
County characteristics    
Total population (in 10,000s) 636.00** 613.96** 
  (93.74) (90.85) 
Percent of the population that is female 247.41** 220.48** 
  (55.25) (53.46) 
Percent of the population that is 19 years old or 
younger 
-130.83** -108.61** 
  (42.84) (36.57) 
Percent of the population that is 65 years old or 
older 
-99.47* -105.61** 
  (42.08) (40.49) 
Percent of the population that is a racial or 
ethnic minority 
94.78* 80.99* 
  (39.30) (38.96) 
Percent of the population that is in poverty 13.52 21.01 
  (11.89) (10.92) 
Inflation-adjusted per capita income (in $100s) -0.58 -0.045 
  (0.93) (0.95) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9951 0.9954 
Notes: * indicates p-value<0.05 , and ** indicates p-value<0.01. Models include county and year fixed effects.  
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Table 3.5. Estimates of State-Specific Effects of Section 1115 Expansions on County-Level 
Healthcare and Social Assistance Employment 
State name 
Estimate of state-specific 
effect 
Lower bound of 
95% confidence 
interval around 
estimate 
Upper bound of 
95% confidence 
interval around 
estimate 
Utah -262.59 -1027.49 502.31 
Iowa -192.64** -325.96 -59.33 
Tennessee -89.82 -503.18 323.54 
Illinois -81.55 -197.10 33.99 
Indiana -35.80 -243.65 172.06 
Michigan 281.31 -207.98 770.60 
Maine 379.11 -397.51 1,155.73 
Maryland 692.04 -433.83 1,817.91 
Arizona  1,106.70 -2,168.61 4,382.01 
New York 1,481.82* 4.35 2,959.29 
New Jersey 2,047.60* 425.81 3,669.40 
Massachusetts 4,223.80* 403.64 8,043.97 
California 8,895.27 -4,389.12 22,179.65 
Notes: * indicates p-value<0.05 for total effect; ** indicates p-value<0.01. Models include county and year 
fixed effects. For a given state, the total state-specific effect of Section 1115 expansion is calculated as the sum 
of the coefficient estimate on the expansion indicator and the coefficient estimate on the interaction between an 
indicator variable for that state and the expansion indicator.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3. State-specific effects of Section 1115 expansions on county-level healthcare and 
social assistance employment. 
Note: The diagram above shows point estimates of state-specific expansion effects and the 95% confidence 
intervals around these effects. 
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Sensitivity Analysis  
 As noted in “Methods,” I replicated the analysis for county-level healthcare and 
social assistance employment counts with county-level ambulatory healthcare services 
employment counts. I created a sample of 18,700 county-year observations in a manner 
similar to that described in “Sample Creation.”  
Table 3.6. Regression Estimates of the Effect of Section 1115 Expansions on County-Level 
Ambulatory Healthcare Services Employment (N=18,700 County-Year Observations) 
Variables 
Average-effect 
model 
State-specific effects 
model 
Section 1115 expansion indicator 194.518**   
  (74.794)   
State-specific expansion interactions 
 Omitted: See table 3.7 
below for total state-
specific effects 
    
County characteristics     
Total population (in 10,000s) 264.04** 297.85** 
  (35.93) (36.40) 
Percent of the population that is female 189.53** 156.95** 
  (48.95) (47.10) 
Percent of the population that is 19 years old or 
younger 
-88.55** -104.80** 
  (30.39) (31.25) 
Percent of the population that is 65 years old or 
older 
-82.54* -105.01** 
  (32.74) (35.26) 
Percent of the population that is a racial or ethnic 
minority 
 
46.52* 
 
26.61 
  (20.32) (20.97) 
Percent of the population that is in poverty 0.69 0.50 
  (7.07) (6.17) 
Inflation-adjusted per capita income (in $100s) 0.55 -0.26 
  (0.85) (0.70) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9915 0.9894 
Notes: * indicates p-value<0.05, and ** indicates p-value<0.01; and *** indicates p-value<0.001. Models 
include county and year fixed effects.  
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The first column of Table 3.6 indicates that Section 1115 expansions were associated 
with an average 195-person increase in county-level ambulatory healthcare services 
employment across all states with changes in Section 1115 expansion status between 2000 
and 2010. This result is statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. In the state-
specific effects model for county-level ambulatory healthcare services employment, only two 
of 13 estimated state-specific effects are statistically significant, as Table 3.7 and Figure 3.4 
show. Section 1115 expansion was associated with a statistically significant increase in 
county-level ambulatory healthcare services employment in New Jersey but a statistically 
significant decrease in county-level ambulatory healthcare services employment in Iowa.  
 
Table 3.7. Estimates of State-Specific Effects of Section 1115 Expansions on County-Level 
Ambulatory Healthcare Services Employment 
State name 
Estimate of the state-
specific effect 
Lower bound of 95% 
confidence interval 
around estimate 
Upper bound of 95% 
confidence interval 
around estimate 
Utah -229.54 -542.52 83.44 
Iowa -141.30* -263.68 -18.93 
Illinois -69.05 -279.25 141.16 
Maine -16.15 -364.52 332.23 
Tennessee -3.40 -128.66 121.87 
Indiana 52.31 -160.94 265.56 
Arizona 83.89 -1,136.65 1,304.44 
Maryland 84.27 -260.32 428.87 
Michigan 192.80 -264.53 650.14 
New York 629.55 -129.06 1,388.16 
California 1,155.47 -1,024.08 3,335.02 
New Jersey 1,234.23* 100.81 2,367.65 
Massachusetts 1,510.30 -80.36 3,100.97 
Notes: * indicates p-value<0.05 for a state-specific coefficient. For a given state, the total state-specific effect of 
Section 1115 expansion is calculated as the sum of the coefficient estimate on the expansion indicator and the 
coefficient estimate on the interaction between an indicator variable for that state and the expansion indicator.  
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Figure 3.4. State-specific effects of Section 1115 expansions on county-level ambulatory 
healthcare services employment. 
 
Supplemental Analyses 
 As described in the “Methods” section, I conducted two supplemental analyses. In the 
first analysis, I tested whether Section 1115 expansions that occurred during the study period 
were associated with changes in total Medicaid enrollment at the state level. Because this 
analysis includes data from every state except for Washington state—which had an active 
state-funded expansion throughout the entire study period—this analysis’s regression could 
be seen as describing associations in a population rather than in a sample. As a result, in this 
case, standard errors around model coefficient estimates are not informative. As Table 3.8 
shows, this analysis indicates that Section 1115 expansions were associated with an average 
118,730-person increase in monthly (December) state-level enrollment in Medicaid for all 
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states with changes in Section 1115 expansion status between 2000 and 2010. This finding 
therefore provides evidence to suggest that Section 1115 expansions increased average 
Medicaid enrollment at the state level.  
 
Table 3.8. Regression Estimates of the Effect of Section 1115 Expansions on State-Level 
Medicaid Enrollment (N=529 State-Year Observations) 
Variables 
Estimated effect on state-level enrollment (in 
thousands) 
Section 1115 expansion indicator 118.73 
 (68.68) 
State characteristics    
Total state population 0.00032*** 
  (0.000050) 
Percent of the state population that is female 282.85 
  (199.42) 
Percent of the state population that is 19 years old 
or younger -108.75* 
  (47.35) 
Percent of the state population that is 65 years old 
or older -136.17 
  (94.81) 
Percent of the state population that is in poverty 8.05 
  (12.91) 
Percent of the population that is a racial or ethnic 
minority -17.23 
  (19.54) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.90 
Notes: * indicates p-value<0.05 for total effect; *** indicates p-value<0.001. Models include state and year 
fixed effects. 
 
 The second supplemental analysis uses a fixed-effects logistic regression model to 
assess whether or not state healthcare employment counts are associated with the probability 
that a state will implement a Section 1115 expansion. This analysis also uses a population of 
states rather than a sample, so it is most informative to focus on average marginal effect 
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estimates rather than on standard errors around these estimates. The fixed-effects logistic 
regression model indicates that a thousand-person increase in the number of individuals 
employed in the healthcare and social assistance sector was associated with a 0.016 
percentage point decrease in the probability of Section 1115 expansion. Because this effect is 
small in magnitude, it suggests that the possibility that states pursue Section 1115 waivers to 
bolster their healthcare employment is unlikely.  
Discussion 
Taking the results from the models together, there is some evidence to support the 
hypotheses that Section 1115 expansions increase healthcare and social assistance 
employment at the county level. The average-effect models for county-level healthcare and 
social assistance employment and for county-level ambulatory healthcare services indicate 
that Section 1115 expansions are positively associated with county-level health sector 
employment. However, the majority of the state-specific estimates of Section 1115 
expansions on county-level healthcare and social assistance employment were not 
statistically significant.  
 The variation in expansion program enrollment counts across states could explain the 
finding that Section 1115 expansions were positively associated with county-level healthcare 
and social assistance employment counts in some states but not in others. First, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York—the states for which Section 1115 expansion 
was associated with increased healthcare and social assistance employment at the county 
level—had relatively larger expansion enrollments. In particular, Massachusetts’s health 
insurance coverage expansion affected a broad group of lower-income individuals.  
Many of the states for which there was no effect of coverage expansion on healthcare 
and social assistance employment had expansions with relatively smaller enrollments. For 
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example, Utah’s Section 1115 waiver–based coverage expansion was capped at 25,000 
enrollees (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, February 2014). (See Table 3.1 for 
representative expansion enrollments.)  
Iowa provides an exception to the proposed relationship between Section 1115 
expansion enrollment and healthcare and social assistance employment growth. Although 
Iowa’s Section 1115 expansion population represented nearly 11% of the state’s total 
Medicaid population in 2011, Section 1115 expansion in Iowa was associated with declines 
in both healthcare and social assistance employment and ambulatory healthcare services 
employment.  
Limitations  
This analysis has four key limitations. First, states’ implementation of Section 1115 
expansions is not random because states have to have substantial political will and expertise 
to pursue and implement Section 1115 expansions. However, one of the study’s supplemental 
analyses finds that state-level healthcare and social assistance employment is not strongly 
associated with the probability that a state will implement a Section 1115 expansion. In other 
words, changes to healthcare employment can be interpreted as a consequence of Section 
1115 expansions rather than as a cause of such expansions.  
Second, data suppression patterns in the CBP data limit the ability to generalize study 
results to counties with small populations. Third, healthcare and social assistance 
employment counts include some non-health employment—that is, employment in social 
services provision. As Table 3.2 shows, social assistance represents about 17% of all 
healthcare and social assistance employment at the national level. Social assistance 
employment is likely not related to Section 1115 expansion status, so the inclusion of social 
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assistance in the dependent variable should not necessarily bias the estimates of Section 1115 
expansions’ effects on healthcare employment.  
Finally, the models in this analysis do not include variables that describe healthcare 
workforce policy at the national, state, and local levels. Due to the broad definition of 
“healthcare workforce” in this study, it would have been challenging to control for all 
policies that affect healthcare employment and are correlated with variables included in this 
study’s regression models. However, year fixed effects can control for national healthcare 
workforce policy changes that affect all counties similarly, and county fixed effects control 
for healthcare workforce policies that do not change over the study period.  
Implications for the Affordable Care Act  
Section 1115 expansions’ statistically significant effects on healthcare and social 
assistance employment in states with larger expansion enrollments indicates that healthcare 
employment could grow in response to the ACA’s Medicaid expansion as well. Although 
Section 1115 expansions can provide information on the potential direction of the effects of 
the ACA’s Medicaid expansion on healthcare employment, Section 1115 expansions differ 
from the ACA’s Medicaid expansion in important ways. First, unlike Section 1115 
expansions, the ACA’s Medicaid expansion includes significant new federal spending. 
Furthermore, at the state level, the ACA’s Medicaid expansion has enrolled more people than 
Section 1115 expansions did. Finally, the ACA’s Medicaid expansion—unlike all Section 
1115 expansions except for the one in Massachusetts—accompanies a significant expansion 
of private health insurance coverage. These ACA-specific factors—federal spending, larger 
enrollments, and private coverage expansion—indicate that the employment effects for the 
ACA could be larger than those associated with Section 1115 expansions. Therefore, there 
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will be a clear opportunity to monitor changes in health care employment in response to the 
ACA’s coverage expansion. 
  
102 
REFERENCES 
Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System. AHCCCS Care (Childless Adults) phase out 
plan fact sheet. 
http://www.azahcccs.gov/community/Downloads/resources/ChildlessAdultPhaseOutF
actSheet.pdf. Not dated. Accessed March 29, 2014.  
 
Artiga S, Mann C. Coverage gains under recent Section 1115 waivers: a data update. 
Washington, DC: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured; August 2005. 
http://kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/coverage-gains-under-recent-section-1115-
waivers/. Accessed March 29, 2014.  
 
Artiga S. The role of Section 1115 waivers in Medicaid and CHIP: looking back and looking 
forward. Washington, DC: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured; 
March 2009. http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7874.pdf. 
Accessed March 23, 2014.  
 
Atherly A, Dowd BE, Coulam RF, Guy G. The effect of HIFA waiver expansions on 
uninsurance rates in adult populations. Health Serv Res. 2012;47(3 Pt 1):939–962 
 
Bertakis KD, Azari R, Helms LJ, Callahan EJ, Robbins JA. Gender differences in the 
utilization of health care services. J Fam Pract. 2000;49(2):147–152.  
 
Bertrand M, Duflo E, Mullainathan S. How much should we trust differences-in-differences 
estimates?. Q J Econ. 2004;119(1):249–275.  
 
Buchmueller T, Miller S, Nasseh K, Vujicic M. How do providers respond to public health 
insurance expansions? evidence from adult Medicaid dental benefits. 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20053. National Bureau of Economic Research 
working paper w20053. Published April 2014. Accessed October 29, 2014.  
 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Current Employment Statistics [database online]. Washington, 
DC: Bureau of Labor Statistics; 2015. http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/dsrv?ce. Accessed 
May 17, 2015.  
 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor. May 2014 National industry-specific 
occupational employment and wage estimates - sector 62 - health care and social 
assistance (including private, state, and local government hospitals). Occupational 
Employment Statistics. http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics2_62.htm. March 25, 
2015. Accessed April 13, 2015.  
 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Medicaid & CHIP: October 2014 monthly 
applications, eligibility determinations and enrollment report. Baltimore, MD: 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; December 18, 2014. 
http://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/program-
information/downloads/october-2014-enrollment-report.pdf. Accessed January 11, 
2015.  
103 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Utah Primary Care Network (PCN) 1115 
demonstration fact sheet. Baltimore, MD: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services; February 7, 2014. http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-
Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ut/ut-primary-care-network-fs.pdf.  
 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. About Section 1115 demonstrations. 
Medicaid.gov. http://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/by-
topics/waivers/1115/section-1115-demonstrations.html. Not dated (a). Accessed April 
13, 2015.  
 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Demonstrations & waivers. Medicaid.gov. 
http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-
Topics/Waivers/Waivers_faceted.html. Not dated (b). Accessed April 13, 2015.  
 
Cozad MJ. A Consideration of the Potential Side Effects of Health Insurance Coverage 
[dissertation]. Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee; 2012.  
 
Dorn S, Meyer J. Pennsylvania: a case study in childless adult coverage. Dublin, Ireland: 
Economic and Social Research Institute; August 2004. 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/medicaid-and-other-
public-programs-for-low-income-childless-adults-pennsylvania.pdf. Accessed March 
27, 2014.  
 
Enquist G, Burns P. Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability initiative: opportunities 
and issues for states. Washington, DC: State Coverage Initiative; August 2002. 
http://www.statecoverage.org/files/Health%20Insurance%20Flexibility%20and%20A
ccountability%20Initiative%20-
%20Opportunities%20and%20Issues%20for%20States.pdf. Accessed March 27, 
2014.  
 
Evans T, Zayatz L, Slanta J. Using noise for disclosure limitation of establishment tabular 
data. J Official Statistics. 1998;14(4):537–551.  
 
Finkelstein A, Taubman S, Wright B, et al. The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment: 
evidence from the first year. Q J Econ. 2012;127(3):1057–1106.  
 
Fiscella K, Franks P, Doescher MP, Saver BG. Disparities in health care by race, ethnicity, 
and language among the insured: Findings from a national sample. Med Care. 
2002;40(1):52–59.  
 
Freed GL, Nahra TA, Wheeler JR. Predicting the pediatric workforce: Use of trend analysis. 
J Pediatr. 2003;143(5):570–575. 
 
Gilmer T, Kronick R, Rice T. Children welcome, adults need not apply: Changes in public 
program enrollment across states and over time. Med Care Res Rev. 2005;62(1):56–
78.  
104 
Gruber J. Universal health insurance coverage or economic relief--a false choice. N Engl J 
Med. 2009;360(5):437–439. 
 
Hartman M, Martin AB, Lassman D, et al. National health spending in 2013: growth slows, 
remains in step with the overall economy. Health Aff. 2015;34(1):150–160.  
 
Health Resources and Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services. Area Health Resource File: overview. Area Health Resources Files. 
http://arf.hrsa.gov/overview.htm. Not dated. Accessed March 31, 2014.  
 
Jones DK, Singer PM, Ayanian JZ. The changing landscape of Medicaid: practical and 
political considerations for expansion. JAMA. 201;311(19):1965–1966.  
 
Jiang HJ, Begun JW. Dynamics of change in local physician supply: an ecological 
perspective. Soc Sci Med. 2002;54(10):1525–1541.  
 
Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured. Annual updates on eligibility rules, 
enrollment and renewal procedures, and cost-sharing practices in Medicaid and CHIP. 
Washington, DC: Kaiser Family Foundation; January 2015. 
http://kff.org/medicaid/report/annual-updates-on-eligibility-rules-enrollment-and/. 
Accessed April 12, 2015.  
 
Kaiser Family Foundation. The role of Medicaid in state economies and the ACA. Menlo 
Park, CA: Kaiser Family Foundation; November 2013. http://kff.org/medicaid/issue-
brief/the-role-of-medicaid-in-state-economies-and-the-aca/. Accessed October 29, 
2014.  
 
Kaiser Family Foundation. Status of state action on the Medicaid expansion decision. State 
health facts. http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-
expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act. Updated June 22, 2015. Accessed 
June 29, 2015.  
 
Kaiser State Health Facts. Monthly Medicaid enrollment (in thousands). 
http://kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/monthly-medicaid-enrollment-in-thousands/. 
Not dated. Accessed April 13, 2015.  
 
Kessler DP, Sage WM, Becker DJ. Impact of malpractice reforms on the supply of physician 
services. JAMA. 2005;293(21):2618–2625.  
 
Long SK, Kenney GM, Zuckerman S, et al. Quick take: number of uninsured adults 
continues to fall under the ACA: down by 8 million in June 2014. Washington, DC: 
Urban Institute; July 10, 2014. http://hrms.urban.org/quicktakes/Number-of-
Uninsured-Adults-Continues-to-Fall.html. 2014. Accessed October 29, 2014.  
 
Meara E, White C, Cutler DM. Trends in medical spending by age, 1963-2000. Health Aff 
(Millwood). 2004;23(4):176–183.  
105 
Miller S. The effect of insurance on emergency room visits: an analysis of the 2006 
Massachusetts health reform. J Pub Econ. 2012;96(11):893–908.  
 
Missouri Economic Research and Information Center. Missouri healthcare employment 
decline analysis. Jefferson City, MO: Missouri Department of Economic 
Development; June 2014. 
http://www.missourieconomy.org/pdfs/Hospital_JobDecline_MERICAnalysis_June-
21-2014.pdf. Accessed October 29, 2014.  
 
Padgett DK, Patrick C, Burns BJ, Schlesinger HJ. Ethnicity and the use of outpatient mental 
health services in a national insured population. Am J Public Health. 1994;84(2):222–
226.  
 
Pathman DE, Konrad TR, King TS, Taylor DH,Jr, Koch GG. Outcomes of states' 
scholarship, loan repayment, and related programs for physicians. Med Care. 
2004;42(6):560–568.  
 
PwC Health Research Institute. The health system haves and have-nots of ACA expansion. 
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/health-industries/health-research-institute/assets/pwc-hri-
medicaid-report-final.pdf. Published 2014. Accessed October 29, 2014.  
 
Ricketts TC, Randolph R. The diffusion of physicians. Health Aff (Millwood). 
2008;27(5):1409–1415.  
 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. State Coverage Initiatives. http://www.statecoverage.org. 
Not dated. Accessed February 6, 2015.  
 
Rosenbach M, Ellwood M, Czajka J, Irvin C, Coupé W, Quinn B. Implementation of the 
State Children’s Health Insurance Program: momentum is increasing after a modest 
start. Cambridge, MA: Mathematica Policy Research; January 2001. 
http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/~/media/publications/PDFs/schip1.pdf. Accessed 
April 13, 2015.  
 
Shin P, Rosenbaum S. Medicaid and community health centers: the relationship between 
coverage for adults and primary care capacity in medically underserved communities. 
Washington, DC: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured; March 2012. 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8293.pdf. Accessed 
March 27, 2014.  
 
Staiger DO, Auerbach DI, Buerhaus PI. Health care reform and the health care workforce--
the Massachusetts experience. N Engl J Med. 2011;365(12):e24.  
 
Turner A. Medicaid expansion does not appear to explain the recent acceleration in health 
sector job growth [blog post]. Ann Arbor, MI: Altarum Institute; December 11, 2014. 
http://altarum.org/health-policy-blog/medicaid-expansion-does-not-appear-to-
106 
explain-the-recent-acceleration-in-health-sector-job-growth. Accessed January 11, 
2015.  
 
U.S. Census Bureau. County Business Patterns—how the data are collected (coverage and 
methodology). Census. gov. Updated May 27, 2015. 
http://www.census.gov/econ/cbp/methodology.htm. Accessed June 29, 2015.  
 
U.S. Census Bureau. About population estimates. Census.gov. 
https://www.census.gov/popest/about/index.html. Updated May 23, 2013. Accessed 
June 29, 2015.  
 
White House Council of Economic Advisors. Missed opportunities: the consequences of state 
decisions not to expand Medicaid. Washington, DC: White House Council of 
Economic Advisors; July 2014. Accesed Januaary 11, 2015. 
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/missed_opportunities_medicaid.pdf. 
Accessed January 11, 2015. 
 
Wisconsin Department of Health Services. BadgerCare Plus—statewide. Wisconsin 
Department of Health Services. 
https://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/badgercareplus/badgercareplusstatereport-nov-
2014.pdf. 2014. Accessed January 11, 2015.  
 
Wood CA. Employment in health care: a crutch for the ailing economy during the 2007–09 
recession. Monthly Labor Review. 2011;134(4). 
 
107 
CHAPTER 4. THE EFFECT OF MEDICAID EXPANSION ON HOSPITAL 
EMPLOYMENT 
Initial reports suggest that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) 
Medicaid expansion has provided financial benefits to some hospitals. A survey of 450 
hospitals in 25 states revealed greater decreases in charity care provision and greater 
increases in Medicaid charges as a percent of total hospital charges for hospitals in Medicaid 
expansion states than for hospitals in non-expansion states six months after the ACA’s 
Medicaid expansion began (Colorado Hospital Association, 2014). Declines in 
uncompensated care at hospitals in Medicaid expansion states have corresponded with 
increases in hospital revenues for non-profit safety net hospitals and for-profit hospitals alike 
(Galewitz, 2014; Herman, 2014; PwC Health Research Institute, 2014).  
Policymakers assumed that the ACA’s expansion of coverage would offset reductions 
in federal funding to hospitals for providing uncompensated care (Dorn et al., 2013). Some 
states’ decisions to reject the ACA’s Medicaid expansion has therefore left hospitals in those 
states subject to reductions in federal funding without large corresponding increases in 
insurance coverage among low-income adults—though Congress has delayed scheduled 
reductions in Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital program payments until the 2018 
fiscal year (Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission, 2015). 
Proponents of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion have attempted to persuade 
policymakers in “non-expansion” states of Medicaid’s economic benefits. Academic 
researchers, consulting firms, advocacy groups, and the White House Council of Economic 
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Advisors have produced simulations of the Medicaid expansion’s economic effects in at least 
24 states. All simulations that model employment show that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion 
stimulates not just healthcare employment but also employment in all sectors (Kaiser 
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2013; Mahan, 2013; White House Council of 
Economic Advisors, 2014). For example, a December 2014 analysis conducted by the Center 
for Health Policy Research at George Washington University estimated that if North Carolina 
implemented the ACA’s Medicaid expansion in 2016, this policy change would create a total 
of 43,314 new jobs by 2020, including 4,954 jobs in hospitals and 18,339 jobs in ambulatory 
healthcare services (Ku et al., 2014).  
These simulations of the ACA’s effects on employment suggest that the ACA will 
continue to increase job growth over the longer term. However, the ACA’s major coverage 
provisions have been in effect only since January 2014, and 21 states have yet to adopt the 
law’s Medicaid expansion as of April 2015 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2015). Therefore, it 
is useful to look back at the effects of pre-ACA health insurance coverage expansions on 
hospital employment to gain insight into the ACA’s possible impacts. Examining the effects 
of health insurance coverage expansion on hospital employment is also important because 
hospitals employed approximately 3.4% of all non-farm workers in the United States and 
nearly one-third of all healthcare workers as of January 2015 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2015). Furthermore, because hospitals are legally required to provide emergency medical 
care regardless of a patient’s health insurance coverage status, hospitals represent an 
important site of care for low-income and uninsured individuals—the target population for 
the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.  
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Prior Research on the Effects of Health Insurance Coverage 
Expansion on Employment 
Coverage Expansions’ Effects on Healthcare Employment at the 
State Level 
Three uncontrolled studies have examined the relationship between health insurance 
coverage expansion and healthcare employment at the state level. Staiger and colleagues’ 
(2011) analysis of unadjusted trends in healthcare employment concludes that healthcare 
employment grew faster in Massachusetts compared to the rest of the nation after 
Massachusetts implemented its state-led healthcare reforms between 2006 and 2007. Using 
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages data, the authors find that healthcare 
employment grew in Massachusetts by approximately 8% between 2001 and the end of 
2005—the same rate as in the rest of the United States (Staiger, Auerbach, & Buerhaus, 
2011). However, between late 2005 and 2010—the period that includes the implementation 
of Massachusetts’s healthcare reforms—healthcare employment in Massachusetts grew by 
9.5% (Staiger, Auerbach, & Buerhaus, 2011). During the same time period in the rest of the 
United States, healthcare employment grew by 5.5% (Staiger, Auerbach, & Buerhaus, 2011). 
Staiger, Auerbach, and Buerhaus (2011) also used the American Community Survey 
to compare unadjusted growth in administrative healthcare occupations and non-
administrative healthcare occupations in Massachusetts and in the rest of the United States. 
The authors find that per-capita employment in administrative healthcare occupations—
which include finance, business, and administrative jobs—grew 18.4% in Massachusetts 
between 2005–2006 and 2008–2009 but only grew 8% in the same time period in the rest of 
the United States.  
Two more recent unadjusted analyses examine trends in healthcare employment in 
states that have accepted the ACA’s Medicaid expansion compared to those that have not. A 
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policy brief from the Missouri Economic Research and Information Center (MERIC) uses the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Employment Statistics data to compare healthcare and 
social assistance job growth in five states that accepted the ACA’s Medicaid expansion to 
that in five states that have rejected the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. These ten states were 
included in this study because they all had total numbers of employed workers similar to the 
number of employed workers in Missouri (Missouri Economic Research and Information 
Center, 2014). This analysis finds that in the states that accepted the ACA’s Medicaid 
expansion healthcare and social assistance employment increased by an average of 2.1% 
between January to May 2013 and January to May 2014 (Missouri Economic Research and 
Information Center, 2014). Meanwhile, in the five states that rejected the ACA’s Medicaid 
expansion healthcare and social assistance employment increased an average of 0.7% 
between the first five months of 2013 and the first five months of 2014 (Missouri Economic 
Research and Information Center, 2014).  
A December 2014 analysis from the Altarum Institute also uses Current Employment 
Statistics to compare healthcare and social assistance job growth in states that have accepted 
the ACA’s Medicaid expansion compared to states that have not (Turner, 2014). Unlike the 
MERIC analysis, the Altarum Institute analysis uses employment data from 47 states. In the 
states that accepted the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, healthcare employment grew 46% 
between April through October 2013 and April to October 2014. However, healthcare and 
social assistance job growth increased 104% over the same period in the states rejecting the 
ACA’s Medicaid expansion.  
 Two of these three uncontrolled studies find that coverage expansion increased 
healthcare employment at the state level. However, because these studies do not control for 
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state-level factors that affect healthcare employment, they may not identify coverage 
expansion’s effects on healthcare employment. For example, differences in economic growth 
rates by state could affect healthcare and social assistance employment growth. In particular, 
economic conditions that vary by state—in addition to differing samples—could explain the 
differences in the findings from the MERIC and Altarum Institute analyses. 
Coverage Expansions’ Effects on Healthcare Employment at the 
Organizational Level 
The literature on the relationship between pre-ACA health insurance coverage 
expansion and employment at healthcare organizations—including but not limited to 
hospitals—is sparse. Cozad (2012) tests whether state-led health insurance coverage 
expansions in Massachusetts in 2006–2007 increased hospital employment in that state 
compared to hospital employment in bordering states. After controlling for time-invariant 
hospital characteristics and state demographic and economic characteristics, she finds no 
statistically significant association between the implementation of near-universal health 
insurance coverage in Massachusetts and employment counts at Massachusetts hospitals.  
Two other studies focus on health insurance coverage expansions’ effects on staffing 
in community health centers (CHCs) and dental clinics, respectively. In an uncontrolled 
analysis of survey data from 519 CHCs, Shin and Rosenbaum (2012) find that CHCs in states 
that expanded Medicaid parental income eligibility limits above 100% of the federal poverty 
level (FPL) employed more clinicians on average than did CHCs in states with Medicaid 
parental income eligibility limits below 100% FPL. The authors also find that employment at 
CHCs in expansion states grew 8 percentage points more (41% vs. 33%) between 2005 and 
2009 than at CHCs in states with lower parental Medicaid income eligibility limits (Shin & 
Rosenbaum, 2012). Buchmueller and colleagues (2014) use the Survey of Dental Practices to 
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assess the association between Medicaid coverage of adult dental benefits in Medicaid and 
staffing in dental offices. The authors find that the implementation of comprehensive adult 
dental Medicaid coverage was associated with a 3 percentage point increase in a dental 
practice’s probability of employing one or more dental hygienists and a 0.1 increase in the 
number of dental hygienists in a dental practice (Buchmueller et al., 2014). In sum, these two 
studies suggest that Medicaid coverage expansion increases employment in ambulatory 
settings but Cozad’s study finds no association between coverage expansion and hospital 
employment.  
The analysis presented here augments the literature on the relationship between health 
insurance coverage expansion and hospital employment by examining the effects of Section 
1115 waiver–based coverage expansions on full-time equivalent (FTE) hospital employment. 
Notably, this study focuses on coverage expansions’ effects on hospital employment in 
multiple states and over an 11-year time period.  
Furthermore, Massachusetts’s experience with health insurance coverage expansion 
in the mid-2000s may not be representative of that in other states. Prior to Massachusetts’s 
2006–2007 coverage expansion, the percent of employed individuals working in hospitals 
grew in Massachusetts—from approximately 5.1% in 2000 to 5.6% in 2005—but declined 
from 5.1% to 4.6% of all employed individuals over the same time period in the entire United 
States (author’s analysis of County Business Patterns data).  
Background on Section 1115 Waivers 
Section 1115 waivers provide states with flexibility to pursue “experimental, pilot, or 
demonstration projects” related to Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(CHIP) eligibility, financing, and care delivery (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
n.d. (a)). Through the Section 1115 program, a state can waive federally mandated features of 
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the Medicaid and CHIP programs, like the requirement to provide certain benefits to all 
Medicaid enrollees, and still obtain program funds from the federal government (Moody & 
Rosenstein, 2009). From the early 1990s through 2013, states had the option to use Section 
1115 expansions to extend publicly financed coverage to individuals who were not otherwise 
already eligible for such coverage, such as non-disabled, non-elderly low-income adults 
without dependent children or parents with incomes otherwise too high to qualify for 
Medicaid.  
To obtain a Section 1115 waiver, a state submitted an application to the Centers for 
Medicaid and Medicaid Services (CMS) within the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services. The state and CMS negotiated the waiver’s terms, possibly leading to CMS 
approval and waiver implementation (Artiga, 2009). As a condition for waiver approval, 
CMS required the waiver to be budget-neutral—that is, Medicaid spending projections 
showed that the waiver would not increase federal spending above what the federal 
government would spend in the waiver’s absence (Artiga, 2009).  
Conceptual Framework 
This study proposes that the expansion of health insurance coverage affects hospital 
employment through two related pathways.
6
 First, hospitals could increase the size of their 
respective workforces in anticipation of an expansion of health insurance coverage (Cozad, 
2012). Because the federal government’s approval of a state’s Section 1115 waiver entailed 
negotiation between state and federal officials, there was a delay between the development of 
a Section 1115 waiver–based coverage expansion and its implementation. That the Section 
                                                          
6
 A supplemental analysis presented in Chapter 3 of this dissertation suggests that state-level healthcare 
workforce employment counts likely do not affect the probability of Section 1115 coverage expansion 
implementation. It can therefore be assumed that health insurance coverage expansions affect healthcare 
employment—including hospital employment—rather than the reverse.  
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1115 waiver approval process was drawn out would presumably provide time for hospital 
management to become aware of the waiver and to decide whether or not to increase their 
labor supply in anticipation of expanded coverage and an accompanying increased demand 
for healthcare services. Furthermore, as part of the waiver application process, states 
projected the number of individuals expected to enroll in a waiver-based coverage expansion 
(see Atherly et al., 2012, for state estimates of expansion enrollment). These estimates of 
Section 1115 expansion enrollment also could have provided hospitals with information on 
whether to increase the number of workers they employ in anticipation of expanded 
coverage. In short, in this pathway, hospitals’ estimates of increases in healthcare demand 
post-expansion are proposed to drive increases in hospital employment. This pathway does 
not require actual increases in demand for health care after a coverage expansion to produce 
an increase in hospital employment.  
Second, hospitals could increase the number of workers they employ after the 
implementation of a Section 1115 expansion. The first step to increased hospital employment 
after an expansion of health insurance coverage is an improvement in health insurance 
coverage rates among the low-income populations that these expansions target.
7
 Studies 
suggest that Medicaid expansions, through Section 1115 waivers or otherwise, reduce 
uninsurance among the low-income individuals that they target (Atherly et al., 2012; Aizer & 
Grogger, 2003; Busch & Duchovny, 2005; Kronick & Gilmer, 2002). 
Changes in health insurance coverage rates affect hospital employment through 
increases in demand for healthcare services from the newly insured. Increases in the demand 
for healthcare services vary by the type of services provided. Evidence from the Oregon 
                                                          
7
 A supplemental analysis presented in Chapter 3 of this dissertation provides evidence that Section 1115 
expansions increased total Medicaid enrollments.  
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Health Insurance Experiment suggests that newly Medicaid-enrolled adults actually use more 
emergency department care after becoming insured, even though theory suggests that these 
newly enrolled individuals should have improved access to outpatient care (Taubman et al., 
2014). Adults who received Medicaid coverage in Oregon used 40% more emergency 
department visits than their uninsured peers over an 18-month period, though studies from 
Massachusetts’s mid-2000s healthcare reform did not find substantial increases in emergency 
department use (Taubman et al., 2014; Chen, Scheffler, & Chandra, 2011; Miller, 2012; Lee 
et al., 2015). Oregon Health Insurance Experiment findings also indicate that receiving 
Medicaid coverage increases the probability of using hospital inpatient care by 30% and the 
probability of having at least one outpatient visit—to a hospital or elsewhere—by 35% 
(Finkelstein et al., 2012).  
Therefore, when a sufficient number of individuals within a community gain 
Medicaid coverage, hospitals within that community face an increased demand for services 
such as emergency department care or inpatient care (Ku et al., 2011; Dorn et al., 2013). To 
address this demand, hospitals could hire additional employees. It should be noted that 
whether hospitals choose to hire additional employees after a coverage expansion could be 
based on calculations of whether post-expansion increases in healthcare demand are 
sustained over the longer term. If hospital executives judge increases in demand to be 
temporary—pent-up demand from formerly uninsured individuals—then hospitals may 
choose to not hire additional workers.  
As Figure 4.1 shows, other factors proposed to affect hospital employment include 
hospital characteristics and characteristics of the county in which a hospital is located. 
County demographic and economic characteristics are proposed to indirectly affect hospital 
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employment through demand for hospital care. For instance, at the individual level, women 
and older people tend to have a higher demand for healthcare services compared to men and 
to younger people (Bertakis et al., 2000; Meara, White, & Cutler, 2004). Therefore, 
communities with relatively more women or relatively more older adults are likely to have 
higher levels of demand for healthcare services. In this conceptual model, this higher level of 
demand would produce a larger healthcare workforce. In contrast, due to the barriers to care 
for racial and ethnic minorities, a community that has a higher proportion of racial or ethnic 
minorities may have a smaller healthcare workforce (Fiscella et al., 2002; Padgett et al., 
1994). Because higher-income individuals are more likely to be covered by private insurance 
and are less likely to report going without care due to affordability concerns, a community 
composed of relatively more higher-income individuals would likely have higher rates of 
demand for healthcare services (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2012). 
This increased demand for care could result in an increased supply of hospital workers.  
The literature on hospital efficiency suggests that hospital characteristics affect how 
efficient hospitals are. For-profit hospitals and hospitals that are part of chains are more 
efficient than not-for-profit hospitals and non-chain hospitals (Rosko, 1999; Rosko, 2001). 
This study’s conceptual framework posits that one source of these efficiency gains is a 
greater incentive to constrain labor costs and to hire fewer hospital employees. The hospital 
efficiency literature suggests that teaching hospitals are less efficient than their non-teaching 
counterparts are (Grosskopf, Margaritis, & Valdmanis, 2004). The conceptual framework for 
this present study suggests that increased employment at teaching hospitals may be required 
to sustain physician-training programs. 
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This conceptual framework also proposes that the types of services that hospitals 
provide affect hospital employment. It is reasonable to expect that the more types of 
services—such as emergency care or skilled nursing care—that a hospital offers, the more 
workers they are likely to have.  
Hypothesis  
This study assesses this proposed link between health insurance coverage expansion 
and hospital employment by testing the hypothesis that Section 1115 expansions increased 
the number of FTE employees at hospitals in expansion states.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Section 1115 expansions’ effects on FTE hospital employment. 
 
 
Data and Sample 
Data Sources  
Information on FTE employees at hospitals comes from the American Hospital 
Association Annual (AHA) Survey of registered U.S. hospitals. I obtained data on the timing 
of Section 1115 expansion implementation or discontinuation from the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services Web site, from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation State Coverage 
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Initiatives Web site (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, n.d.; Robert Wood 
Johnson Foundation, n.d.) and the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured’s 
state-level surveys of Medicaid and CHIP program characteristics (Kaiser Commission on 
Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2015). Data on county demographic characteristics come from 
the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Intercensal Estimates (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). Annual 
estimates of the percent of each county’s population in poverty are from the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014). I use data 
on county-level per-capita income from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Local Area 
Personal Income estimates (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2015). 
Sample Creation 
 Sample timeframe. This study’s sample includes annual observations from hospitals 
in 49 U.S. states and for the 11 years from 2000 to 2010. The beginning of the study period is 
2000 because 48 states had implemented coverage expansions through the Children’s Health 
Insurance Program by that year (Rosenbach et al., 2001). The year 2010 is the last year 
included in the study timeframe because the ACA was enacted in late March 2010. The 
Section 1115 waiver–based coverage expansions that were either implemented or ended 
during this period are listed in Table 4.1.  
More information on each Section 1115 waiver–based expansion is available in the 
appendix to this dissertation.  
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Table 4.1. States that Implemented Section 1115 Waiver–Based Coverage Expansions to 
Parents or Low-Income Adults Without Dependent Children Between 2000 and 2010  
Expansion 
state 
Year expansion 
implemented 
Expansion program enrollment as 
of June 2011 
Expansion enrollment 
as percent of total 
Medicaid enrollment 
in June 2011 
Arizona 2001 224,500 childless adults 16% 
California 
10 counties in 
2007, 35 primarily 
rural counties in 
2011
1
 
184,200 childless adults and 
parents 
2% 
 
Illinois 
2002. Expansion 
discontinued in 
2007.  
129,994 parents on December 31, 
2006
2 
7% of June 2006 
enrollment 
Indiana 2008 16,100 childless adults 2% 
Iowa 2005 
46,000 childless adults and 
parents 
11% 
Maine 2002 16,500 childless adults 6% 
Maryland 2007
3
 56,800 childless adults 7% 
Massachusetts  2007
4 
114,700 childless adults 
10% (but accompanied 
by other coverage 
changes) 
Michigan 2004 77,900 childless adults 4%  
New Jersey 2001 
156,598 adults ever enrolled in 
2011 fiscal year
5 
(monthly 
enrollment count not available) 
N/A 
New York 2001 949,300 childless adults 19% 
Tennessee  
1994. Expansion 
discontinued in 
2005.  
Reduced uninsurance in 
Tennessee from 15.7% in 1992-
1993 to 7.2% in 1994-1995. After 
the program’s first year, it was 
closed to most new enrollment.
6
  
N/A 
Utah 2002 
16,800 parents and childless 
adults 
6% 
Notes: *Unless indicated otherwise, data on expansion enrollments and monthly Medicaid enrollments come 
from Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Medicaid enrollment: June 2013 data snapshot. 
Washington, DC: Kaiser Family Foundation; January 2014. 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/8050-07-medicaid-enrollment-june-2013-data-
snapshot1.pdf. 
 
1. California’s Section 1115 expansions were not implemented on a statewide basis.  
2. Illinois expansion program enrollment count from Artiga S, Mann C. Family coverage under SCHIP 
waivers. Washington, DC: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured; May 2007. 
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7644.pdf. Accessed May 14, 2015.  
3. Maryland’s coverage expansion to low-income adults without dependent children was an addition to a 
Section 1115 waiver that implemented Medicaid managed care in Maryland in 1997. 
4. Massachusetts’ major expansion of coverage in 2006-2007 was carried out through Massachusetts’ 
pre-existing Section 1115 waiver. 
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5. New Jersey expansion program enrollment count from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services. New Jersey Family Coverage under SCHIP. Baltimore, MD: Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services; April 2012.  
6. Tennessee’s expansion program’s effects on state rates of health insurance coverage from Conover CJ, 
Davies HH. The role of TennCare in health policy for low-income people in Tennessee. Washington, 
DC: Urban Institute; February 2000. http://webarchive.urban.org/UploadedPDF/occa33.pdf. Accessed 
May 18, 2015.  
 
 Exclusion of observations from the study sample. As Figure 4.2 shows, this study’s 
sample was subject to a number of exclusions. First, I excluded from the sample 36,221 
hospital-year observations from hospitals that were not classified as general medical and 
surgical hospitals. In the AHA data, hospitals that are not general medical and surgical 
hospitals are a diverse group that includes, for example, hospital units within prisons, 
psychiatric hospitals, rehabilitation hospitals, children’s specialty hospitals, and acute long-
term care hospitals. I removed these specialty hospitals from the study sample because they 
do not necessarily serve a broad adult population and therefore may be less likely to treat 
adults eligible for coverage under Section 1115 expansions. As a result, specialty hospitals 
may not experience the same post-expansion increase in healthcare demand that general 
medical and surgical hospitals are hypothesized to experience.  
 I also excluded observations from hospitals for which admissions were primarily 
restricted to children (N=12 hospital year-observations), observations from hospitals that 
were federally operated (N=2,280 hospital-year observations)—such as observations from 
military hospitals—and observations from general medical and surgical hospitals that did not 
report also being community hospitals (N=394 hospital-year observations). (An Internet 
search of the names of hospitals described as general medical and surgical hospitals but not 
community hospitals suggests that many of these hospitals are long-term care hospitals.)  
Next, I excluded from the sample observations with missing or otherwise problematic 
data. These include the 525 hospital-year observations for which the year of the reported data 
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does not correspond with the survey year. For example, I dropped an observation from the 
sample if the end date for the observation is 2009, but the survey year was 2010. I also 
removed from the sample 59 hospital-year observations with either missing or negative FTE 
data because it is impossible for an organization to have a negative number of employees. I 
eliminated 17 hospital-year observations that indicated that a hospital was open during the 
entire survey year but reported having zero FTE employees during that year because it seems 
unlikely that a hospital would be able to operate without employees.  
I removed 8,091 hospital-year observations with missing values of any control 
variables from the study sample. Most missing values were for variables describing whether 
or not a hospital was a member of a network or whether a hospital had an emergency 
department. I dropped 904 hospital-year observations from the sample because they indicated 
a change in the counties in which hospitals were located. I excluded these observations from 
the sample because the changing county location makes it impossible to match hospital 
location to county characteristics.  
In addition, I excluded 2,007 hospital-year observations from hospitals in states with 
state-funded coverage expansions to adults. Applying this criterion results in the exclusion 
from the study sample of observations from Connecticut from 2008 to 2010; Washington, 
DC, from 2001 to 2010; Pennsylvania from 2002 to 2010; and Washington state during the 
entire study period. I removed observations from states with active primarily state-funded 
programs from the sample because state-funded programs—unlike Section 1115 waiver–
based programs—were not subject to federal approval. States had complete leeway to define 
and change eligibility and benefits for these programs. Furthermore, because these state-
funded programs did not receive federal approval to operate, they do not have to be budget 
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neutral. As a result, I consider these state-funded programs different enough from Medicaid 
or CHIP expansions to be excluded from the study sample. 
  Observations in states that implemented Section 1115 premium assistance programs 
and no other types of Section 1115 coverage expansions are included in the control group. 
Premium assistance programs tended to have low enrollment—numbering anywhere between 
a few hundred to a few thousand—and so seem unlikely to affect rates of health insurance 
coverage at the community level (Atherly et al., 2012).  
 Finally, 269 hospitals that were only included in the sample in one year were 
excluded from the sample. Figure 4.2 summarizes the sample exclusions.  
Sample size and characteristics. There are a total of 38,530 hospital-year observations 
from 4,494 total hospitals in the study sample. The sample includes 11,594 hospital-year 
observations from 1,289 hospitals in states with active Section 1115 coverage expansions 
during the study period, and 26,936 hospital-year observations from 3,205 hospitals in non-
expansion states.  
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Figure 4.2. Creating a sample of hospital-year observations.  
 
Variables 
Variables included in the regression models for this study describe full-time 
equivalent hospital employment, a state’s Section 1115 expansion status, the economic and 
demographic characteristics of the county in which a hospital is located, and a hospital’s 
characteristics and services.  
Full-Time Equivalent Hospital Employment 
This analysis’s dependent variable is the FTE number of people employed at a 
particular hospital in a specific year. FTE hospital employment counts include all hospital 
employees, not just clinicians. FTE hospital employment is calculated as the number of full-
time hospital employees plus one-half of the number of part-time hospital employees.  
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Section 1115 Expansion Indicator 
This study’s key independent variable is an indicator for an active Section 1115 
expansion within a state for a particular year. In a Section 1115 expansion state, this indicator 
is equal to 1 as long as the expansion in this state is active. If an expansion program is 
discontinued in an expansion state, the indicator is reset to zero. The indicator is set to zero in 
states without active Section 1115 expansions.  
County Demographic and Economic Characteristics 
This analysis controls for time-varying county demographic and economic 
characteristics that that are correlated with both hospital FTEs and the Section 1115 
expansion indicator. County demographic variables included in this analysis are the percent 
of the county population that is female, the percent of the county population that is 19 years 
old or younger, the percent of the county population that is 65 years old or older, the percent 
of the county population that is a racial or ethnic minority, and the total county population (in 
tens of thousands of people). This study’s conceptual framework explains how each of these 
demographic characteristics could be associated with either increases or decreases in FTE 
employment at the hospital level. Because these variables are correlated with the Section 
1115 expansion indicator and are likely to be associated with changes in FTE hospital 
employment, including them in this study’s regression models reduces the potential for bias 
in model estimates. 
Total county population (r = 0.0796), county per capita income (r = 0.173), and the 
percent of the county population that is 65 years old or older (r = 0.015) are positively 
correlated with the expansion indicator. The percent of a county’s population that is a racial 
or ethnic minority (r = -0.106), the percent of a county’s population that is female (r = -
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0.0045), and the percent of a county’s population that is aged 19 years old or younger (r = -
0.1125) are negatively correlated with the Section 1115 expansion indicator.  
This analysis controls for time-varying county economic characteristics that affect 
hospital employment and are correlated with the expansion indicator. The county-level 
economic control variables are the percent of the county population that is in poverty and 
county per capita income, which is inflation-adjusted based on the Consumer Price Index to 
2012 dollars. These variables are included in the model because, as noted in this study’s 
conceptual framework, wealthier people experience fewer barriers to care, so higher-income 
communities are likely to demand relatively more health care. The percent of the county 
population in poverty is negatively correlated with the expansion indicator (r = -0.2025), and 
county per capita income is positively correlated with the expansion indicator (r = 0.173).  
Hospital Characteristics 
This analysis controls for hospital ownership, teaching status, and services provided. 
As noted in the conceptual framework, hospitals that are for-profit and are part of a hospital 
network tend to manage their costs more efficiently than non-profit and non-chain hospitals, 
respectively. One element of managing costs more efficiently could be maintaining lower 
levels of hospital staffing. As a result, this analysis includes a categorical variable that 
describes hospital ownership and an indicator for whether a hospital is part of a network. 
Teaching hospitals have to have residents and additional staff to support teaching, so this 
analysis includes two indicator variables related to teaching status. One indicator describes 
whether a hospital is a teaching hospital, and the other indicator describes whether a hospital 
is a member of the Council of Teaching Hospitals and Health Systems—that is, whether it is 
a more prominent teaching hospital.  
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 Non-federal government hospital ownership (r = -0.1184) and for-profit ownership (r 
= -0.1407) are negatively correlated with the Section 1115 expansion indicator. Membership 
in a hospital network (r = 0.0111) is positively, though weakly, correlated with Section 1115 
expansion as well. Medical school affiliation (r = 0.0592) and membership in the Council on 
Teaching Hospitals and Health Systems (r = 0.0678) are also positively correlated with the 
expansion indicator. 
 Another set of hospital control variables describe the types of services that a hospital 
offers. As the conceptual framework notes, the more services a hospital provides, the more 
employees a hospital will have to provide those services. This analysis includes indicators for 
whether or not a hospital has an emergency department, provides home health services, 
offers outpatient surgery, has a skilled nursing care unit, has social work services, has a 
separate long-term care unit, or is a certified trauma center. Although individual hospitals do 
not typically frequently change the mix of services they provide, there is change over time in 
the sample in the percent of hospitals offering each of these services.  
 Emergency department care (r = 0.0204), outpatient surgery (r = 0.1005), social work 
services (r = 0.1031), and certification as a trauma center (r = 0.0559) are positively 
correlated with Section 1115 expansion implementation. Home health services (r = -0.0106), 
skilled nursing care (r = -0.0244), and having a separate long-term care unit (r = -0.0036) are 
weakly negatively correlated with the expansion indicator.  
Methods 
This analysis evaluates the effects of Section 1115 expansions on FTE hospital 
employment using ordinary least squares models with hospital and year fixed effects. It 
should be noted that the models presented in this analysis identify the effects of these 
expansions on hospital employment only for expansions that had changes in status during the 
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study period. The models cannot identify effects of expansions that were active throughout 
the entire 11 years of the study period. 
The first model specification assesses the average effect of Section 1115 expansions 
on FTE hospital employment across hospitals in all of the study’s expansion states: 
FTEht = 1EXPst + 2Xct + 3HOSPht + t + h + ht 
In the equation above, the subscripts h, c, and s indicate that observations vary by the 
hospital, county, and state levels, respectively. The subscript t denotes variation by year. This 
dependent variable, FTE, describes the number of FTE employees in a hospital in a particular 
year. The variable EXP is the indicator for an active Section 1115 expansion. The vector Xct 
includes time-varying county demographic and economic characteristics. HOSPht represents 
the control variables for hospital ownership, teaching status, and service provision. The terms 
t and h represent year and hospital fixed effects, respectively. The term is ht is the model’s 
error term. 
The second specification allows the effect of Section 1115 expansion implementation 
on FTE hospital employees to differ by state:  
FTEht = 1EXPst + 2STATEs + 3STATEs  EXPst + 4Xct + 5HOSPht t + c + ct 
This model is similar to the average-effect model described previously. However, the 
state-specific effects model includes STATE, a vector of indicator variables for each U.S. 
state. In this model, the effects of STATE are not separately estimated because they are 
subsumed by the hospital fixed effects in this model. The state-specific effects model also 
includes an interaction term, EXP  STATE, that allows the effect of Section 1115 expansions 
on FTE hospital employment to vary at the state level. This model allows potential expansion 
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effects to differ at the state level because Section 1115 expansion characteristics—eligibility 
rules, enrollment numbers, and benefits—vary widely across states.  
I employ block bootstrapping to estimate the standard errors for each coefficient 
estimate in both the average-effect and state-specific effects model specifications. Block 
bootstrapping helps mitigate the possibility that the model’s standard errors indicate the 
existence of statistically significant effects when no such effects exist (Bertrand, Duflo, & 
Mullanaithan, 2004).  
I use an F-test to evaluate the hypothesis that the state-specific coefficient estimates 
from the state-specific effects model are statistically different from zero. 
Model Specification 
I tested whether or not to use logged FTE hospital employment in place of FTE 
hospital employment as this analysis’s dependent variable. An advantage of the logged 
dependent variable is that it presents the effect of coverage expansion on FTE hospital 
employment as a percentage change that is constant across hospitals of different sizes 
(Finkelstein, 2007). Because a Boxcox test did not produce definitive guidance on whether to 
use logged FTE hospital employment, I implemented a Wooldridge test (Wooldridge, 2009). 
The Wooldridge test prefers both the average-effect and state-specific effect models with 
unlogged variables to the same models with logged dependent variables. 
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Table 4.2. Summary Statistics for Hospital-Year Observations 
Variables 
All hospital-year 
observations 
(N=38,530)  
Hospital-year 
observations in 
non-expansion 
states (N=26,936) 
Hospital-year 
observations in 
expansion states 
(N=11,594)*  
Dependent variable       
Number of FTE hospital employees 
895.93 
(1,281.91) 
809.45 
(1,169.50) 
1,096.85*** 
(1,491.95) 
Hospital characteristics     
Hospital ownership type 
 (Referent category: Non-governmental, 
not-for-profit) 
 
Non-federal government ownership 25.3% 28.6% 17.7%*** 
 
For-profit ownership 13.5% 18.0% 3.2%*** 
Membership in a network 
Hospital is a member of a network  55.7% 56.0% 55.3% 
Hospital teaching status  
Medical school affiliation 22.0% 19.8% 27.1%*** 
Member of the Council of Teaching 
Hospitals and Health Systems  6.2% 4.7% 9.6%*** 
Services hospital offers 
Hospital has an emergency department 97.3% 96.9% 98.3%*** 
Hospital offers home health services 40.7% 40.3% 41.7%** 
Hospital offers outpatient surgery  94.1% 92.2% 98.6%*** 
Hospital offers skilled nursing care 35.2% 35.3% 35.0% 
Hospital offers social work services 86.2% 83.3% 93.1%*** 
Hospital maintains a separate nursing-
home type of long-term care unit 27.2% 26.5% 28.8%*** 
Hospital is a certified trauma center 35.9% 34.1% 40.1%*** 
Characteristics of the county in which 
each hospital is located      
Total county population (in 10,000s) 
59.09 
(150.09) 
59.56 
(164.09) 
57.99 
(110.94) 
Percent of the county population that is 
female 
50.62 
(1.59) 
50.58 
(1.72) 
50.69*** 
(1.22) 
Percent of the county population that is 
19 years old or less 
27.53 
(3.10) 
27.66 
(3.20) 
27.22*** 
(2.81) 
Percent of the county population that is 
65 years old or older 
14.06 
(3.99) 
13.99 
(4.22) 
14.22*** 
(3.38) 
Percent of the county population that is a 
racial or ethnic minority 
26.59 
(21.49) 
29.43 
(21.68) 
19.98*** 
(19.51) 
Percent of the county population in 
poverty 
14.12 
(5.40) 
15.23 
(5.47) 
11.54*** 
(4.24) 
Per capita income in county (in $100s) 
377.76 (103.29) 
365.58  
(92.47) 
406.08*** 
(120.17) 
Note: T-tests and chi-squared tests were used to compare differences in averages or proportions between 
hospitals in expansion states and hospitals in non-expansion states. **indicates p-value<0.01, and *** indicates 
p-value<0.001. 
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Results 
Summary Statistics  
As Table 4.2 shows, the average number of FTE employees across all hospitals and 
years in the sample was 895.93, though the median number of FTE hospital employees was 
439 FTE employees. The distribution of FTE hospital employees is skewed rightward by a 
small number of observations from large hospitals; the average number of FTE employees 
for the top 1% of all hospital-year observations was 8,538.75 (data not shown).  
Hospitals in expansion states had an average of 1,096.85 FTE employees while 
hospitals in non-expansion states had an average of 809.45 FTE employees. Hospitals in 
expansion and non-expansion states also differed by hospital characteristics and by the 
characteristics of the counties in which each hospital is located. These differences may reflect 
unobserved differences between hospitals in expansion states and non-expansion states or 
between expansion states and non-expansion states. The hospital fixed effects included in 
this study’s models control for time-invariant differences between hospitals as well for time-
invariant differences between expansion and non-expansion counties and states.  
Multivariate Analyses 
Table 4.3 displays coefficient estimates for the average-effect and state-specific 
effects model specifications, respectively. Coefficient estimates on the state-specific 
interactions terms in the state-specific model are omitted from Table 4.3.  
Column 1 in Table 4.3 indicates that after accounting for hospital characteristics and 
the characteristics of a hospital’s geographic location Section 1115 expansions were not 
associated with changes in FTE hospital employment across all expansion states. 
Table 4.4 and Figure 4.3 show that Iowa is the only state for which there was a 
statistically significant effect of Section 1115 expansion on FTE hospital employment. 
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Controlling for other factors, Section 1115 expansion in Iowa was associated with a decrease 
in FTE hospital employment. An F-test rejects the null hypothesis that the state-specific 
estimates of the effects of Section 1115 expansion on hospital employment are all equal to 
zero.  
 
Table 4.3. Estimates of the Effects of Section 1115 Expansions on FTE Hospital 
Employment (N=38,530 Hospital-Year Observations) 
 
Variables 
Average-effect 
model 
State-specific effects 
model 
Section 1115 expansion indicator 29.06   
  (16.23)   
State-specific interaction terms for Section 
1115 expansion implementation 
 
Omitted: See table 
4.4 below for total 
state-specific effects 
    
Hospital characteristics     
Hospital ownership type 
(Referent category: nongovernment, not-for-
profit ownership)  
 
Non-federal government ownership 
 
 
 
 
-1.13 
 
 
 
 
-2.62 
  (12.39) (12.45) 
For-profit ownership -46.25** -48.56** 
  (1.13) (14.13) 
Hospital teaching status 
Medical school affiliation 
 
31.72* 
 
34.85** 
  (13.20) (13.23) 
Member of the Council of Teaching Hospitals 
and Health Systems  
 
147.52* 
 
148.70* 
  (65.81) (65.36) 
Membership in a network 
Hospital is a member of a network  
 
-43.84** 
 
-41.23** 
  (9.15) (9.13) 
Hospital has an emergency department -25.84* -29.74** 
  (11.36) (11.47) 
Hospital offers home health services 59.51** 58.08** 
  (15.75) (15.68) 
Hospital offers outpatient surgery  30.08** 28.18* 
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  (11.17) (11.12) 
Hospital offers skilled nursing care 19.83* 21.39** 
  (7.71) (7.67) 
Hospital offers social work services 6.35 6.38 
  (7.35) (7.47) 
Hospital maintains a separate nursing-home type 
of long-term care unit 
 
-6.89 
 
-6.79 
  (11.96) (11.95) 
Hospital is a certified trauma center 6.65 8.09 
  (8.06) (8.08) 
Characteristics of the county in which each 
hospital is located     
Total county population (in 10,000s) 5.17** 4.98** 
  (1.16) (1.17) 
Percent of the county population that is female 
 
49.58** 
 
45.58** 
  (6.22) (6.18) 
Percent of the county population that is 19 years 
old or less 
 
-4.03 
 
-1.87 
  (5.05) (5.12) 
Percent of the county population that is 65 years 
old or older 
 
-14.19* 
 
-15.64* 
  (6.17) (6.28) 
Percent of the county population that is a racial 
or ethnic minority 
 
12.50** 
 
11.83** 
  (2.89) (2.90) 
Percent of the county population in poverty 2.04 2.71 
  (1.62) (1.55) 
Per capita income in county (in $100s) -0.23 -0.18 
 (0.13) (0.13) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9666  0.9706 
Notes: * indicates p-value<0.05 for a particular coefficient; ** indicates p-value<0.01. Hospital fixed effects, 
year fixed effects, and state-five year fixed effects are included in both the average-effect and state-specific-
effects model specifications but excluded from the tables presented above. Coefficient estimates are rounded.  
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Table 4.4. Estimates of State-Specific Effects of Section 1115 Expansions on FTE Hospital 
Employment 
State name 
Estimate of the total state-
specific effect of Section 
1115 expansion on FTE 
hospital employment 
Lower bound of 95% 
confidence interval 
around estimate 
Upper bound of 95% 
confidence interval 
around estimate 
Tennessee -66.90 -212.63 78.83 
Iowa -48.78* -83.91 -13.65 
New Jersey -43.74 -240.82 153.34 
Indiana -20.71 -89.71 48.29 
Illinois 4.63 -21.95 31.22 
Michigan 52.86 -56.14 161.85 
Utah 55.58 -145.24 256.39 
Maine 85.86 -5.76 177.48 
New York 101.08 -10.61 212.78 
California 101.81 -0.93 204.56 
Maryland 118.45 -23.89 260.80 
Arizona 121.7 -44.94 288.35 
Massachusetts 175.25 -30.94 381.43 
Note: For a given state, the total state-specific effect of Section 1115 expansion is calculated as the sum of the 
coefficient estimate on the expansion indicator and the coefficient estimate on the interaction between an 
indicator variable for that state and the expansion indicator.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. State-specific effects of Section 1115 expansions on FTE hospital employment. 
Note: An F-test on the state-specific expansion coefficients rejects the null hypothesis that these coefficients are 
jointly equal to zero.  
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Discussion 
The estimates from the average-effect and state-specific effect model specifications 
provide no support for the hypothesis that Section 1115 expansions increase FTE 
employment at the hospital level. This result is consistent with Cozad’s (2012) finding of no 
effect of Massachusetts’s 2007 reforms on hospital employment in that state.  
  Section 1115 expansions could have had no positive effect on FTE hospital 
employment in all states for two reasons. First, as Table 4.1 shows, several state expansion 
programs such as those in Maine, Maryland, and Michigan had enrollments representing less 
than 10% of total state Medicaid enrollment. These expansion enrollments could have been 
too small to produce increases in hospital care use or decreases in uncompensated care 
provision and, therefore, too small to produce effects on hospital employment. That being 
said, there was no effect of Section 1115 expansion on hospital employment in Arizona, New 
York, and Massachusetts, states with larger coverage expansions. 
Second, because Section 1115 expansions must be budget neutral to be approved by 
the federal government, the Section 1115 waiver–based expansions in this study generally 
included cost-containment mechanisms such as enrolling Medicaid beneficiaries into 
managed care, benefit reductions and cost-sharing for expansion populations, and enrollment 
caps on expansion programs (Government Accountability Office, 2013). By constraining 
Medicaid spending, Section 1115 demonstrations could have also constrained FTE hospital 
employment growth.  
Limitations  
This analysis has several limitations. Section 1115 coverage expansions, like other 
state-based policy changes, are subject to selection bias. At the state level, developing and 
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implementing Section 1115 waiver–based health insurance coverage expansions require both 
expertise in Medicaid policy development and implementation and political will.  
Second, enrollments in the Section 1115 expansions included in this study were much 
smaller than enrollments in the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. For example, Michigan’s Adult 
Benefits Waiver expansion program had nearly 78,000 enrollees in June 2011 while 
Michigan’s ACA Medicaid expansion program enrolled approximately 322,000 individuals 
in the first 100 days of that program’s launch (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the 
Uninsured, 2014; Michigan.gov, 2014). The ACA’s Medicaid expansion also differs from 
Section 1115 expansions because the former expansion is not budget neutral and is part of a 
larger set of comprehensive reforms to health insurance coverage and healthcare delivery. 
Therefore, some caution should be exercised in extrapolating this study’s results to the 
ACA’s Medicaid expansion.  
Implications for the Affordable Care Act  
Although the Section 1115 expansions are smaller in magnitude than the ACA’s 
Medicaid expansion, this study’s findings suggest that there could be few gains in hospital 
employment from the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. The statistically insignificant effects of 
Section 1115 expansions on FTE hospital employment indicate that health insurance 
expansion does not necessarily translate into hospital employment growth. As described 
previously, one possible explanation for this study’s findings was that Section 1115 
expansions’ potential employment-increasing effects were offset by cost-containment 
measures implemented in tandem with these expansions. As in Section 1115 expansions, 
there are various healthcare delivery and payment changes included in the ACA that could 
limit new spending on hospital care over the long term, such as accountable care 
organizations, bundled payments, value-based purchasing in Medicare, and Medicare 
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payment reductions and bonuses to hospitals based on rates of hospital readmissions and 
hospital-acquired infections (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2013). Hospitals also face the 
prospect of ACA’s cuts to Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital funding, though 
Congress has delayed these reductions (Burak, 2013). (Medicare Disproportionate Share 
Hospital funding cuts have already been implemented.) 
This study’s failure to find an association between pre-ACA coverage expansions and 
hospital employment growth does not, of course, negate other non-employment economic 
arguments in favor of Medicaid expansion. Medicaid shields low-income individuals from 
financial risks associated with unaffordable medical expenditures and enables low-income 
persons to access crucial medical services. It can also stimulate consumer spending among 
previously uninsured individuals and benefit state budgets by reducing state and local 
spending on care for the uninsured (Gruber & Yelowitz, 1999; Baicker et al., 2013; Angeles, 
2012). In short, even if Medicaid expansion does not produce a substantial boost in 
employment, there are other compelling rationales to extend coverage to low-income 
Americans. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
Summary of Findings 
 This dissertation examines the effects of Section 1115 expansions on health insurance 
coverage and healthcare employment to gain insights into the longer-term effects of the 
ACA’s Medicaid expansion. This dissertation’s first study tests whether Section 1115 
expansions affected health insurance coverage for pre-expansion eligible children and 
parents. I use IPUMS CPS ASEC data from 2001 to 2011 to describe an individual’s health 
insurance status, individual characteristics, and family characteristics; information from the 
CMS Web site and other sources to determine the timing of Section 1115 expansions; and 
information from the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured’s 50-state 
Medicaid and CHIP survey to describe Medicaid and CHIP program characteristics. I employ 
multinomial probit models to assess how Section 1115 expansions change the probabilities of 
Medicaid or CHIP coverage, private coverage, or uninsurance.  
For pre-expansion eligible children, Section 1115 expansions were associated with a 
1.4 percentage point increase in the probability of enrollment in Medicaid or CHIP coverage. 
For pre-expansion eligible parents, Section 1115 expansions were associated with a 6.5 
percentage point increase in the probability of Medicaid coverage. For pre-expansion eligible 
children, Section 1115 expansions were associated with 1.4 percentage point decline in 
uninsurance, but for pre-expansion eligible parents, there was no statistically significant 
association between Section 1115 expansions and the probability of having no coverage. For 
pre-expansion eligible children, Section 1115 expansions were not associated with the 
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probability of enrollment in private insurance and Section 1115 expansions were associated 
with a 4.3 percentage point decline in the probability of private coverage enrollment for pre-
expansion eligible parents.  
My second analysis evaluates the effects of Section 1115 expansions on healthcare 
and social assistance employment between 2000 and 2010 at the county level. This analysis 
uses County Business Patterns to describe county-level healthcare and social assistance 
employment; information from CMS and other data sources to describe Section 1115 
expansion timing; and data from the County Intercensal Estimates, Small Area Income and 
Poverty Estimates, and the Local Area Personal Income estimates to describe county 
characteristics. The analysis, which uses ordinary least squares models with county and year 
fixed effects, finds that Section 1115 expansions were associated with a 372-person increase, 
on average, in the number of people employed in health care and social assistance at the 
county level. Estimates from a regression model in which Section 1115 expansion effects 
vary by state indicate Section 1115 expansions were associated with increases in county-level 
healthcare and social assistance employment in Massachusetts, New York, and New Jersey. I 
also examine the effects of Section 1115 expansions on county-level ambulatory healthcare 
services employment. This sensitivity analysis finds that, on average, Section 1115 
expansions were associated with a 195-person increase in the number of people employed in 
ambulatory healthcare services in a county. However, at the state level, Section 1115 
expansions were positively and statistically significantly associated with county-level 
ambulatory healthcare services employment only for New Jersey.  
My third study assesses the effect of Section 1115 expansions on FTE hospital 
employment. I use American Hospital Association annual survey data from 2000 to 2010 to 
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describe FTE hospital employment and hospital characteristics, information from CMS on 
Section 1115 expansion timing, and data from several federal data sources to describe the 
characteristics of the county in which each hospital is located. This analysis uses ordinary 
least squares models with hospital and year effects. Study findings indicate that there were no 
statistically significant positive associations between Section 1115 expansions and FTE 
hospital employment.  
Limitations 
 These studies have four main limitations. First, Section 1115 expansions were not 
randomly assigned to states. Because obtaining a Section 1115 waiver requires sustained 
negotiation with the federal government, states must have both the administrative expertise 
and political will to pursue these waivers. Because state decisions to implement Section 1115 
expansions are non-random, study results potentially could be biased in two ways. First, high 
rates of uninsurance at the state level could spur policymakers to expand health insurance 
coverage. However, research on states’ decision-making about the ACA’s Medicaid 
expansion suggests that expansion decisions depend on other factors such as party control of 
government, state administrative capacity, and past state policy on coverage for low-income 
people (Jacobs & Callaghan, 2013). Second, if state policymakers view coverage expansion 
as an opportunity for economic growth, it is possible that state-level healthcare employment 
counts could influence the probability that a state pursues coverage expansion. However, an 
analysis presented in the second study finds little evidence that state-level healthcare and 
social assistance employment counts were associated with the probability of Section 1115 
expansion after controlling for state and year factors. 
 Two of the three studies included in this dissertation also had notable data limitations. 
The CPS ASEC, used in the first study, does not provide information on family assets or 
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monthly incomes, introducing imprecision into this study’s imputation of pre-expansion 
eligibility for parents and children. Furthermore, the CPS ASEC understates Medicaid 
coverage rates, though there is no evidence that this tendency varies systematically across 
states and years (Sonier, Boudreaux, & Blewett, 2013).  
Moreover, the County Business Patterns data set, the second study’s key data set, 
does not contain county-level employment data for all U.S. counties in all study years. 
Rather, the U.S. Census Bureau suppresses employment counts that could potentially identify 
specific individuals or firms (Evans, Zayatz, & Slanta, 1998). This data suppression appears 
to be related to county population size; Census Bureau decisions to suppress county-level 
employment data should not be related to Section 1115 expansion status. Nonetheless, 
because observations from counties with an average population size of 12,000 people, study 
findings might not be generalizable to counties with small populations.  
Third, omitted variables are a limitation in each of the three dissertation studies. For 
example, local, state, and national healthcare workforce policies are omitted from regression 
models for the second and third studies. These policies likely affect healthcare workforce 
employment and could be correlated with Section 1115 expansion status. Fixed effects in the 
models for these studies control for policies that do not change during the study period and 
for policies that affect all counties or hospitals similarly. However, fixed effects cannot 
control for policies that vary over time or affect different counties or hospitals differently.  
 Finally, it should be emphasized that Section 1115 expansions—which I study to 
gain insights into the effects of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion—generally had smaller 
enrollments than the ACA’s Medicaid expansion and usually (except in the case of 
Massachusetts) were not accompanied by extensive changes to health insurance markets. 
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Furthermore, Section 1115 expansions were budget-neutral while the ACA’s Medicaid 
expansion is not. As a result, effects of Section 1115 expansions are likely to be smaller in 
magnitude than the ACA’s effects.  
Policy Implications 
Although Section 1115 expansions were smaller than the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, 
Section 1115 expansions can indicate the direction of the potential effects of ACA’s 
Medicaid expansion. The first dissertation study indicates that Section 1115 expansions were 
associated with statistically significant increases in the probability of public coverage for 
both pre-expansion eligible parents and children and with decreases in the probability of 
uninsurance for children. This suggests that even though the ACA’s Medicaid expansion is 
targeted toward low-income adults, it could increase children’s enrollment into public 
coverage. In addition, the finding of a negative association between Section 1115 expansions 
and the probability of private coverage for pre-expansion eligible parents indicates that some 
pre-expansion eligible parents likely will switch from private coverage to Medicaid coverage 
as a result of the ACA. Although an individual who substitutes private coverage for public 
coverage represents an additional cost to the Medicaid program, switching from private 
coverage to public coverage could financially benefit that individual.  
Discussions of “woodwork enrollment” due to the ACA’s coverage expansion tend to 
focus on individuals who are uninsured but public coverage eligible under pre-ACA rules 
(see, for example, Sommers & Epstein, 2011). Because coverage expansion is associated 
with changes in private coverage for pre-expansion eligible parents, future studies of the 
ACA should explore not only enrollment in public coverage among pre-expansion eligible 
individuals but also the crowd-out of private coverage in this population.  
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The second and third studies in this dissertation assess the effect of Section 1115 
expansions on healthcare workforce employment—at the county level and in hospitals, 
respectively—but have different results. The second study finds that Section 1115 expansions 
were associated with increases in county-level healthcare and social assistance 
employment—notably, in states with relatively larger expansions. The third dissertation 
study finds that Section 1115 expansions were not associated with changes in full-time 
equivalent (FTE) hospital employment. Applying study findings to the ACA’s Medicaid 
expansion suggests that although overall employment in the healthcare industry could grow 
in response to the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, any changes to employment at the hospital 
level could be much more modest.  
A possible explanation for the discrepancies in the findings of these two studies is 
that hospital employment represents only one part of healthcare and social assistance 
employment. Although hospital employment may not respond to Medicaid expansions, 
healthcare employment in non-hospital settings could still be affected by such expansions. In 
fact, the sensitivity analysis from this dissertation’s second study suggests that across all 
states with changes in Section 1115 expansion status during the study period, Section 1115 
expansions were associated with increases in county-level ambulatory healthcare services 
employment.  
Hospital employment and non-hospital employment could change at different rates 
after a coverage expansion if post-expansion increases in usage rates differ for hospital care 
and non-hospital care. In fact, findings from the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment 
indicated that compared to having no insurance coverage, Medicaid coverage was associated 
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with a 1.08 increase in the number of outpatient physician visits and 0.021 increase in the 
number of hospital admissions (Finkelstein et al., 2012). 
Future Research 
The findings from this dissertation suggest opportunities to further explore the ACA’s 
effects on health insurance coverage among pre-expansion eligible individuals and on 
healthcare workforce issues.  
First, it eventually will be possible to evaluate the effects of the ACA’s Medicaid 
expansion on coverage for individuals who were eligible for either Medicaid or CHIP under 
pre-ACA rules. Although the ACA’s creation of private health insurance marketplaces 
should affect coverage for pre-expansion eligible populations in both states that have 
accepted the ACA’s Medicaid and in states that have not, such effects could be larger in 
states accepting the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.  
In addition, there are opportunities for examining the effects of the ACA’s Medicaid 
expansion on the U.S. healthcare workforce. When County Business Patterns data from 2014 
become available, it will be possible to assess the early effects of the ACA’s Medicaid 
expansion on county-level healthcare and social assistance employment counts. Because 
CMS has released state-level Medicaid and CHIP enrollment counts, it may be possible to 
directly examine how changes in Medicaid and CHIP enrollment through the ACA affect 
healthcare employment (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, n.d.).  
This dissertation’s analysis of the effects of Section 1115 expansions on FTE hospital 
employment could be adapted to compare FTE hospital employment changes at hospitals in 
ACA Medicaid expansion states to FTE employment changes at hospitals in non-expansion 
states.  
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This dissertation does not address the effects of Medicaid expansions on healthcare 
employment by occupation. Understanding how Medicaid expansions affect different 
healthcare occupations is useful for guiding federal and state policies related to healthcare 
workforce training. Therefore, a future study could examine how the ACA’s Medicaid 
expansion has affected employment growth for both clinicians and non-clinicians working in 
the healthcare sector.  
In sum, the analyses conducted in this dissertation provide a path forward for 
examining the effects of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion on health insurance and on the U.S. 
healthcare workforce.  
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 APPENDIX. SECTION 1115 EXPANSIONS 
Table A: Description of Section 1115 Expansions  
 
State name 
Year 
expansion 
began 
Name of 
expansion 
program 
Population 
covered and 
relevant income 
eligibility limits Additional description 
Full or limited 
Medicaid 
benefits for 
expansion 
groups? 
Enrollment 
or spending 
cap? 
Arizona 
Phase I: 
2001 
Phase II: 
2002 
AHCCCS Care 
(Childless 
Adults)/ 
Proposition 204 
Parents: 200% 
FPL  
Childless 
adults: 100% 
FPL 
In Phase I, the waiver program expanded 
coverage to childless adults in households 
with incomes below 100% FPL. In Phase 
II, the program expanded coverage to 
parents below 200% FPL with Medicaid- 
or CHIP-enrolled children. For childless 
adults enrolling in coverage, there was no 
asset test, and eligibility could be renewed 
on an annual basis. Arizona closed 
enrollment in coverage for childless 
adults under this program in July 2011. 
Full 
Yes, in 
2011 
California  2007 
Health Care 
Coverage 
Initiative/ 
California Bridge 
to Reform 
Parents: 200% 
FPL  
Childless 
adults: 200% 
FPL  
(though 
counties could 
set own 
thresholds) 
The Health Care Coverage Initiative 
provided coverage to low-income, non-
pregnant, non-elderly uninsured adults in 
10 California counties. Participating 
counties had the authority to set benefits, 
income thresholds, and cap enrollment in 
county-administered health insurance 
coverage. In 2010, California’s Section 
1115 waiver was renewed as the Bridge to 
Reform, which provided additional 
California counties with the opportunity 
to expand coverage to up a total of 
500,000 individuals.  
Limited Yes 
1
5
2
 
 Delaware 1996 
Diamond State 
Health Plan  
Parents: 100% 
FPL  
Childless 
adults: 100% 
FPL  
This program moved almost all Medicaid 
enrollees into managed care in order to 
expand coverage to adults at or below 
100% FPL.  
Full No 
Hawaii  1994 
QUEST 
Expanded 
Parents: 133% 
FPL 
Childless 
adults: 133% 
FPL  
This program moved Medicaid enrollees 
into managed care in order to expand 
coverage to low-income parents and 
childless adults. Childless adults and 
parents at or below 100% FPL were 
eligible for QUEST, Hawaii's Medicaid 
managed care program. Adults with 
incomes below 133% FPL who were not 
eligible for Medicaid could receive 
limited benefits. 
Full for 
individuals at 
or below 100% 
FPL; limited 
otherwise  
Yes, in 
2003  
Illinois  
2002; 
expansion 
expired in 
2007  
Illinois KidCare 
Parent  
Parents: 185% 
FPL  
Parents who enrolled in this expansion 
could either receive public coverage or 
premium assistance. The program also 
included the possibility of premium 
assistance for children in families with 
incomes between 133% FPL and 200% 
FPL. 
Full  No 
Indiana 2008 
Healthy Indiana 
Plan  
Parents: 200% 
FPL  
Childless 
adults: 200% 
FPL  
The Healthy Indiana Plan provided a 
high-deductible health insurance with a 
health savings account to non-elderly 
adults with incomes below 200% FPL 
who were not eligible for employer-
sponsored coverage or other public 
coverage. Adults had to have been 
uninsured for more than 6 months to 
qualify.  
Limited 
Yes, for 
childless 
adults  
1
5
3
 
 Iowa 2005 IowaCare  
Parents: 200% 
FPL  
Childless 
adults: 200% 
FPL  
IowaCare provided limited coverage to 
non-elderly adults below 200% FPL who 
were not eligible for employer-sponsored 
coverage or other public coverage. The 
IowaCare network was limited to a small 
set of providers. 
Limited 
Yes, in 
2013 
Maine 2002 
Maine Childless 
Adults  
Childless 
adults: 100% 
FPL  
Maine provided coverage to childless 
adults up to 100% FPL. Maine reduced 
benefits in 2004 and 2005 due to state 
budget issues.  
Limited 
Yes, 
capped at 
20,000 
enrollees 
Maryland 2007 
Maryland 
HealthChoice - 
Primary Adult 
Care (PAC) 
program  
Childless 
adults: 116% 
FPL  
The PAC program provided a limited set 
of Medicaid managed care benefits to 
low-income childless adults who were not 
otherwise Medicare- or Medicaid-eligible. 
The program was an addition to the 
Maryland HealthChoice waiver, which 
allowed Maryland to implement managed 
care in Medicaid in 1997. 
Limited No 
Mass- 
achusetts 
Waiver 
amendment 
approved in 
2006; health 
reform 
provisions 
were fully 
implement-
ed by 2007 
MassHealth 
Parents: Up to 
300% FPL for 
subsidized 
coverage (for 
parents who do 
not qualify for 
Medicaid) 
Childless 
adults: Up to 
300% FPL for 
subsidized 
coverage  
Children: Up 
to 300% FPL 
Massachusetts amended and expanded its 
Section 1115 waiver, first implemented in 
1997, multiple times. In 1997, 
Massachusetts moved Medicaid enrollees 
into managed care and used the savings to 
expand Medicaid coverage to additional 
populations. In summer 2006, CMS 
approved a waiver amendment to redirect 
funds from the state’s Uncompensated 
Care Pool to help fund subsidized health 
insurance coverage to individuals with 
incomes below 300% FPL.  
 Limited No 
1
5
4
 
 Michigan 2004 
Michigan 
Medicaid 
Nonpregnant 
Childless Adults 
(Adult Benefits 
Waiver)  
Childless 
adults: 35% 
FPL 
This program provided limited coverage 
to non-elderly, non-pregnant childless 
adults through county-administered health 
insurance. 
Limited; 
initially more 
generous but 
later reduced  
Yes 
Minnesota 
Amendment 
to expand 
parental/ 
caretaker 
relative 
coverage 
approved in 
1999  
Prepaid Medical 
Assistance 
Project Plus 
(PMAP+) 
Parents: Up to 
275% FPL  
Childless 
adults: 
Coverage not 
extended to 
childless adults 
until 2011. 
The PMAP+ program, initially 
implemented in 1995, enrolled the state's 
Medicaid population in managed care and 
initially expanded Medicaid coverage to 
children and pregnant women who were 
previously covered under a state-funded 
expansion program. A waiver amendment 
expanded coverage for parents and 
caretaker relatives.  
Full for parents 
below 215% 
FPL;  
limited for 
parents above 
215% FPL and 
childless adults  
No 
New Jersey  2001 
New Jersey 
Family Coverage 
through SCHIP  
Parents: 200% 
FPL 
Childless 
adults: 
Waiver-based 
coverage not 
extended to 
childless adults 
until 2011.  
This program allowed New Jersey to 
cover parents of children enrolled in 
Medicaid or SCHIP. The waiver 
population also included children with 
family incomes up to 185% FPL and 
otherwise-uninsured pregnant women 
with family incomes between 185% FPL 
and 200% FPL.  
Full Yes 
New York  2001 
Partnership Plan 
- Family Health 
Plus  
Parents: 150% 
FPL  
Childless 
adults: 100% 
FPL  
The Partnership Plan demonstration 
allowed New York to move Medicaid 
enrollees into managed care in order 
expand coverage.  
Limited, but 
comparable to 
full benefit 
No 
1
5
5
 
 Oregon 1994 
Oregon Health 
Plan/ Oregon 
Health Plan 2 
Parents: 100% 
Childless 
adults: 100% 
FPL 
The Oregon Health Plan (OHP) provided 
limited benefits to eligible low-income 
adults based on a ranked set of medical 
services. Changes to the Oregon Health 
Plan in 2003 resulted in mass 
disenrollment in that year. From January 
2003 to December 2003, enrollment in 
OHP dropped from 104,000 to 49,000.  
Limited 
Yes, enroll-
ment was 
capped in 
June 2004 
but was 
briefly 
reopened in 
2008.  
Tennessee  
1994; 
discontinued 
in 2005 
TennCare/ 
TennCare II 
Originally no 
income 
eligibility limit 
for uninsured 
individuals; 
income 
eligibility limits 
were imposed 
later 
The TennCare waiver moved Tennessee’s 
Medicaid population into managed care 
and expanded coverage to uninsured and 
medically uninsurable Tennesseans.  
Full  Yes. 
Utah 2002 
Utah Primary 
Care Network  
Parents: 150% 
FPL  
Childless 
adults: 150% 
FPL  
The Primary Care Network Program 
provided adults with coverage for primary 
care services. Demonstration enrollees 
also had the option of receiving premium 
assistance to pay for employer-sponsored 
health insurance coverage.  
Limited 
Yes, 
capped at 
25,000 
enrollees 
Vermont 1996 
Vermont Health 
Access Plan 
(VHAP)  
Parents: 185% 
FPL  
Childless 
adults: 150% 
FPL  
VHAP eligibility was initially restricted 
to parents up to 150% FPL; eligibility was 
increased up to 185% FPL in 1999.  
Limited for 
childless 
adults; full for 
parents 
Yes 
Wisconsin 1999 BadgerCare 
Parents: 185% 
FPL  
Childless 
adults: Not 
until 2009 
The waiver allowed Wisconsin to enroll 
higher-income parents in Medicaid. 
BadgerCare also covered low-income 
children.  
Full for 
parents; limited 
for childless 
adults  
Yes 
1
5
6
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